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Abstract
This dissertation examines the impact of adverse changes in the personal cost of building
human capital on individuals’ choices with regard to employment and education, as well as
market reactions to that impact. In my first and third chapters, I focus on child care as a
significant cost of employment, examining the effects of reducing that cost via public subsidy
on employment stability for recipient and non-recipient women and wage outcomes for female
workers overall. In my second chapter, I look at high school students’ decisions regarding
postsecondary education, incorporating their possible concerns about adverse events that
could derail their educational progress.
In the first chapter, “Female Unemployment and Statistical Discrimination: The Re-
vealing Effects Child Care Subsidies,” I examine the effects of child care subsidies on female
employment, including potential spillover effects on those without children, which can occur
in the presence of limited information and statistical discrimination. I provide evidence from
the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) that working mothers quit their
jobs less often and childless women in low-wage occupations experience layoffs less frequently
where child care subsidies are more generous. To rationalize these patterns, I develop a labor
search and matching model that incorporates statistical discrimination and a firm cost of
separation from employees. Estimates from the search model allow me to examine counter-
factual scenarios which reveal that changes in discriminatory behavior by firms can generate
an economically significant spillover effect outside a policy’s target population.
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In my second chapter, “Rational Responses to Uncertainty? Understanding Disad-
vantaged Youths’ Educational Choices,” my coauthors (Stefanie DeLuca, Seth Gershenson,
and Nicholas Papageorge) and I investigate a heretofore overlooked reason that youths from
historically disadvantaged backgrounds might underinvest in education: their experiences of
instability. If youths correctly anticipate adverse shocks that will interrupt their educational
pursuits, then avoiding the time commitment associated with obtaining a four-year degree
is a rational decision. We examine this possibility using nationally-representative data sets,
and propose the future collection of more narrowly focused data for the purpose of analyzing
the frequency of such shocks and their effect on educational choices and outcomes. We also
formulate a structural model which both informs the survey design process and will allow us
to predict the effects policies designed to mitigate educational derailment.
I expand on my model of job search in the third chapter, “Involuntary Quits, Bargaining
Power, and the Wage Effects of Labor Market Policy,” to demonstrate that policies which
enhance labor market attachment, provided that they operate through reducing the size
and variability of the costs of employment such as child care, should vary in their wage
effects based on how much bargaining power workers have. If variable costs of employment
are reduced or eliminated, quit rates are lowered, generating additional expected profit but
also reducing reservation wages. How much does worker bargaining power affect which
party obtains the new surplus? I provide evidence that workers whose expected costs of
employment and quit probabilities are reduced by a policy intervention experience little
change in their wages on average, but this masks an interaction between the policy and a
proxy for worker bargaining power, union concentration. Where union membership is very
prevalent, workers are able to reap enough of the resultant surplus that their wages rise, but
with little contextual union strength, wages fall.
Primary Reader: Nicholas Papageorge
Secondary Reader: Robert Moffitt
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Chapter 1
Female Unemployment and Statistical
Discrimination: The Revealing Effects
of Child Care Subsidies
1.1 Introduction
Starting with papers by Mincer and Jovanovic (1981) and Bartel and Borjas (1981), economists
have examined effects of job turnover as reflected in what is known as “mobility.” Mobility is
essentially the tendency of (generally well-educated) workers to move from job to job rapidly,
particularly in the first several years of their careers, in search of the best job. Results show
that mobility accelerates wage growth.
I would like to thank Nicholas W. Papageorge, Robert Moffitt, and Richard Spady for providing guidance
and feedback. I would also like to acknowledge helpful comments from Michael Darden, Stefanie DeLuca,
Susan Dynarski, Christopher Flinn, Kevin Thom, and seminar participants at Davidson College, the U.S.
Census Bureau, and the Southern Economic Association (2018). All errors are my own.
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However, less investigation has been done regarding another common labor turnover
pattern in which less-educated workers in low-wage occupations cycle frequently in and
out of employment, rather than moving directly from job to job, a phenomenon which I
will call “job churn.” Job churn may arise if a worker has a preference for temporary
work arrangements, but could also occur if a worker experiences frequent adverse events
which cause them to be unable to work, such as vehicle breakdowns, illnesses, or family
emergencies. Observationally, rapid moves between employers and frequent voluntary quits
may look like traditional mobility, but in fact they likely contribute to wage stagnation for
low-wage workers (Gladden and Taber, 2002). As Stewart (2007) shows, low-wage work
and repeat unemployment are tied together, seemingly cyclically. The mobility of young,
skilled workers may be a tendency to be encouraged, but the intermittent churning through
low-wage jobs of the less educated, marked by frequent unemployment, may call instead for
a preventative policy approach.
In this paper, I investigate some of the causes and consequences of job churn and a
particular policy that can alter it. I focus on two churn-related patterns: mothers quit
their jobs more frequently than other workers, and firms have less permanent employment
relationships with female workers than with male workers — that is, they contract women to
temporary positions more often and lay them off more readily. I first explore evidence from
the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) that a policy which directly reduces
the rate at which working mothers quit their jobs — a child care subsidy — also reduces the
rate at which childless women find themselves losing temporary positions or being laid off
by their employers.
To understand the latter finding, suppose that firms use gender as a shorthand for
attachment to the labor market. High female quit rates driven by working mothers may
then lead employers to steer female applicants toward jobs which are themselves inherently
less permanent. The SIPP data suggest that the childless women most affected are those who
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“look like” mothers of young children in terms of their age. Thus, job market attachment
generates churn not only directly as a result of household factors like instability in child
care needs, but also as a consequence of statistically discriminatory market responses to
limited information. The SIPP data also demonstrate that churn has detrimental effects on
the careers of workers who experience it, in particular by reducing their access to health
insurance, which is often provided by employers only on the condition that an employee has
been with the company for a specified length of time.
Given these findings, the job search model I formulate characterizes a potential link
between demographic group quit and layoff rates via statistical discrimination. I arrive at
this link by modifying the standard search model in three main ways. First, rather than
treat quit probabilities simply as worker characteristics impacting the productivity of an
employment match, I incorporate these probabilities as governing the frequency of random
events that end employment spells, and allow them to vary across individuals and time.
Second, I allow jobs on the market to differ in expected natural duration, such as when firms
hire seasonal or temporary workers. In the model, this means that some jobs have a higher
probability of ending in a layoff in each period than other jobs. Finally, firms do not have
full information about applicants when hiring for these positions of varying permanence,
knowing only each applicant’s gender rather than a full family structure.
In my case, if a subgroup, like single mothers, has a particularly high probability of
quitting a job, the model suggests this can result in firms steering all female employees toward
shorter-lived jobs. In fact, the model predicts that this steering will have the greatest effect
on the layoff rates of women who are not especially likely to quit, as with childless women
in the SIPP data. Job churn thus increases for female workers who might otherwise not
experience it.
Finally, I reformulate the job search model for estimation and implement it in the
data, using the parameter estimates to perform counterfactual exercises. Results suggest
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that the difference between the absence of child care subsidies altogether and a universal
subsidy maximum of $275 (the largest such value in any state during the relevant period)
reduces monthly quit probabilities by 24 percent among less educated mothers (and a great
deal more for recipients). Further, this reduction in quit rates leads to spillover benefits for
childless women due to the fact that firms fail to differentiate among female workers. The
hourly wages of all low-education women increase by around a dollar,1 while the rate at
which they are let go by employers decreases by around 7 percent. Thus, the model suggests
that policy spillover effects due to discrimination can be economically significant.
This paper contributes mainly to three strains of economic literature, the first of which
concerns statistical discrimination. Discrimination against women based on quit rates can
be conceptually linked to discrimination against black men based on rates of criminality,
which may perversely be increased by modern movements to “ban the box” (Agan and
Starr, 2016; Doleac and Hansen, 2016). Asking female job applicants their expectations
with regard to family obligations is effectively a box which has already been banned, which
this literature shows may engender statistical discrimination. Fang and Moro (2011) provide
a summary of the statistical discrimination literature, which essentially starts with the classic
model of Coate and Loury (1993). Moro (2003) formulates a model in which a labor market
consisting of complex and simple jobs, a noisy worker productivity signal to firms, and a
human capital investment choice lead to depressed wage offers to women. More explicitly
focused on quit rates, Sattinger (1998) models the response of hiring firms to the existence
of distinguishable groups of workers who differ only in their periodic quit probabilities.
However, both papers effectively translate the factor that differentiates male from female
workers, the quit probability, into a noisy difference in productivity levels by gender. This
1The model does not incorporate any potential effect of subsidies on reservation wage, which would clearly
have a significant effect on wage bargaining outcomes in particular. A model which incorporates the direct
cost of work in the form of child care expenses is an important potential extension for accurately capturing
wage effects, which in the data are in fact insignificant. Bargaining power has a potentially large role to play
in this case as well; I address this in another paper.
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assumes away any effect from the specific nature of quits as terminations of employment
relationships, which my model and results suggest can generate imbalances in the expected
durations of jobs actually offered to women with attractive wages.
Furthermore, most of the literature concerning discrimination in the labor market fo-
cuses directly on wage differentials; for instance, Gayle and Golan (2012) show that statistical
discrimination plays a significant role in the wage gap between men and women, and Bowlus
and Grogan (2009) suggest that differing quit rates due to differential responses to family
concerns contribute to this gap. Particularly relevant to this paper, Ransom and Oaxaca
(2010) find that in a chain of retail stores, monopsony power allows a firm to pay female
employees less because the elasticity of their overall quit rates with respect to wages is lower.
The model I employ in this paper incorporates variable quit rates directly into the theoret-
ical job search process, which allows for more nuanced effects on wages and job durations.
In particular, it suggests that wage effects may not always be apparent where statistical
discrimination based on group quit rates is occurring — a result corroborated by the SIPP
data in terms of child care policy effects — and that job permanence in terms of layoff rates
may also be impacted.
This is a conclusion somewhat similar to that of Barron, Black, and Loewenstein (1993),
who show that in a model in which quit rates vary and firms decide how much specific training
a worker receives, those with higher quit rates will be sorted by wage offers into jobs that use
less capital and will receive less training. Using Employment Opportunity Pilot Project data,
the authors suggest that this kind of sorting affects female workers, who get less on-the-job
training. This result can be viewed as a response to the question of the gender pay gap,
much of which is devoted to examining human capital investment of various kinds. Initially,
Mincer (1974) identify women’s plans to leave the labor force (particularly for parenthood)
as a reason they themselves would invest less in their own human capital. However, Gronau
(1988) shows that the causality may well run the other way — firms, anticipating that
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some women are liable to quit their jobs, are reluctant to place them in positions which
require extensive investment in skill improvement over time. For Gronau, this contributes
to poorer wage outcomes for women, who then have less incentive than men to stay in the
labor force upon having children and thus depart, confirming firms’ expectations. In this
paper, I examine another aspect of this dynamic: when female workers persist in seeking
work whether or not they have children, how are they impacted in the range of jobs offered
to them? It is not only their wages which are depressed, but also the expected duration of
employment at any given job. And if employers are reluctant to place women in positions
that require long-term investment and thus let them go more frequently, can policy alleviate
this?
This paper thus also contributes to the literature directly examining the effects of child
care subsidy policy. Blau (2003) provides a thorough review of both the structure of child
care subsidy programs and the economic literature concerning its effects. He finds that
estimated elasticities of labor supply with respect to the price of child care (intended as a
stand-in for the effect of a subsidy) vary widely, but are smaller when the decision to use
paid care is accounted for separately from the labor supply decision. Subsequent research
by Tekin (2007) and Blau and Tekin (2007) suggests that child care subsidies do in fact
bolster employment rates among mothers, even accounting for the decision to take up the
subsidy, with the former paper suggesting a 13 percentage point increase in employment rates
among recipients. But the mechanisms behind this elasticity remain clouded. Do subsidies
simply push some parents across a binary labor supply threshold? Or is there also some
volatility in other child care options — family, school, etc. — to which parents resort while
working which might cause them to work only intermittently in the absence of funding for
formal child care? As evidence of a policy effect similar to the latter scenario, Graves (2013)
examines the effect of a move to year-round schooling with breaks every three weeks on the
labor supply of mothers of school-age children in the school district. She finds a negative
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response, suggesting that some mothers were reliant on the steady child care schools provided
during the traditional school year in order to work. In this paper I build on these results by
providing evidence that subsidies for formal child care alleviate the volatility of child care
arrangements for parents at low-wage jobs, while also acknowledging that the effects of child
care subsidies may include spill-over to non-recipient female workers.
A paper closely related to this paper and both of the above literatures is that by
Lin and Tanaka (2016). The authors look into the effects of child care availability on the
hiring of young women in Japan, utilizing a signalling model in which workers can select
different job training tracks that lend themselves to short- or long-term jobs. The authors
find evidence of statistical discrimination using regional child care availability and group
averages of labor force attachment as well as survey answers about individual quit intentions.
However, in order to generate a separating equilibrium their model relies on the ability of
workers to propose delayed-payment contracts, which in the U.S. low-wage context are not
likely to be viable. The results presented by Lin and Tanaka (2016) focus on the effects of
switching between separating and pooling equilibria on total hiring and typical wages, while
the full search model implemented in this paper permits exploration of further effects such
as individual job duration and sorting.2
Finally, the theoretical model in this paper links it to the literature developing models
of labor search, with its roots in Mortensen (1977) and Burdett (1978). Search models
which generate worker quits typically do so via on-the-job search resembling the “mobility”
discussed above, by which an employee may leave one firm for another, better-paying one
within an employment spell; this approach is also generally taken with a macro perspective
2Lin and Tanaka (2016) use a calibrated version of their model to conclude that child care subsidies are
detrimental even for potential recipients because, in order to maintain the separating equilibrium as subsidies
make it easier for mothers to work, firms must enforce greater and greater payment delays on women who are
not likely to leave. Only once a pooling equilibrium is reached do subsidies benefit workers. Labor markets
in which ensuring these kinds of delayed payments is difficult for firms might reasonably be expected to show
the latter effect.
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toward overall quit rates (Pissarides, 1994; Gautier, Teulings, and Vuuren, 2010), rather
than an interest in the impact of quits on individuals’ labor market trajectories. As noted,
however, in the low-wage markets in which U.S. child care policy has its largest effect, this
kind of job churn is not the most common sort. Neither, intuitively, are job-to-job moves
the kinds of quits that child care subsidies avert most effectively. The model in this paper
contributes by allowing for variability in the probability a worker will quit due to the value
of non-employment, as broadly suggested by Flinn and Heckman (1982), as well as effects
of this variability on outcomes in the Nash bargaining framework examined closely by Flinn
(2003).
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. I describe the SIPP data used in this
paper in Section 3.3, and in Section 3.4 provide evidence therefrom of the detrimental effects
of inconsistent employment histories, as well as the nuanced effects of child care subsidies
on the job churn rates of women. In Section 3.2 I provide a theoretical model of job search
which has the ability to characterize the salient patterns. I estimate a version of the model,
noting identification issues, and report the results in Section 1.4. In Section 1.4.3 I complete
the counterfactual exercises. Section 3.5 concludes.
1.2 Data
In this section I describe the data set used in this paper, as well as the construction of key
variables and summary statistics. I then provide linear regression and hazard rate model
analysis establishing the patterns for which the model in Section 3.2 accounts.
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1.2.1 Survey of Income and Program Participation
I employ data from the 2001 and 2004 panels of the Survey of Income and Program Partici-
pation (SIPP). I restrict the working sample to individuals who at all points in the sample
are between the ages of 25 and 55 in order to reduce the impact of retirement on the older
end and of individuals who alternate between temporary work and school on the younger
end. Individuals who report significant self-employment income in any period are removed
as well,3 along with individuals who ever fail to provide interview responses in a particular
wave.4
SIPP respondents are surveyed in four monthly rotations, each rotation representing
approximately one quarter of the sample. During a “wave,” respondents provide answers
to each survey question for each of the previous four months.5 In practice, interviewees
frequently give the same answer for all four months in question at each survey, so that
there is a tendency for changes in activity patterns — such as employment spells — to be
clustered at the interview month, an issue known as “seam bias.” This likely decreases
the measurable presence of employment status transitions because brief transitional periods
which occur between interviews may be lost. In fact, a majority of individuals in the sample
who quit their jobs for personal reasons (specifically not for another job) or are fired have
a job immediately in the following month of data. Intuitively, this would suggest that my
results with regard to the impact of policy on churn are conservative, because repeated
3Employment statuses are inconsistently reported in the SIPP alongside self-generated income. This
creates an issue for recording and measuring employment spell durations. Removing such individuals results
in a reduction of the sample size of less than 5 percent.
4Non-interview waves in the SIPP are filled in with imputed data, which generates a relatively large
number potentially spurious employment status transitions. Eliminating these respondents reduces the
sample size by 13 percent.
5More specifically, if the panel begins in January, rotation 1 is interviewed in January and answers
questions concerning employment status, public assistance usage, etc. for October, November, December,
and January, or “wave 1.” The respondents in rotation 1 are not interviewed again until May, in which they
provide information for the intervening months constituting wave 2. Rotation 2 starts similarly in February
by providing answers back to November, and the full sample is has supplied its wave 1 responses by the end
of April.
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brief stints in unemployment are more common among the low-wage workers for whom child
care policy is most relevant. On the other hand, if child care subsidies do not eliminate
unemployment spells but merely make them short enough to disappear between waves, the
bias would run in the opposite direction. At first glance, it seems reasonable to guess that
the former source of bias would be greater.
There are multiple ways to handle seam bias; for instance, much of the SIPP literature
focuses on the last month in each wave as the only possible transition point. Ham, Li, and
Shore-Sheppard (2016) devise a method for estimating the likelihood that an end-of-wave
transition actually occurred during the other months in the wave, and analyze the effects of
welfare policies on employment status spell durations. I attempt to alleviate the seam bias
issue by instead using the work start and end dates available in the SIPP data. It is possible
to adjust or impute many employment records to correct for some of the missing transitions.
Since my concern is not durations per se but rather the incidence of events like quits and
layoffs, capturing as many actual transitions as possible is the main goal of this correction.
1.2.2 Key Variables
In this section I define the most important variables in my analysis — job churn rates,
different types of job separation events and churn, and occupational groupings — and provide
a discussion of the focal policy variable, child care subsidy values.
Job Churn and Subtypes. The outcome variable I use most frequently is what I will
call a respondent’s “churn rate.” The base rate of churn for an individual in a given period
(month) is essentially the percent of preceding periods in which the individual experienced
a job separation — that is, a transition from employed status to nonemployed status. Such
events are tabulated as they occur in the survey; work histories in the SIPP are insufficient to
examine individuals’ employment volatility prior to their appearance in the data. Formally,
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where t is the current in-panel period and the siτ are periodic indicators of whether a job
separation event occurred in the given month τ . This expression is similar to the construction
of the measure of job mobility used by Munasinghe and Sigman (2004). An increase of one
unit in this measure represents a one percentage point increase in the monthly job separation
“rate” of a worker.6 Because these rates are the objects of interest, the high frequency with
which SIPP responses are gathered is one significant advantage of this data set.
Another key feature is the SIPP question concerning the cause of respondents’ depar-
tures from employers. Respondents have fifteen options, but these can be categorized in
more parsimonious ways. The categories I use admit four general types of events:
↪→ Firing churn: firings for cause
↪→ Layoff churn: layoffs, employer closure or sale, and the ends of temporary work ar-
rangements
↪→ Match Quit churn: quits due to working conditions and departures for a new job
↪→ Life Quit churn: illnesses and injuries, departures for familial obligations or school
or retirement7, and voluntary quits for “other” reasons, which can be shown to be
correlated with familial events like the birth of children
Below, I occasionally refer to the first two types as “demand-side” events or churn, and
the last two as “supply-side.” In addition, over 40 percent of transitions from employed to
6Because this calculation could result in large jumps in the rate during the first few months of a respon-
dent’s time in the panel, I run the basic churn rate regressions described in this section on a subsample
excluding the first wave (four months) for each individual. This does not alter the patterns captured in the
results.
7Retirement and departures for school are quite rare due to age restrictions placed on the sample.
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not-employed in the data are not accompanied by information regarding the cause of the
transition. These events are collected under the category “Unknown.” The contributions of
this category to overall employment status churn are somewhat erratic, but the category is
occasionally included for completeness. Rates of these different types of churn are calculated
similarly to the overall rate.
Occupational Groups. Finally, I control for occupation throughout this paper using a
simplified structure which includes four job categories constructed so that the educational
requirements and wage outcomes of their constituent occupations, as evidenced by the SIPP
data, are relatively similar: high-end, mid-tier, and low-end services, and manual work. High-
end services include management, STEM occupations, and sales of financial services and large
durables like homes and vehicles (i.e., non-retail items). Mid-tier services covers personal
and health services and clerical work. Low-end services include hospitality, food service,
and retail, while manual occupations include trades like construction and manufacturing
as well as mechanics and transportation. Their basic purpose is the reduction of the state
space for structural estimation. However, when I use them in place of much more detailed
occupational categories (a set of 18 dummies based on occupational codes provided by the
SIPP) in the regressions I perform below, these parsimonious groupings suffice to control for
any relevant occupational effects and reverting to the larger set of controls does not alter my
results.
Child Care Subsidies
The key policy variable in this paper is the child care subsidy. In the U.S., public child care
assistance is provided by the states using block grant funds under the federal Child Care
and Development Fund (CCDF). Created in 1996 by the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), the CCDF represented the consolidation of
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multiple disparate child care assistance programs into funding block granted to states with
relatively loose restrictions on the rules states employ in disbursing the funds. For instance,
the federal maximum eligibility threshold for a child care subsidy is 85 percent of state
median income, but most states set the threshold lower, with states providing subsidies only
to parents making less than 50 percent of state median income in about one-fifth of state-year
observations between 2000 and 2007. States also have a great deal of flexibility regarding
any fees as well as the maximum available size of the subsidy, which is the feature of state
subsidy policy on which I focus in this paper.
It is worth noting that, shortly after the CCDF was created, it was estimated that child
care subsidies covered approximately 12-15 percent of the children who were in fact eligible
for care (Administration for Children and Families, 2000). In the SIPP data, I construct
an eligibility indicator using state eligibility criteria, the relevant state median income, and
individuals’ household income and parental status. Respondents disclose whether they have
received government subsidies for child care in each month of the panel. In comparing the
latter to the former, I too find that around 12 percent of eligible female workers receive
subsidies. However, this is not solely, or even mostly, an issue of takeup — many states
maintained waitlists for families who are eligible and have applied for child care subsidies
but cannot be funded under the CCDF grant budgets.
This fact prompts the question: what generates differences in subsidy policy both across
states and within states over time? Could variations in the block grant value available to
each state be driving these differences? As I employ models both with and without state
fixed effects below, both kinds of variation are of interest. The legislation which created
the CCDF, the Child Care and Development Block Grant Act, stipulates8 that each state
receive a grant amount based on the following calculation:
8United States Congress (1990)
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1. Calculate the fraction of all U.S. children under 5 years of age residing in the state;
2. Calculate the fraction of all U.S. schoolchildren receiving free or reduced-price lunch
attending school in the state;
3. Take the average of the above two values;
4. Multiply this average by the ratio of state per capita income to U.S. per capita income;
5. Supply the resulting percentage of the federal block grant value to the state.
Thus, barring dramatic changes in the young or reduced-price lunch populations across states
or in incomes in the state relative to the rest of the country, grant values to different states
and ratios across states ought to be relatively consistent over time, and are intended to
reflect the anticipated need for child care subsidies in each state. Moreover, the total block
grant amount supplied by the federal government remained at $5 billion in 2006, an amount
identical to that appropriated for the CCDF at its inception. Variations in subsidy features,
including weekly maxima, across states and within states over time are thus likely to be
the result of political changes at the state level rather than a response to funding changes.
Throughout this paper, I assume that whatever generates this variation, it is exogenous to
the economic outcomes of state residents conditional on year (and, in the regression case,
state) fixed effects, controls for other state-level labor market policies such as minimum
wages, occupation controls, and demographics.
For simplicity, I use the maximum subsidy payout per week to reflect each state’s
generosity with regard to subsidies.9 I extract child care assistance payment maxima for
state-year pairs from biannual reports produced by the National Child Care Information
Center of state plans for their use of Child Care and Development Fund dollars. Because these
9Variables reflecting individuals’ eligibility as well as state-level income limits on eligibility were included
in the estimation of many of the models in Section 3.4, but were generally estimated to have little effect on
churn and are thus excluded from the analysis here.
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plans were submitted biannually, states’ child care subsidy maxima are set at constant values
for two-year periods. Figure 9 shows the trajectories of child care subsidy policy by state
over the eight-year course of the two SIPP panels. It demonstrates that there is meaningful
variation in maximum subsidy levels both among states in each year and within many states
over time.10 For use in reduced-form estimation, I standardize the subsidy maximum variable
so that coefficients represent the effect of a one-standard-deviation increase in the maximum
subsidy value. Three other policy variables are retained in the set of regressors in Section 3.4:
a state minimum wage variable, a variable recording the contemporaneous state maximum on
weekly unemployment insurance (UI) payouts to out-of-work individuals, and one reflecting
the generosity of workers’ compensation in the given state and year. These are intended
to reflect the labor market policy environment prevailing in each state in each year. In the
churn rate regressions, I also incorporate state-of-residence dummies.11
1.2.3 Summary Statistics
Summary statistics for the working sample are found in Table 1, which shows means of many
basic control variables for the full analytic sample of individuals as well as some important
subgroups. Those with lower educational attainment are less likely to be married, but have
more children in addition to displaying higher overall churn rates. Women are seldom in the
layoff-prone manual occupations, but are still laid off at similar rates to men.
Overall, easily the most common types of churn are layoffs and quits due to circum-
stances beyond the employment relationship. Groups that display greater overall job churn
tend to be less educated, and to experience more “exterior” events like layoffs and family
10In results not included in this paper, I reestimate the most basic models in Section 3.4 with each state
in turn removed from the sample to ensure no single state dictated the size and significance of the estimates.
Results are similar in every round.
11When I apply duration models below, I instead use four regional dummies. The 48 state indicators
— a handful of small states are grouped together in the data — present too large a parameter set for the
binary-outcome hazard rate specification.
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issues. There are many features of this sort of churn that distinguish it from that expe-
rienced by the more-educated — the types of separation events and modal occupations of
those who are “upwardly mobile” are quite different from those of workers who “churn.” One
pattern not apparent in Table 1 is the fact that while their overall rates of churn are lower,
workers in more advantaged groups, like those with greater education, report significantly
more departures for new jobs: over 16 percent of all recorded job separation events and 8
percent of transit-to-nonemployment events among the college educated are departures for
a specific new job, while these percentages are under 10 and 5 for those with only a high
school diploma, and the college educated are also more likely to leave a job without entering
a recorded nonemployment spell. Educated individuals thus appear to engage in more on-
the-job search and job-to-job transitions, even when this results in (generally short) periods
of unemployment.
Table 2 reports statistics as of exit from the panel by number of employment separation
events recorded. As in-panel separations increase, subsamples become less white, less fre-
quently married, less educated (although some-college attainers are over-represented at high
churn counts), younger, somewhat more likely to work in manual occupations, and nearly
twice as likely to work in the low-end services. Departures from employment for familial
reasons are relatively common amongst those with just one separation event, but don’t recur
at the same rate as other types of separation amongst those with multiple such events. This
reflects their greater tendency to be permanent or semi-permanent changes in labor supply
at significant family events like births.
Low-wage service occupations like retail sales and hospitality generate high levels of job
churn as demonstrated by Table 2, but also contain a high concentration of workers of the
type most likely to access child care subsidies. Female workers with a high school diploma or
less appear frequently in the mid-tier and low-end services, with these occupational groups
totaling over 60 percent of this subsample of the labor force. That churn and low wages
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are strongly associated among working women suggests that churn is not a particularly
advantageous pattern for them, but indicates a potentially strong role for labor market
attachment policy aimed at this group, such as child care subsidization.
1.2.4 Preliminary Data Analysis
In this section, I establish key findings from the SIPP data bearing on the relationships
among child care subsidies, quit rates, layoff rates, and gender. For each set of estimates, I
use all person-month observations in the working sample. For this reason, I cluster standard
errors at the individual level.12
The findings include: (1) job churn has a negative effect on worker outcomes; (2)
women with identical measurable productivity characteristics are laid off more readily than
men; (3) more generous child care subsidy policies are related to a reduction in these higher
layoff frequencies among childless women as well as reduced rates of voluntary quits by both
mothers and (to a lesser degree) childless women; (4) the reduction in layoffs does not appear
to be related to large shifts in the composition of the labor force and is strongest among the
subgroups predicted by the statistical discrimination model, namely young women without
children; and (5) the reduction in mothers’ quits is the result of actual subsidy receipt.
Job churn has negative consequences. It is important to differentiate between churn
and traditional job mobility because the former has detrimental effects which it might be
desirable to limit with policy. Table 3 demonstrates that job churn generated by either
demand- or supply-side separation events is associated with poor results for workers across
an array of outcomes. In particular, estimates from OLS regressions reported in the first
and second panels show deleterious associations between churn rates and subsequent wage
levels, access to health insurance while employed, health, food adequacy, home ownership,
12The basic results are robust to the alternative use of an individual random effects model.
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home values given ownership, and welfare recipiency. Because there are concerns about
endogeneity with regard to each of these outcomes, I use state-year child care subsidy policy
(along with worker’s comp generosity) as instruments for overall churn rates to produce the
results in the third panel. Sample sizes sufficient for this exercise only exist with respect to
wages and health coverage, since the other outcome variables are based on responses to SIPP
topical modules, asked only in specific waves during the panel. F-test values imply that, for
these outcomes, these policy structures are decent instruments for churn. Churn rates have
a statistically significant negative effect on subsequent wages and, even given employment,
health insurance coverage. This makes sense, since most employer-provided health insurance
comes with requirements as to the length of the employment relationship, and workers with
high churn rates will often just be starting new jobs.
Women experience layoffs at a higher rate. Churn rate regression results (Table 4)13
suggest that women of the same race, age, education, occupation, marital and disability sta-
tus, and state or region are more likely to experience layoffs than men. This effect seems to
be largest for the least educated. Note that controlling for occupation is important, because
layoffs are an integral part of working in the trades occupations, which are overwhelmingly
male. Raw rates of layoff are a bit higher amongst men for this reason. However, the main
concern here is not so much overall layoff rates as it is whether any given employer will be
more likely to lay off, or place in temporary positions, a particular kind of worker.14 This
13In results available on request, I replicate these results using a duration model, with the layoff hazard
rate the object of interest. Duration or hazard models treat spells of employment or nonemployment as units
in which in each period there is some probability or “hazard rate” of experiencing the end of that spell, and
constituent hazard rates of experiencing specific spell-ending events like firings, layoffs, or quits. The effects
of covariates, including spell duration itself, on these hazards can be estimated under certain conditions and
assumptions. The foundations of the duration model approach and its connection with structural models
of employment decisions like that specified in Section 3.2 are developed by Flinn and Heckman (1982), and
van den Berg (2001) provides a thorough summary of the theory and usage of duration models.
14In addition, Fujita and Moscarini (2017) demonstrate that recall from unemployment to the employer by
whom a worker was laid off is common, and has a significant influence on rates of separation and movement to
new jobs. Recall is particularly prevalent in the manual occupations, indicating that male workers’ experience
of “layoffs” or temporary work is likely different from that of female workers in other occupations. Men in
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within-firm process is where statistical discrimination becomes relevant and quit probabili-
ties, and thereby child care policy, can have a spillover effect on other forms of job churn.
Next, I demonstrate that the data reflect just such a spillover.
Child care policy reduces multiple types of job separation rates. Table 5 demon-
strates that child care subsidy rates reduce the overall rate of job separation, and that the
majority of this effect can be attributed to a corresponding reduction in supply-side sepa-
ration events, which is precisely what would be expected — child care subsidies reduce the
need for parents to adjust their labor supply in response to child care issues. It is easy to
explain the reduction in match-related quits, because a large proportion of these are vol-
untary quits due to “unsatisfactory work arrangements,” in particular hours. The second
panel of Table 515 reveals that, among those with children, this specific kind of churn reduc-
tion is strongest for women as well as those who work in the low-end service occupations,
restaurant service, hospitality, and retail. In these occupations, while part-time hours are
common, so are inconsistent but inflexible scheduling schemes. An employee who can han-
dle this absent family issues may find it difficult to adjust adequately when an inconsistent
or impermanent child care arrangement, like a family member or an after-school program,
falls through or ends. A worker who quits in this environment may claim to have done so
due to an unsatisfactory work arrangement. The rate of job separations due to personal
concerns drops as well, though the estimated decrease is more imprecisely estimated and is
not statistically significant at conventional levels (p-value=.22). Overall, though, increased
child care subsidy maxima are estimated to significantly reduce quits, particularly for the
expected demographic groups, mothers in low-wage work.
nonemployment spells likely experience reemployment more rapidly and are more likely to maintain the
employment relationships key to health coverage and wage growth as discussed previously.
15In the lower panels of the table, I have run the same churn rate regression for subsamples by gender,
occupation, and education, but have included only the significant results for the coefficient on child care
subsidies in the table.
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The third panel of Table 5 displays the effects of increased child care subsidy maxima
on job separation rates among respondents who in the given month have no children in their
households, in the full sample as well as in a subsample including only those with no more
than a high school education. The overall churn-reducing effect of the child care subsidy
maximum is around three-quarters the size of the similarly-estimated effect among parents
and is nearly statistically significant (p-value=.16).16 This is curious, since intuitively a
subsidy ought not have any effect on those who cannot access it. Moreover, as the table
breaks the effect down by demographic and other characteristics, it reveals a relatively
dramatic, statistically significant drop in layoffs amongst low-educated workers and those in
the low-end service occupations. In particular, female workers drive this result. Therefore,
workers with similar characteristics to those whose quit rates are reduced by policy, namely
women in low-income (and thus subsidy-qualifying) jobs who resemble mothers of young
children, experience a reduction in demand-side separations.
What might explain such a result?
Statistical discrimination is a reasonable explanation for layoff rate reductions.
There are a few reasons why a relationship between child care policy and the labor market
experience of childless women might appear in estimation. The first and simplest is that
child care subsidization is correlated with some omitted variable also associated with lay-
offs. In churn rate regressions, I include state and year dummies and other policy variables
(unemployment insurance maxima, minimum wages, and worker’s compensation generosity)
characterizing the general “political stance” toward labor in each state in an attempt to
mitigate this potential issue. One other concern is that child care subsidy policy may affect
the composition of female labor supply so significantly that childless women are pushed into
16The analogous estimated effect in a duration model is negative and statistically significant, though the
exclusion of state dummies from this specification generates concerns for validity — particularly in the case
of layoffs, where this effect is concentrated, because the occupational distribution among states is strongly
related to layoff rates and may be correlated with policy. Duration model results are thus not reported here.
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new positions or out of the labor force entirely, which could of course result in fewer layoffs.
I make a few adjustments to the specification to dispel this concern. In the last panel of
Table 5, all individuals who never work at any time during their participation in the survey
are removed from the estimation sample. The clearly similar results demonstrate that the
effect is not due to childless women who are pushed out of the labor force by the beginning
of the second SIPP cohort by policy enacted during the first, or by policy differences across
states.
If labor force composition effects are not to be credited with the reduction in layoffs
among childless women, statistical discrimination seems like a good candidate. One way
to assess its feasibility is to further divide the sample of low-education women into those
who “look most like” mothers with greater volatility in their home lives and thus higher
quit rates. One characteristic this suggests most strongly is relative youth — firms, knowing
nothing other than gender and age, might reasonably be less likely to view women beyond
the ages at which mothers are typically caring for young children as frequent quitters with
unstable home lives. I therefore split the less-educated female sample at the age of 40 (that
is, any individual who is never older than 40 in the sample is below the cutoff) in order to
assess the differences in subsidy effects by age, with particular attention to layoffs among
the childless.
Table 6 shows that among low-educated women — the group in which the effect is
concentrated — the layoff reduction effect of child care subsidization is in fact much larger
for women under 40, and is insignificant among those who ever reach 40 or beyond in-sample.
Thus, there is suggestive evidence that the oldest women in the sample reap less benefit in
the way of layoff reduction than do women at ages which employers might more frequently
associate with the presence of young children. This finding bolsters the case that changing
the quit rates of young mothers alters a landscape of statistical discrimination against other
young women.
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Subsidy receipt drives the reduction in mothers’ quits. It is not necessarily clear
from the above results, which do not focus on actual subsidy receipt, that the estimated
supply-side effects are due to altered labor market behavior on the part of those workers who
actually receive subsidies. The specifications utilized above permit examination of effects
on other workers, but do not necessarily establish a link between the policy itself and the
measured outcomes. To remedy this in the case of recipients, I include in the specification
reported in Table 7 a dummy indicating receipt of a subsidy for child care during the panel,
and interact it with the state subsidy maximum value. Receipt is of course endogenous,
but the question being asked here is merely whether the estimated effect of increases in the
value of subsidies on labor supply can reasonably be credited to the actual disbursement of
subsidies. The results in Table 7 suggest that this is so. The meaningful reduction in quits for
family reasons when subsidies are larger is entirely due to a large and statistically significant
reduction in such quits among those who report receiving a subsidy during the panel. The
reduction in unsatisfied quits is also of much greater magnitude for subsidy recipients. This is
unsurprisingly especially true for mothers.17 These findings strongly suggest that, whatever
is the process that determines whether a parent applies for and receives a subsidy, subsidy
receipt is directly linked to reductions in mothers’ quit rates.
In Section 3.2 I will demonstrate that a model of statistical discrimination predicts
that quits among childless women could also be reduced by generous child care subsidies
as a consequence of improved wage outcomes for all women, so the finding of a statistically
significant reduction in match-related quits for subsidy non-recipients is no surprise. Finally,
the fact that subsidy receipt is so clearly linked to the reduction in quits among mothers
17One related concern may be that it is not volatility associated with raising young children generating
these separations, but birth events. In results available on request, I include interactions of subsidy maxima
with an indicator for an in-spell birth and the age of the youngest child in the household and its square. The
first specification shows no significant effect unique to mothers who give birth during an employment spell
— which is unsurprising, given that the cost of child care may not be the most important factor dictating
the departure of a new parent from a job. The second specification suggests that the quit-reducing effects
of child care subsidies max out at a child age of around six years, rather than in infancy.
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might favorably be interpreted as evidence that the other significant effects found in the
presence of more generous child care subsidies — specifically reductions in layoffs — could
be credited to the impact of such policy as well.
1.3 Model
In this section, I formulate a model of job search and matching which accounts explicitly for
the impact of demographic group quit rates on various outcomes. The agents in the model
are workers who, when not employed, search for jobs with two characteristics: a probability
that in each period the job will end in a layoff, and a wage offer bargained based on the
productivity of the job and the applicant (and other parameters).
Job search models provide a straightforward way to examine how labor market out-
comes depend on quit probabilities, since the latter enter workers’ and firms’ valuation of
employment relationships directly as the probability that those relationships will be termi-
nated, an outcome both parties want to avoid. Moreover, the model nests a wage bargaining
structure in which wages can be allowed to respond to quit and layoff rates jointly, linking
the two outcomes; as I explain in this section, firms with layoff-prone jobs will care less
about applicants’ propensity to quit, and therefore not punish potential quitters in wage
negotiations as much as firms with high-duration job openings. High-turnover jobs thus
attract high-turnover workers, and vice versa. Since this is a story about the matching of a
particular kind of employer to a particular kind of employee, a search and matching model
is well-suited to the task of assessing it.
In order to explain the empirical patterns in Section 3.4 as a consequence of statistical
discrimination, I make three important adjustments to the essential search and matching
framework. First, I incorporate individually variable quit probabilities in the model. The
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probability of a costly quit ending an employment relationship is allowed to vary by demo-
graphic characteristics including gender and the presence of children as well as the wage,
and this probability impacts how workers and firms value employment contracts because it
represents the threat that the contracts will end. This stands in contrast to a typical model
of statistical discrimination on quit rates, in which a higher quit probability reduces the
productivity of a match.
Second, I allow jobs on the market to differ in their natural periodic layoff probability,
denoted φ. As noted above, firms will adjust their wage offers based on quit probabilities,
which will have the effect of pushing workers likely to quit towards jobs likely to end quickly
in a layoff anyway. Workers perceived as quit-prone will thus experience more frequent
layoffs, as in the results in Section 3.4.
Finally, I assume that firms cannot know a given worker’s true quit probability at the
time of a job match. Specifically, firms can see workers’ gender, but not their familial struc-
ture. They therefore project quit probabilities based on this limited knowledge. This, plus
the fact that quits negatively impact firms’ bottom lines, leads to statistical discrimination
in the hiring process against those in the gender group — women — that includes the most
quit-prone workers — mothers of young children.
In combination, these features of the model allow changes in mothers’ quit probabilities
to influence the layoff-proneness of the jobs to which wage offers push all female workers.
In fact, as I discuss in Section 1.3.2, the model predicts that the change in layoff rates, like
those measured as outcomes in Section 3.4, will be most significant for those women who
are unlikely to quit before a layoff occurs — specifically childless women, as in the foregoing
empirical results. The model specified in this section thus serves to theoretically examine
the findings in Section 3.4, as well as to lay the foundation for a slightly simplified version
to be estimated in Section 1.4.
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1.3.1 Search Model Specification
The model is based on the classic search and matching framework18 in which potential
workers in the nonemployed state are matched with employers in continuous time at a given
rate, denoted λθ. Once a match occurs, a match-specific productivity level θ is revealed. The
match wage offer is determined via a Nash bargaining process in which the bargaining power
parameter α determines how much of the match surplus, the difference between θ and the
worker’s reservation wage, is recovered by the worker. Given this offer, the worker decides
whether to accept and enter the employed state or to remain in the nonemployed state and
continue searching. In the canonical model, there is usually a constant rate of exit from
employment called the “job destruction rate,” here φ, which I will instead call the “layoff
probability.” It is at this rate that employees exogenously return to the nonemployed state.
There is no on-the-job search.
Let the distribution of θ be denoted G (θ), and for the time being assume that this
distribution is the same across worker subgroups j ∈ J . A worker’s subgroup j is invisible
to the firm, though they are nested by gender, which is known. In the employment state,
individual i pays a flow utility cost cit. New employment disutility levels are drawn at
frequency λc from a distribution Fj (c) which depends on the group identity of the individual
and has support C = [c,∞), and the cost remains at the drawn value until a new draw is
taken. Fluctuations in cit explain quit behavior because if a high employment cost value
is drawn, the present discounted value (PDV) of employment to the worker decreases, and
may decrease enough to alter the worker’s decision with regard to their current employment
arrangement.19
18A thorough exploration of the basic search model can be found in Chapter 3 of Flinn (2010).
19Bontemps, Robin, and den Berg (1999) allow for a distribution of opportunity cost across workers, but
not within-individual changes. On the other hand, Bowlus and Grogan (2009) formulate a model with
a gender-specific rate of at-home events which cause quits, but do not link this with other types of job
separation or to policy variables within the model or differentiate among subgroups, which I do so as to
examine statistical discrimination specifically.
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When a new draw of cit induces a quit by a worker or an exogenous demand-side
separation occurs (at rate φ), firms pay a cost cqφ. The subscript φ indicates an allowance
for differences in separation costs across jobs based on the expected duration of the job (the
inverse of the job-specific exogenous layoff rate). In the model, separation costs are supposed
to be larger for long-lived (small-φ) jobs like management and professional positions than
for short-lived positions like those on the front-lines of the low-wage service industries. This
assumption is strongly supported by the range of cost values found in the management
literature, as well as intuition. Large retail and hospitality employers maintain a constant
pool of applicants to entry-level jobs, perform relatively little vetting in the hiring process,
and in fact often outsource the process entirely to temporary employment agencies. As will
become clear in the estimation exposition in Section 1.4.1, this is an important channel via
which quit and layoff rates become associated: because firms with short-lived jobs incur
much smaller costs when workers separate from them, they care less about the prospect
that a worker will quit. This means they differentiate their wage offers less in response to
perceived applicant quit rates.
While it is intuitively clear that these costs exist and follow such a pattern, estimates of
how substantial they are have been mostly the domain of management literature, particularly
that dealing with the health care industry, and reliant on surveys of front-line managers.20
In Section 1.4, I estimate the cost of separations to firms based on differences in wage offers
accepted by workers with different expected quit rates, holding other characteristics constant.
Since firm separation costs are not the focus of this paper, this estimation method is allowed
to be somewhat crude, but the estimated values are well within the general range of estimates
described in the management literature.
As I demonstrate in this section, the intensity of firms’ incentive to alter wage offers
20See Waldman et al. (2004); Hinkin and Tracey (2000); Davidson, Timo, and Wang (2010); McKinney,
Bartlett, and Mulvaney (2007) for estimates of separation costs in the hospitality and medical industries
ranging from around $2,000 to tens of thousands of dollars, depending on occupation.
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in the face of the potential cost of a quit will depend in part on the expected duration of
the job as captured by the demand-side termination rate, not only because of the costs that
differ due to the above assumption, but also because firms with short-term jobs expect to
pay separation costs with a high frequency regardless of quit rates. The job-specific rate
of demand-side separation, φ, is drawn from an exogenously given distribution H (φ) at the
time of a labor market match, and is known to both the firm and the individual. It may
be helpful to think of firms as having vacancies at many points on H (φ) and formulating
hiring rules based on the layoff rate imposed on each job, in which case some workers may
be favored for long-lasting positions over others based on relevant characteristics. I assume
that while the distributions G, H, and Fj are known to all parties, cit and j (beyond gender)
are private information not communicable to firms.
Worker State Valuations. After rearranging terms in a Bellman equation expression,
the value of the nonemployment state can be expressed as
V Nj (cit) =
(














dH (φ) dG (θ) + λc
∫ ∞
c
V Nj (c) dFj (c)
)
, (1.1)
where Θ is the support of θ, Φ is the support of φ, and individuals and firms discount
the future at shared rate (1 + ρ)−1. Thus, the unemployed searcher’s value is generated
by the sum of the expected payoff from a job match across the distributions of θ and φ
and the expected change in the value of the nonemployment state given a new draw of
c. New disutility draws alter V Nj because they affect the expected value of any future job
matches. Because c constitutes a flow disutility of the employment state, a flow utility of
the nonemployment state would not be separately identifiable and is omitted.
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If the flow utility of employment at a particular match is equal to the wage wj (θ, φ)
upon which a firm will agree with a group-j applicant via Nash bargaining given θ and φ,
then the value of the employment state can be similarly expressed as





wj (θ, φ)− cit + λc
[∫ c∗
−c
V Ej (θ, φ, c) dFj (c) +
∫ ∞
c∗
V Nj (c) dFj (c)
])
, (1.2)
where c∗ (θ, φ; j) is a “critical disutility value” generated by the prescribed wage-layoff rate
pair, specifically that cost draw value above which the worker will quit a job at that wage
and return to the nonemployment state. While employed, the worker earns the wage wj and
pays the cost of employment cit, but also anticipates new draws from Fj which will either
alter the continuation value of the employed state if below c∗ or cause a return to V Nj if
above.
Firm Valuation of Employment Relationship. The next piece of the model is an ex-
pression of the firm’s value of an employment relationship. Define for each group j a function
F ∗j (θ, φ) to be equal to the cumulative distribution function (CDF) value of c
∗ (θ, φ; j) on
Fj — the proportion of the possible cost draws at which the worker will take or stay at such
a job. Then
(
1− F ∗j (θ, φ)
)
is the probability that any given employment disutility draw
will result in a worker in group j quitting the job defined by (θ, φ). The value of a group j
worker to a firm in a match defined by (θ, φ) is therefore:




1− F ∗j (θ, φ)
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θ − wj (θ, φ)− λc
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Wages Under Incomplete Information: Statistical Discrimination. In a typical
search specification, job applicants’ valuation of the employment state given the wage level
is known to all parties. In this case, however, this valuation depends on a random variable
cit and its distribution, known only to the applicant. Applicants can bargain based only on
the features of their valuations of employment and nonemployment known to firms, which
with respect to cit is only gender. Thus, in bargaining, firms negotiate only against the
expected value of employment and nonemployment to a worker of known gender, and select
a wage based on (θ, φ) so that the mean individual expected to accept that offer would in
fact negotiate to that wage. If an upper bar indicates an expected value from the firm’s
perspective (and abusing notation by continuing with j subscripts though firms only see the
broader gender groups), the Nash bargaining wage function is expressed
wj (θ, φ) = arg max
w
{(
V Ej (θ, φ)− V Nj
)α (
V Fj (θ, φ, w)
)1−α}
. (1.4)
Given this function, it can be shown that the wage for a group j worker in a match defined
by (θ, φ) is





























where c is firms’ expected disutility value for workers who will accept the wage offer.
If quit rates were constant with respect to the wage, the derivatives of the value func-
tions for the employee and the firm would be equal to one and negative one respectively,
and the complex quit probability expression could be replaced by a constant, say λq. In this
case this expression would reduce to something resembling the familiar bargaining result:




. However, in the present case, an increase in the wage does
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not only transfer instantaneous flow value from the firm to the worker; a wage increase also
reduces the probability that a future cost draw will induce a quit, increasing the expected
duration of the match and conferring some additional value on both parties. Firms therefore
have some incentive to offer a wage that is higher than would otherwise be optimal in order
to keep quit-prone workers on the job.
Note that if firms expect too high an Fj (c), they may not make an offer where it
would in fact be mutually beneficial; if their expectation is too low, they may make a losing
offer. This means that in general, more quit-prone workers (e.g., single mothers) and fewer
low-quit workers (e.g., childless women) will be employed than in a full-information setting.
This increases the overall churn rate of the workforce relative to the full-information case by
bringing in workers who are more likely to quit.
Within gender groups, family structure subgroups with greater expected flow disutility
from employment will have a smaller V Ej and a larger quit rate at any wage level than
firms project, while subgroups with smaller expected disutility experience the opposite. The
direction of the net effect of these misalignments — the effect of statistical discrimination
— on wages is theoretically ambiguous. In fact, it can be shown that the direction of the
wage effect depends on α.21 In most applications of statistical discrimination theory, it is
assumed that firms are discriminating on differing productivity, so that the direction of the
predicted wage effect is obvious. Here, however, the differentiating characteristic, proneness
to quits due to family instability, also impacts workers’ reservation wages — a more likely
quitter must also be paid more in order to agree to work in the first place. Thus, firms
may statistically discriminate without having a discernable effect on wages. As I discuss in
21This is essentially because α determines how close the bargained wage lies to the negotiating floor, the
reservation wage. If α is small and the wage is close to this floor, and a shift of Fj (c) raises the floor,
wages will also rise. This implies the opposite possibility — a reduction in quit rates could result in lower
wages if firm bargaining power is great enough. In another paper, I demonstrate that child care subsidies are
estimated to have no statistically significant effect on wages overall. However, when I include an interaction
of subsidies with a proxy for worker bargaining power, state-year unionization levels, results predict that
wages decrease where worker power is low and increase where it is great.
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Section 1.3.2, though, there are other dimensions along which this type of discrimination can
be detrimental. A strength of this theoretical model is that it allows for examination of the
effects of discrimination via multiple channels.
1.3.2 Layoff Frequency: Discussion
This model can generate the kind of layoff rate variation displayed by the data in Section 3.4
because the degree to which quit rates impact the value of an employment relationship varies
with the associated layoff rate, and vice versa. In the case of a low-layoff job, the difference
in expected duration of employment between individuals with quite different quit rates will
be significant, with a higher quit rate reducing expectations a great deal. The difference
would be much less significant at a layoff-prone job, which will be short-lived regardless of
employee quit probabilities. In addition, firms looking to fill high-φ jobs will not anticipate
significant costs if the applicant they choose to fill that position quits. All this causes firms
with layoff-prone openings to mostly disregard quits. Inversely, a rare-quits individual will
value a rare-layoff job relatively more than a quit-prone individual will. The hiring effect is
particularly consequential in the context of statistical discrimination. Rare-layoff firms will
be more reluctant to hire female workers, pushing them toward layoff-prone jobs regardless
of their actual propensity to quit.22
Such a relative shift in hiring does not imply directly that the frequency of layoffs —
the empirical outcome measure on which I focused in Section 3.4 — will be greater among
workers with greater (or perceived greater) disutility distributions Fj. However, child care
policy that increases women’s labor market attachment appears to reduce the frequency of
22This should be reflected in the data in wages: group quit rates and occupational layoff rates ought to
reduce wages, other things equal, but the interaction of these rates should dampen the effect, so that the
quit probability drags wages down less in a layoff-prone job and vice-versa. In results not included here, I
show that this pattern is present in the SIPP data: group quit rates and occupational layoff rates indicate
lower wages, but their interaction effect is positive and negates approximately one half of their added specific
effects.
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their layoffs, not merely alter the types of positions they fill. This is simply because, though
statistical discrimination drives them toward layoff-prone jobs, these workers do not quit —
they stick around until the high φ on their jobs generates a layoff. Thus, the model predicts
that childless women would experience the largest decrease in measured layoff rates due to
child care policy changes, just as demonstrated in Section 3.4.
1.4 Identification and Estimation
In this section, I estimate a version of the theoretical model from Section 3.2. To support
identification of parameters of interest, I make certain adjustments to the model. I discuss
these adjustments, the estimation procedure, and identification in Section 1.4.1. I report
results of the implementation of the model in the SIPP data in Section 1.4.2. The estimates
allow me to perform the counterfactual exercises described in Section 1.4.3.
1.4.1 Estimation Approach
Model Adjustments
In estimation, I replace the full subgroup distributions of disutility of work with a fixed
base reservation wage and variable individual quit rates, allowing the worker’s quit rate to
depend on demographic and human capital covariates, the use of child care and subsidies,
and the value of available subsidies. I estimate this quit rate equation outside the main
structural model as a first step. I also exclude the wage from the equation determining the
probability that an individual will quit due to family concerns. That is, the probability of
a quit is determined by demographic characteristics and relevant child care variables: the
presence of children, use of child care services, takeup of a subsidy, and the available subsidy
amount. The disutility of work is therefore a constant reflected in the reservation wage.
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While disutility distributions are useful in the theoretical model for an intuitive description
of how adverse events at home can generate quits, the main concern in estimation in this
case is the importance of the spillover effect from changes in mothers’ quit rates on childless
female workers, rather than the mechanism generating the quit rates themselves.
These adjustments dramatically simplify estimation and in particular identification.
Specifically, restricting the relationship between wages and quit rates to a single direction
— higher quit rates lead to lower wages due to greater expected costs to the firm — permits
identification of the size of that relationship, which is the relevant cost of separations to the
firm. This is a result of a tradeoff in estimation of the model: I can either fix the cost of
separations, determining the way in which varying quit rates reduce wage offers, and estimate
the reduction of quits coming from wage increases, or fix the latter value and identify the
former. I choose to estimate firm costs because this is the model parameter determining
the size of spillover effects from any change in subgroup quit rates. Essential features of the
theoretical model remain; child care policy can be allowed to affect quit rates for relevant
subgroups, and these effects have their impact through changes in the expected duration of
an employment relationship, not through the periodic productivity of that relationship.
Whether an individual i quits a given employment spell of occupational group m in
month t is thus specified as a probit in which a quit occurs if Q∗i ≥ 0:
Q∗i = β1 + β2 (groupi) + β3 (racei) + β4 (SCi) + β5 (ageit ≥ 40) +
β6 (CCusei) + β7 (kidsi) + β8 (CCreci) + β9 (CCreci)× (CCsubi) + β11,m + εit, (1.6)
where the vector racei includes dummies for respondents declaring black or African American
as their race or Hispanic ethnicity, the vector SCi is a dummy for postsecondary education
less than a bachelor’s degree, kidsi is a count of children in the household, subscript F
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indicates that the value is dependent on the firm or job involved in the match, β11,m is
a vector of coefficients corresponding to the occupational group dummies (with high-end
services the excluded group), and εit is a standard normal error term. CCusei records
whether the worker utilizes some form of child care — subsidized or not — while employed
in the given spell. CCreci is an indicator for receipt of a child care subsidy, and its interaction
with CCsubi represents the maximum available value of those subsidies to recipients given
the state and year of the start of the employment spell.
This alters the expressions of the value of each employment state and the bargained









+ (1− α)w∗. (1.7)
Equation (1.7) permits more explicit examination of the theoretical claim made in
Section 1.3.2 that individuals with high (perceived) quit probabilities will be relatively more
attractive to firms with layoff-prone job openings. First, note the subtraction of the term
λFj × φF , which represents the probability that both a quit and a layoff will occur randomly
in the same discrete period.23 A larger value of φF deflates the negative impact of increasing
λFj on the bargained wage because a layoff may intervene before a quit can occur in any given
period. In addition, costs of separation are lower on short-term jobs (as represented by the
φ subscript on cq). The decrease in wage offers due to quit probabilities will thus be smaller
at layoff-prone firms, making matches with quit-prone workers relatively more likely. This
is key in generating the effect demonstrated in Section 3.4 that child care subsidies reduce
layoffs for childless women, since reducing women’s overall average quit rates also reduces
the degree to which layoff-prone firms and female workers are relatively more attracted to
one another.
23In continuous time in the theoretical model, this value was assumed to shrink to zero.
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The effect on childless women of course arises due to statistical discrimination. In
estimation, I collect all male workers into a single subgroup, while subgroups of female
workers are divided by whether or not they have a child as well as whether they access
child care and subsidies. Female workers differ in their quit probabilities based on the
presence of children and their usage of child care arrangements and subsidies, but firms
cannot differentiate along these lines in negotiations over θ. Instead, firms construct an
expected quit probability as a weighted average of the subgroup rates given the wage offer,
the job-specific layoff rate, state subsidy maxima, and the known proportions of mothers
who use child care and subsidies. That is, firms know how frequently childless women,
mothers who do not use child care, mothers who use child care but not subsidies, and subsidy
recipients will quit at any wage rate, as well as the proportions of the female workforce those
groups represent, and thus can derive an expected quit rate. This creates the potential for
statistical discrimination — if quit rates vary widely within the female workforce, firms will
underpay some female employees and overpay others.
The Likelihood Function and Estimation
Estimation is by maximum likelihood. The estimation procedure itself works as follows.
I collect monthly data into spells of employment and nonemployment and characterized
by their lengths, whether they ended in-sample or were right-censored, the child care subsidy
rate in the state of residence at the time the spell began, and the demographic information
of the respondent. Employment spell records also include the wage level, the occupational
sector (of the four job types described in Section 3.3), the worker’s usage of and expenditure
on child care subsidies and services during the spell, and whether the spell ended with a
quit, a layoff, or some other event such as retirement. Each wage offer draw (accepted or
rejected) must be characterized by an occupational category, so the probabilities qmj that a
draw of θ comes from job type m are estimated separately by gender group.
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I assume that φ for each job match is drawn from a common discrete distribution
with two points of support, {φ1, φ2}. I allow the probabilities assigned to each point in the
distribution to vary across the four occupational categories. I also allow occupation type,
workers’ demographic characteristics, and the drawn layoff rate φ to affect the parameters of
the productivity draw distribution, from which the θ characterizing the job offers are taken.
Distributions are parameterized as lognormal, a typical assumption in the literature. The
means of these distributions, denoted µ, vary additively with job type, gender, race/ethnicity,
educational attainment, and job layoff rate shifters; the standard deviations, denoted σ,
vary multiplicatively with the same set of variables. That these distributions vary by gender
assures that the weight assigned to quit rates in the wage equation does not reflect any
other wage effect associated with the gender groups into which firms divide workers when
negotiating what to pay them; the case of variance by job layoff rate and the types of jobs
associated with frequent layoffs. Occupational groups are designated by the notation (“high-
end service” = 1, “mid-tier service” = 2, “low-end service” = 3, “manual” = 4), so that θ
for an individual i who matches with an occupation-m employer (with probability qmj, given
a match) is distributed thusly:
ln (θ) ∼ N (µi, σi) ;
µi = µm + µfem (femalei) + µmin (minorityi) + µsc (SCi) + µhi (1 [φi = φ2])
σi = σm × σfem (femalei)× σmin (minorityi)× σsc (SCi)× σhi (1 [φi = φ2])
I fix certain parameters, found in Table 8: the layoff probability for the lower φ-type
(φ1) is .0019,
24 the probability of drawing the lower layoff probability φ1 in manual work
(denoted p4 in accordance with the below notation) is 0.4, ρ is set so that the annualized
24This value is one half the proportion of total recorded employed periods in all spells during which a
layoff occurred.
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discount factor is 0.1, and α equals 0.3.25 I fix the reservation wage at the lowest value
permitted in the data, $2.25, or the lowest state minimum hourly wage for tipped workers
during the covered period. The lowest wage accepted in the data is a consistent estimator of
the reservation wage (Flinn and Heckman, 1982). I assume that wage values are measured
accurately.
The high layoff rate type φ2 and the probability pm for each job type m that the
low φ-type is drawn are estimated separately based on the fixed φ1 and p4. I use the
maximum likelihood approach subsequently used to estimate the remaining parameters, but
the occupation-draw probabilities at their actual workforce proportions in the data and the
µ and σ at values predicted by reverse-engineering θ values from data and initial parameter
guesses and approximating the distribution of those θ with lognormal distributions. These
assumptions allow me to pin down a value for φ2 based on the actual rate of layoffs in
manual work, and from there the draw probabilities in the other occupational groups. The
fixed value of φ2 is .0083 (over four times the lower layoff rate φ1), and the probabilities
of drawing φ1 are set at .768 in high-end services, .696 in middle-tier services, and .585 in
low-end services.
In order to identify firms’ layoff rate-dependent separation costs independently from
the wage effects of varying layoff rates themselves, I set the separation cost to be one tenth




. I arrive at a multiplier of .1 using a simple linear estimation of the relationship
between turnover frequency and cost values for different industries presented in Table 2 of
Manning (2006). Given the values of φ determined above, short-term jobs would be expected
to generate about one tenth the turnover costs per turnover event.
The parameters that remain to be estimated are thus the probability λθ of drawing a
25This value is based on results from Flinn (2003) and Dey and Flinn (2005), which suggest that around
0.4 is a good estimate for α in the labor market overall, while 0.25 is a more reasonable estimate for workers
in jobs with wages relatively close to the minimum wage, which are overrepresented in the focal sample here.
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new wage offer, the gender-specific probabilities qm that such a new wage offer comes from
each of the four occupational categories, the parameters of the productivity distributions,
the β vectors determining the quit probabilities for each group, and long-term job separation
cost cqφ1 .
Likelihoods are constructed for each spell in the data as the product of the likelihood
that a spell of precisely its kind (e.g. with the given occupation and wage level) would
be started, the likelihood that it would last exactly the number of months it did, and the
likelihood it would end in the fashion that it did. If L is the full length of a spell, RC is a
dummy for a right-censored spell,26 θ∗ is that productivity draw which generates w∗, θ∗F is
that productivity draw which generates the firm’s gender-based conjecture for the reservation
wage (w∗F ), and G (· ) is the CDF of the productivity distribution at its argument, then for





+ λθ (G (max {θ∗, θ∗F}))
)(L−1+RC)]× [(λθ (1−G (max {θ∗, θ∗F})))(1−RC)] .
(1.8)
The likelihood of an employment spell is more complex due to the presence of a wage
and multiple avenues to exit the spell. First, the parameter guesses and wage value for the
spell are used to back out a value for θ from the wage formula for each employment spell.
Next, the following value is calculated for each spell:
pθ =
g (θ)
1−G (max {θ∗, θ∗F})
,
where g (· ) is the PDF of the productivity distribution at its argument and the entire value
is replaced with zero if θ−λF cq < w∗ — that is, if there is no surplus over which to bargain.
pθ is thus the probability that, given that the productivity draw was sufficient to initiate a
26Relatively rare departures from work for retirement or school are treated as right-censoring in estimation.
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wage offer as well as the job type from which the draw was made, the draw was exactly that
value of θ derived from the parameter guesses and data.
Once these expressions are established, the likelihood of a completed or censored em-
ployment spell can be written
LE = pθ (qmj)
[
1− (pmφ1 + (1− pm)φ2 + λq)L−D−Q ×
[






where D is an indicator for the spell ending in a layoff and Q is similar for a quit. I calculate
these likelihood values for all spells in the data and maximize the sum of their natural logs.
Identification
The main identification concern in estimating this model will be the parameters of the wage
equation. In particular, two questions arise: how can I be sure that firms are responding
to quit probabilities rather than some other correlated factor in adjusting their wage offers,
and how can I be sure that the response I estimate of wages to quit rates does not reflect
the opposite causal relationship, quits caused by unsatisfactory wages?
Because what firms believe about applicants’ quit rates comes entirely from factors
exogenous to any single job match, like child care policy and population group averages of
child care behavior, or variables which are also permitted to affect the productivity distri-
bution directly — gender, race, and educational attainment — the impact of any of these
other characteristics on the wage is identified and estimated elsewhere in the model. Firms’
understanding of quit rates is not informed by any factors other than these because, by
construction, it cannot be. One could argue that having subsidized child care does not only
reduce the rate at which mothers quit, but increases their productivity by making them more
reliable or providing them with peace of mind. In this case, estimates of the effect of quit
rate reductions, as well as information revelation concerning quit probabilities, on wages and
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other contingent outcomes would be biased upward in magnitude. However, in this scenario
any estimated effect could still be credited to child care subsidies and information about
their usage per se rather than (or in addition to) its effect on quit probabilities.
Given α, the lognormality assumption on the distributions of θ allows identification of
the parameters of those distributions as demonstrated by Flinn and Heckman (1982). λθ and
the occupation draw probabilities qm are identified by the length of nonemployment spells
and the gender-specific probability that, given job offer acceptance, an employment spell
starts with a job of a given type. Coefficients in the quit probability equation are identified
by actual quit frequencies just as they would be in a regular probit. Once quit probabilities
and distributions of θ are identified, cq can be estimated from the relationship between wages
and the rates of separation (quits and layoffs) known to firms.
1.4.2 Parameter Estimates and Model Fit
In order to focus the estimation results on somewhat more relevant groups of workers, I
estimate the search model using a sample which includes only SIPP respondents with less
educational attainment than a bachelor’s degree. Having completed some level of college is
allowed to shift the productivity distribution parameters and the quit probability.
Results from maximum likelihood estimation can be found in Table 9. The right-
hand column reports the coefficients from the true quit rate function. All women’s quit
probabilities are significantly larger than those of men, but those of women with children
are the largest, with a coefficient around 40 percent larger than that assigned to childless
women. Moreover, mothers who use child care subsidies while working experience a large,
though statistically insignificant, increase in their base probability of quitting, on the same
order of magnitude as the difference between men and women. This is presumably because
women who receive subsidies are more likely to quit for other reasons not captured by the
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other variables included in the model.
Given usage of a child care subsidy, however, the effect of larger subsidy maxima (β9)
is to reduce quit rates in a statistically significant way. For some perspective regarding the
value of the coefficient, child care subsidy maxima range from $50 to $275 (on a weekly
basis) in this data, though the vast majority of state-year values fall in the $75-$175 range.
Parents who use child care and access subsidies are more likely to quit, but the generosity
of subsidies counteracts this increase; probit estimates imply that it takes around $110 per
week of child care subsidization to fully alleviate the quit probability increase faced by female
workers with children who are in position to use subsidies over and above the base quit rate
of their childless female coworkers, or around $200 to reduce recipients’ quit rates to those
of male workers.27
In the structural estimates, I note that female workers are estimated to draw from
a productivity distribution with a lognormal mean barely (and insignificantly) larger than
that of men, but the lognormal standard deviation is just 86 percent the size, indicating that
women’s wage distribution is concentrated at lower levels (and its true mean is smaller).
Minority (black or Hispanic) workers suffer large mean penalties, while having some post-
baccalaureate educational experience increases the lognormal mean by about 0.14 over a high
school education. The productivity penalty on short-term jobs (coefficient values designated
in Table 9 with a hi subscript, for high φ) is extreme, with a change in the lognormal
standard deviation of 32 percent. Some of this is recovered due to lower expected costs
of separation; replacing a long-term employee is estimated to cost $2,498, while short-term
employee replacement costs are set at one tenth of this value.28 However, wages are on
27Though it reduces the statistical significance of the coefficients, a probit model in which a square term
for the subsidy value is included yields a very small positive coefficient on that term — small enough that
there is next to no decline in the power of subsidy generosity to reduce quits as that generosity increases
within the range existent in the data. For this reason, I am comfortable using a linear term and extending
counterfactuals to the maximum subsidy available in the data.
28Recall that this estimate comes only from the degree to which firms translate increased expected costs
into lower wage offers, not actual estimates of true replacement costs.
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average much lower on short-lived jobs.
In order to assess the impact of child care subsidies in the empirical model, I per-
form simulation exercises. To ease the computational burden, I discretize the estimated θ
distributions as well as the true distribution of child care subsidy values, from which these
simulation inputs will be drawn. Because spell durations and wage growth over time are of
interest, I simulate 25,000 total individuals (5,000 each of identical men, childless women,
mothers who do not require child care, mothers who procure child care but do not use sub-
sidies, and subsidy recipients) for a total of 480 months while holding age constant at 30
for all simulated individuals for simplicity. I posit a post-retirement value identical to the
present discounted value of 240 months receiving the value of the unemployment state. Since
mid-career outcomes are of the greatest interest, establishing a reasonable retirement value
simply allows for backward solution of the individual decision problem with regard to each
possible wage offer, following the approach of Rendon (2006). In simulation, rather than
fixing the reservation wage, I allow workers to account for their own calculated PDV of the
nonemployment state when choosing to accept a wage offer. This increases reservation wages,
and thus accepted wages, above the range suggested by the data, as we will see. However,
it allows for a nuanced simulation of the dynamic optimization of workers as they navigate
the labor market, one in which it is reasonable to expect short-term firms and short-term
workers to attract one another as long-term firms (via wage offers) and long-term workers
(via reservation wages) hold out to meet one another.
For each simulated individual, the following characteristics are drawn at period 1 and
are permanent: race, number of children (if the individual is in a parent subgroup; either one
or two children), child care user status, child care subsidy recipient status, and state child
care subsidy maximum.29 Each worker-job pair is characterized by a job type draw, a quit
29Because child care and subsidy user statuses are permanent, this is not a true life-cycle simulation, and
the interest is in comparing across groups over middle-term windows of time.
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probability based on the estimated parameter values, and a draw of the layoff probability
φ based on the estimated probabilities for the job type. Workers compare the PDV of
being employed at the offered wage given these separation probabilities and the PDV of the
nonemployment state — this is different from the model, which assumes that the PDV of
the nonemployment state is the fixed reservation wage, but facilitates extension beyond the
comparatively short length of the panel for the examination of spell lengths and separation
events more generally. Once employed, individuals draw anew each period against their quit
and layoff probabilities and potentially separate from the job, reentering the nonemployment
state. Wages are assumed to increase on a yearly basis during an employment spell up to
the tenth year based on the following specification:





where ω is the initial wage offer and yt is the number of years spent in the current
employment spell as of period t. This specification roughly follows that estimated by Rendon
(2006), but uses parameters set to match ten-year wage growth as estimated by Pavan
(2011) — levelling off at around 34 percent growth over the initial wage after ten years of
tenure. Simulated wage growth allows for results to be obtained with respect to the effects
of employment continuity on periodic income, and is for these illustrative purposes only as
it too increases simulated wage averages.
For reference, Figure 3 displays the time-paths of wages, employment rates, layoff rates,
and quit rates by gender and, for women, parental status in the SIPP data, using a sample
of workers lacking bachelor’s degrees. Married men garner the highest wages, single mothers
earn the least, and the growth of wages is meaningfully smaller for women and quit-prone
groups — a difference of about $2 per hour in wage growth when comparing mothers to
married men — over the course of the 30 year career. While men are employed at a rate of
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nearly 90 percent in both the data and the simulation, women with children work at lower
rates, particularly at the ages at which their children are likely young. Finally, while layoff
rates are much messier in both the data and the model, note that in the SIPP data interesting
trends are present. Though men vastly overpopulate the high-turnover occupations of trades,
manufacturing, and construction, men and women from similar family structures are laid off
at relatively similar rates. At many ages, single mothers show the highest rate of layoffs and
temporary work. Overall, layoff rates decline as workers age.
All these patterns are generally borne out in simulation, though women’s employment
rates catch up much more completely to men’s over time in the model than in the data.
These results are contained in Figure 2.30 Wages and wage growth are greater for male
workers, while quit rates are somewhat higher for female workers, in particular those with
children.31 Levels and trends regarding layoffs are also similar between data and simulation.
In simulation, all subgroups of female workers experience similar outcomes, with the only
variation on average generated by variant quit rates. Because mothers quit more often,
they have to return from the unemployed pool more often, dampening their wages and
employment rates somewhat; women without children fare slightly better on these measures,
as in the data. In particular, mothers who need to use child care to work but are never-users
of subsidies32 have the highest quit rates. In the base simulation, subsidy recipients’ quit
rates are lower due to the size of subsidies available to some of these workers, so that their
other outcomes are somewhat more positive.
30In this and all simulation figures that follow, I smooth the generated periodic quit rates, rather volatile
month-to-month, in each group by taking the average over the 12-month period starting in each given month.
This shortens the x-axis by 12 observations. I also focus on employment rates from months 120 to 360, since
the simulants all start out unemployed and take time to settle into equilibrium with respect to employment
status.
31The assumption regarding constant simulant age group, under 40, implies that the convergence of quit
rates across gender with age shown in the data will not be present in simulation. All simulation results
should be read as relevant for workers in the first half of their working-age life.
32Female workers who use child care are presumed to have a permanent characteristic dictating whether,
if they are eligible, they will access subsidies. The proportion of such workers in the hiring pool is assumed
by firms in wage bargaining to match that reflected in the true data.
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1.4.3 Counterfactual Analysis
In this section, I explore changes in worker quit rates dictated by three counterfactual sce-
narios: one in which firms are provided with full information regarding applicants’ quit rates,
and two in which there are large changes in child care subsidy generosity. I closely examine
the direct impact of subsidy generosity on mothers but also any spillover effect to childless
women that arises.
Results from simulation in which firms are fully aware of each worker’s quit proba-
bility are displayed in Figure 4. Note that in comparison to the base simulation, there is
significantly more divergence in outcomes across groups of female workers as a result of their
now-known divergent quit rates. In particular, there is a larger gap in layoff rates between
unsubsidized child care users and childless women than between the latter and men. This
demonstrates the first key feature of the model: higher quit rates do in fact spill over into
higher layoff rates. This is in part because quits prevent workers from “sticking” in long-
term jobs and continually recording employment on a low-φ job. This is the reason the gap
between female workers who require child care services and childless women also increases
over time — workers in the latter group stay in low-φ jobs longer. But their wage offers on
those jobs are also much higher, the main contributor to the gap.
Figures 5 and 6 compare workers’ outcomes in a scenario in which the cap on all child
care subsidy amounts is reduced to zero to their outcomes when all caps are raised to the
maximum value observed in the data, $275 per week. The difference most obvious from
these graphs is the precipitous decline in subsidy-users’ quit rates, from between .8 and .9
percent per period to below even the level of male workers, about .1 percent.33 The remaining
33While this simulated example appears extreme, recall that a quadratic term in the quit probability
equation suggests little change in the effect of subsidies throughout this range outside of the decrease in
marginal effect from the probit specification. A smaller change in quit rates simply generates proportionally
smaller changes in other outcomes, as suggested by the base simulation in which the true distribution of
child care subsidy values is used.
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relevant differences in outcomes are more legible in Table 10, which reports mean outcomes
for months 120 to 360, the middle 20 years of the simulation, for all four scenarios (the base
simulation, full information, and two extreme values of the subsidy maximum). Outcomes
for men are the same across all scenarios because, in this model, only female workers differ
along quit rate lines and may be affected by the policy changes.
While subsidy generosity changes do not directly cause quit rates to change for non-
recipients, employment rates are greater for all female workers in the generous-subsidy sce-
nario, by 0.7 percentage points for childless women and 1.9 percentage points for mothers.34
Mothers’ employment rates increase more because those who use subsidies are in fact quit-
ting less often, but the increase across groups of female workers occurs for two reasons.
Because firms see a decreased average quit rate for all women and they do not differentiate
within the female applicant pool, all female workers seem more attractive to hiring firms,
and wage offers increase. This attracts more childless women, for whom nothing else has
changed, to the labor market. However, this increase in wage offers does not occur equally
across the long- and short-term sectors. Since replacement costs are low on short-term (that
is, high-φ) jobs, wage offers to women applying for these jobs were already only marginally
penalized for the threat of a quit. But firms hiring for long-term positions offer a more
dramatic wage increase. This pulls more female applicants toward such jobs, even those who
were already on the labor market but relatively attracted to short-term jobs.
This implies a net increase in the number of workers employed in long-term jobs in the
economy as a whole. In the context of this model, this is a result of its partial equilibrium
setup. However, consider the possibility that many jobs can be performed either by a series
of temporary workers or by a single more permanent worker, and that firms may convert
some jobs from one to the other as it suits them. In the low-wage service industry, firms may
34Mean outcomes for mothers in Table 10 are a weighted average across the simulated groups, with the
weights being the relative proportions in the SIPP data of women in each group to the total number of
mothers.
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consider treating some jobs as permanent hires rather than temps if they believe applicants
are more likely to stick around. Again, imagine that firms are hiring for multiple jobs with
different layoff rates φ. The differential wage offer increase seen by the model can occur
within firms, indicating that these firms are “opening” more long-term jobs in the sense that
they are willing to hire a wider pool of applicants for such jobs. The model is thus replicating
this theoretical effect, if crudely so.
The employment rate effect can of course also be seen, most importantly, in the de-
crease in childless women’s on-the-job layoff rates in the generous-subsidy scenario, from
0.271 percent to 0.257 percent. While this decrease appears small numerically, it repre-
sents approximately 5.2 percent of all layoffs and temporary-work separations among low-
education women. This is of course an economically meaningful difference, and one that
must be considered in analysis of the effects of child care subsidization policy. Consider that
the results reported in Section 3.4 suggest that, for low-education workers, the reduction
in quits among mothers and layoffs among female workers more generally in the face of a
one-standard-deviation increase in the subsidy maximum are around the same magnitude,
approximately a quarter of the base quit rate. Simulation results suggest that a reduction
of about 18 percent in mothers’ quit rates (from .68 percent per month to .56 percent), by
whatever mechanism, can result in a 5.2% decrease in layoffs for childless women, very much
on the same order of magnitude. Thus, the model seems to suggest that the contribution of
such a mechanism can be quite substantial.
1.5 Conclusions
In this paper, I develop a job search model which directly incorporates variable probabilities
of quits and layoffs into the structure of labor market decision-making. I demonstrate that
such a model predicts nuanced links among quit probabilities, wages, and layoff rates, and
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that information asymmetries can result in spillover effects within gender groups because quit
probabilities are not observable individual characteristics. SIPP data suggest that not only
can reliable child care, enhanced for low-wage workers by subsidies, reduce the probability
that a mother will be forced to quit her job, but firms may be aware of this effect and
alter their treatment of female employees in response. Results from estimation of the model
imply that employers looking for long-term employees are somewhat wary of female workers,
but become less so when the surrounding policy environment suggests that they will be less
likely to quit of their own volition. These conclusions have implications for policy designed
to enhance labor market attachment for some group of workers, including explicit child care
policy but also conceptually related programs such as the Earned Income Tax Credit and
even health care policies that reduce health-related absences or separations from work. In
an environment in which firms believe their employees will be able to continue working for
them long-term — especially if there is a meaningful cost of separation — the nature of
employment relationships is altered. One result may be that described by Barron, Black,
and Loewenstein (1993) — those employees receive more on-the-job training — while another
may be that they endure job destruction less often. In fact, these results go hand in hand.
Counterfactual simulations with full information demonstrate that statistical discrim-
ination helps quit-prone workers who can pool with workers who are unlikely to quit due
to asymmetries in information, but hurts those other workers, and that these impacts in-
clude a convergence of proportions in short-term work across groups. Additional simulations
incorporating varied child care subsidy maxima reveal that a policy that reduces the quit
probabilities of a small subgroup of workers can improve outcomes for any workers affected by
such statistical discrimination. More investigation remains to be done into the relevance of
bargaining power to the ways in which statistical discrimination, and any policy that affects
reservation wages, can affect various worker outcomes. Future research could ask whether
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other policies that enhance labor market attachment, such as improved public transporta-
tion or health care, improve or diminish wage outcomes for affected workers, and whether
this reflects bargaining power. In any case, the results in this paper point to the impact
of policy remedies for issues that give rise to statistical discrimination, further leveling the
labor market playing field. They also reveal the importance of policy impacts beyond the
target or recipient population in the face of labor market issues affecting broad demographic
groups, such as discrimination.
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Chapter 2
Rational Responses to Uncertainty?
Understanding Disadvantaged
Youths’ Educational Choices
This chapter is joint work with Nicholas W. Papageorge, Stefanie DeLuca, and Seth Ger-
shenson.
2.1 Introduction
Despite increases in postsecondary enrollment by disadvantaged groups, gaps in final edu-
cational attainment across demographic and socioeconomic lines remain a significant issue
(Bailey and Dynarski, 2011). Given these trends as well as prior research (Rosenbaum, 2015;
Gershenson, Holt, and Papageorge, 2016), it is clear that there is a growing population of
individuals who start postsecondary education but never attain a bachelor’s degree. An
We thank Stephen Holt for excellent research assistance in the initial stages of this project. We also
gratefully acknowledge the input of administrators at the Baltimore City Community College as well as
helpful comments from Robert Moffitt and seminar participants at the Hopkins Health, Labor, Education
and Development conference.
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emerging literature demonstrates that sub-baccalaureate credentials have highly variable re-
turns, sometimes zero or negative on net (Cellini and Turner, Forthcoming). As we will show
in this paper, this issue is disproportionately concentrated amongst low-income and minority
students. While a significant body of research, including that by Keane and Wolpin (2001),
Bettinger et al. (2012), and Hoxby and Turner (2015), has been dedicated to the question
of the enrollment gap, somewhat less is known about what causes students who start post-
secondary programs to attain less valuable credentials or drop out entirely.1 Moreover, the
extent to which students’ beliefs about college completion given enrollment, which as this
paper demonstrates also vary across sociodemographic groups, affect their decisions about
whether and where to enroll is unclear. For instance, students may be concerned that issues
at home, such as the illness or incarceration of a parent, might force them to take a break
from school, which may violate financial aid or degree requirements or simply increase the
barriers to continuation of the pursuit of a degree, or to drop out. In this case, students’
subjective prospects for degree completion are reduced, which may affect application and
enrollment decisions. Rather than a deficiency of information or resources, then, this would
represent a rational response to uncertainty. Policies designed solely to address financial
constraints, insufficient academic preparation, or lack of information will not represent a
solution to this kind of issue. The sociological literature, including research by Holland and
DeLuca (2016) and DeLuca, Clampet-Lundquist, and Edin (2016), shows that low-income
and minority youth in fact do seek out short-term postsecondary credentials while harboring
significant concerns about the probability that negative events will derail their efforts to
succeed. A rigorous assessment of the decision-making process potentially mediating these
facts remains to be performed.
One purpose of this paper is to provide evidence that young students develop rational
1Dynarski (2003) and Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2008) do report mixed results on the effects of
resources on persistence at college, and Ellis and Gershenson (2016) document the impact of a college campus
mentoring program.
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expectations for postsecondary credential completion based not only on their demographic
characteristics and academic ability but also their sense of instability in their own lives, and
that they apply these expectations in making decisions about postsecondary schooling. In
particular, we suggest that students with a history of frequent traumatic or disruptive life
events, which we will call “adverse shocks” and which could potentially derail an educational
trajectory, are likely to forecast more of these events in their own future, that these students
adjust their subjective educational attainment expectations (downward) accordingly, and
that these attainment expectations affect their decisions regarding enrollment. Because
credit constraints and information and resource deficits, as documented in the above-cited
literature, seem to explain some but not all of the attainment gap, and because adverse shocks
are not evenly distributed throughout the student population, this research potentially fills
a gap in our understanding regarding sociodemographic attainment differentials.
However, as we will show, the data regarding attainment expectations that is currently
available in nationally representative surveys makes it difficult to identify the relationship
between those expectations and informative past shocks on the one hand and enrollment
decisions on the other hand. We can fix ideas with a brief example. This paper makes
use of the National Longitudinal Study of Youth, 1997 (henceforth NLSY), in which high
school students are asked to assign a percentage between 0 and 100 to the probability that
they will earn a bachelor’s degree before turning 30 years old. Their responses are of course
some measure of their expectations regarding educational attainment. However, a number
of component subjective probabilities are subsumed in this single question - the probabilities
students assign to application to, acceptance by, and enrollment in specific postsecondary
programs, the probability of degree attainment given enrollment in certain programs even
without adverse shocks, the probability that adverse shock events will occur while students
are enrolled, and the probability that these events fully derail their educational paths. Be-
cause we are particularly focused in the formulation and use of these last two objects, the
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NLSY survey questions are not specific enough to satisfactorily identify the relationships of
interest.
Thus, another goal we undertake in this paper is to describe, in a specific and use-
ful way, the information which must be gathered in order to rigorously assess the effects
suggested by the evidence we do provide, as well as the approach to this data-gathering
process. This approach will be informed by a variety of research modalities. First, a sim-
ple structural model of the educational decision-making process will be formulated. This
model will be used to highlight the important parameters which cannot be identified using
available data, but also potential entry points for impactful policy responses to the effects
of adverse shocks and expectations on the attainment gap. And second, a survey method-
ology will be constructed which permits the investigation of the relevant processes while
also pinpointing potential confounders and sources of endogeneity in a way not sufficiently
achieved in currently available data sets. In explicating this methodology, we will note the
valuable interplay of various research techniques which permit a more complete and thus
more detailed view of the decision-making process in question. As we note below, we hope
that the example of this interdisciplinary, interactive, iterative approach can be applied in
other dynamic-choice-related research contexts.
The paper proceeds as follows. We examine the relevant economic and sociological
literature in Section 2.2 and describe the essential characteristics of the data we utilize in
Section 3.3. In Section 3.4, we provide results from these nationally representative data sets
which suggest a certain explanation for the attainment gap, demonstrating that attainment
expectations are related to shocks both past and expected, educational decisions, and final
attainment. We model decision-making in increasingly rigorous ways in Section 2.5, utilizing
a two-stage least squares (2SLS) framework to provide more evidence of the impact of in-
stability on expectations and in turn on attainment, as well as laying out a structural model
of a high school student’s educational decision. However, there are significant identification
53
issues in each case owing to the nature of the available data. Rather than gloss over these
concerns, in Section 2.6 we argue that these issues present an opportunity to test the merits
of a cross-disciplinary approach to the formulation of surveys and interview protocols and the
gathering of data, and describe methods which can be used to do so. This approach includes
standard survey questions, cognitive interviewing techniques, and open-ended interviewing,
all informed by economic modeling. Section 3.5 concludes.
2.2 Relevant Literature and Contributions
The vast majority of today’s students not only graduate high school and plan to attend
college, but actually enroll in some kind of higher education after graduation (Bailey and
Dynarski, 2011). Rosenbaum (2015) find that, in a recent cohort, nearly 90 percent of high-
income students enrolled in college after high school, as did three quarters of low-income
students. While this represents a dramatic increase in enrollment over past generations,
degree completion remains an issue. Only about half of students who attempt to earn a
postsecondary credential of any kind actually complete one (Ma, Pender, and Welch, 2016).
Minority students are particularly subject to this phenomenon; Snyder and Dillow (2011)
find that only about 40 percent of African-American students who enter college receive a
bachelor’s degree within six years of starting a program, compared to 62 percent of white
students. Those authors also note that only 20-30 percent of public community college
students complete associate’s degree programs within three years of beginning their studies.
As we show below, the set of such outcomes (labeled “some college”) is now the modal
result for individuals who enroll in some kind of postsecondary program. These students
eventually experience economic outcomes quite like those of high school graduates without
any college — Hillman (2014) shows that they are more likely to be poor, to be unemployed,
and to default on student loans than students who complete their degrees, while earning
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substantially less.
While these gaps reflect the financial and academic challenges disadvantaged youth face,
they also reflect another growing trend: most poor and minority youth never enroll in four-
year colleges at all. Instead, they are increasingly found in shorter-duration programs at for-
profit institutions like occupational colleges and trade schools (Ma, Pender, and Welch, 2016).
In fact, as recent work including that by Cottom (2018) shows, low-income students are three
and a half times more likely to enroll in for-profit institutions than higher-income students,
and more students of color begin their postsecondary education in for-profit institutions
than in public or private two- or four-year schools. Yet relatively little literature examines
how these decisions regarding enrollment are made. We aim to fill this gap by identifying
how low-income minority students choose postsecondary programs, understanding student
perceptions of returns, estimating the extent to which these perceptions can explain their
choices, and examining whether they would make more optimal ones given more counseling
and support while applying, or more flexible policies after they enroll.
Previous research has approached questions about unequal educational attainment pri-
marily by hypothesizing that students encounter financial constraints or a lack of information
or parental support (Attewell, Heil, and Reisel, 2011; Perna and Li, 2006; Keane and Wolpin,
2001; Dynarski, 2003). For example, students might be unaware of how to obtain funding for
school or fail to recognize the relatively high returns to a four-year college degree versus one
from a community college or a for-profit trade school (Bettinger et al., 2012). Specifically,
Hoxby and Turner (2013) find that providing targeted customized information about college
choices, cost, and application processes increased the quality of the colleges high-achieving
low-income students attended, and reduced their college costs. However, their experiment
focused on four-year college-bound high-achievers, so it is unclear if such findings would
extend to students opting for other sub-baccalaureate pathways. In fact, Deil-Amen and
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DeLuca (2010) show that in high school, counseling for middle- and low-achievers concern-
ing sub-baccalaureate programs and career options tends to be inadequate.
While all these issues remain important, we explore another possibility, one that explic-
itly acknowledges how the neighborhood and family contexts in which low-income youth grow
up might shape their educational choices. Our hypothesis is rooted in a combination of eco-
nomic theories of rational dynamic investment decisions, in which individuals make optimal
choices under constraints, and ecological models of human development which acknowledge
the importance of social settings in explaining life course outcomes (Bronfenbrenner, 1977).
Specifically, family socioeconomic background is a powerful predictor of educational attain-
ment, but the role it plays extends beyond financial resources. Research concerning food
and housing insecurity among college students (Goldrick-Rab, 2016), eviction (Desmond,
2016), and mass incarceration (Alexander, 2010) all point to the pervasiveness of family and
community instability. DeLuca, Clampet-Lundquist, and Edin (2016) document that low-
income African American youth frequently experience what we call “adverse shocks,” such
as family members and friends being evicted, arrested, incarcerated, injured, hospitalized,
or killed. Any one of these events could require a student to take time out of school to
grieve, support other family members financially, or both. This literature motivates us to
rigorously test whether and how such shocks and instabilities shape students’ postsecondary
decision-making.
We thus contribute to the varied literature examining schooling decisions under uncer-
tainty, and in particular the role of attitudes and beliefs about the future in the decision-
making process. Belzil and Leonardi (2013) provide evidence that individual risk aversion
deters investment in higher education. Wiswall and Zafar (2015) demonstrate that college
students’ choices of major are a function of their beliefs with regard to typical starting
salaries by major. More directly relevant to this paper, Raley, Kim, and Daniels (2012)
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show an association in the NLSY97 between higher subjective probabilities of young preg-
nancy and reduced enrollment in and persistence at postsecondary programs. Expectations
regarding pregnancy are just one of the indicators of anticipated adverse shocks we utilize
in the empirical analysis of educational expectations and attainment below, in which we
make an attempt to account for at least some of the inherent endogeneity concerns. As
Jacob and Wilder (2010) note, a great deal of literature dating back to the 1970’s shows
that educational expectations are a strong predictor of final attainment even conditional on
many background characteristics. However, the nature of the relationship between the two
— whether and via what channels it is causal — remains an open question. In this paper
we attempt to provide some preliminary answers, but also to refine the question so it might
more plausibly be answered fully, given additional information we specify.
Jacob and Wilder (2010) also show that high school students update their educational
expectations over the course of their secondary school careers, most often downward, and
that these revisions are more likely to be made by students with low socioeconomic status and
academic performance, as well as students who have children during high school. Here, we
demonstrate that this sort of trend may be related to these students’ forecasts of instability in
their own lives, especially as they are informed by adverse shocks, including those that occur
during their high school careers. We do so in part using existing nationally representative
data sets, described in Section 3.3.
2.3 Data
We utilize data from three sources: the NLSY, the Education Longitundinal Study of 2002
(ELS), and the High School Longitudinal Study of 2009 (HSLS). These data sets differ in
salient ways, as summarized in Table 11. The NLSY has the advantages of reporting GPA
on a yearly basis in publicly available files and (significantly for our purposes) including
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questions about students’ expectations regarding adverse shocks in their own futures. These
reported expectations can be included in models of educational expectations and decisions
to more directly assess the relationships of interest. On the other hand, the ELS panel
contains a report of educational attainment expectations at each wave, so it is possible to
assess the adjustment of these expectations over time, in particular in response to adverse
shocks and other kinds of events. Students who start but do not complete a postsecondary
program are also asked to supply a reason for this derailment. In addition, the two surveys
pose the educational expectation question in different ways: NLSY respondents supply a
subjective probability, 0-100, of earning a bachelor’s degree prior to turning 30, whereas ELS
respondents state the specific level of education they expect to ultimately attain. Replicating
the core of our analysis using each response type can thus serve to mitigate some concerns
with regard to measurement error that may attend each. In Section 3.4, we show that all
major results are quite similar across the two panels. The HSLS combines some of the
advantages of each of these data sets as demonstrated by Table 11, but its respondents are
not generally old enough to have graduated from a four-year college program — only 59
individuals report having done so, while a majority of respondents whose status is known as
of the most recent wave are still enrolled in some kind of postsecondary school. Thus, we
use some of the unique variables available in the HSLS, discussed below, to assess parts of
the decision-making process, but cannot make statements about impact on outcomes and do
not feature these data prominently elsewhere.
Tables 12 and 13 summarize key background and academic variables for the full NLSY
and ELS samples, as well as for subsamples by actual final educational attainment. In the
interest of space, the “Some Coll” column includes individuals who start a postsecondary
program but never earn any credential as well as certificate and associate’s degree earners. It
is clear that in both panels, minority and low-income students are more highly concentrated
in the low-attainment groups, and in particular only end up with half their proportional
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representation in the degree-earning group.2 Mother’s education, high school GPA, and test
scores3 bear the expected relationships with attainment as well.
Table 14 summarizes each panel’s expectations responses for each sample and the
same subgroups. The top panel in the table shows the proportions of ELS respondents
in each group column who said in tenth grade that they expected their final educational
attainment to be that in the given row. For instance, just 10 percent of respondents said
they anticipated starting a postsecondary program but never earning a bachelor’s degree,
while 22 percent on those who never finished high school stated this particular expectation.
There are two obvious trends: expectations are relatively accurate, and inaccuracies tend
to be too optimistic. Subgroups which finish with less education clearly have lower average
expectations for their own attainment. However, 62 percent of respondents who stopped
school after earning a high school diploma believed in tenth grade that they would go further
than that, including a full 40 percent who expected to earn at least a bachelor’s degree.
50 percent of those who started postsecondary school of some kind but never earned a
bachelor’s degree believed in high school that they would do just that. Explaining why these
individuals fall short of their own expectations is an important part of determining the role
of expectations in decision-making.
The second and third panels of Table 14, summarizing expectations data in the NLSY,
suggest an answer.4 In the middle panel of the table, respondents are supplying subjective
probabilities of earning a bachelor’s degree by age 30, and have been divided into quartiles
based on their responses. First, note again that while attainment expectations are positively
2Note that the NLSY intentionally oversamples minority and at-risk white youth, which accounts for the
differences in overall representation percentages between the panels.
3Score values are standardized in the NLSY sample, but remain raw in the ELS.
4Response rates for the expectations question are much higher in the ELS than in the NLSY mostly
because the latter survey asked for attainment expectations only from those students who were at least
15 at the time of the initial survey, and never repeated the question. Because the sample is otherwise
representative, there is no selection concern with respect to the results from the NLSY for the 15-18 year
old starting cohorts.
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correlated with outcomes, many appear to be overly optimistic; 30 and 39 percent, respec-
tively, of high school dropouts and those who stop school after high school graduation state
in the initial survey that they project at least a 75 percent chance of completing a bache-
lor’s degree, many of these stating unequivocally that they certainly would. The third panel,
meanwhile, summarizes expectations with regard to the occurrence of other events in the one
year following the first survey, for which respondents also supplied subjective probabilities
on a 0-100 scale. These events include being the victim of a crime, being arrested, dying,5
and becoming pregnant. The most obvious trend is that those who eventually complete a
bachelor’s degree report much lower subjective probabilities of all these events.6 However,
it is also valuable to compare the trends across attainment in both types of expectations.
Specifically, note that in terms of expectations for educational attainment, the “some college”
group resembles the “college” group quite a bit — in general, their subjective probability
distribution appears to be about the average of that of the “high school” group and that
of the college group, if not slightly greater. Yet in terms of expectations regarding adverse
shocks, their expectations are nearly identical to those of the high school group, and quite
different from those of students who eventually earn a bachelor’s degree. This may suggest
that, amongst those with greater concern about future adverse shocks, those who start a
5In all groups the average percent chance placed on death in the next year is clearly much higher than
the true probability. There are large spikes, for this and any question requiring a probabilistic response, at
50 percent, but even removing individuals giving this response leaves an average subjective probability of
death of over 10 percent, as many students supply round values like 5, 10, and 20 percent at the low end.
This raises concerns about numeracy and students’ ability to accurately characterize their expectations in
percentages as noted previously; however, the concentration of expectations for adverse shocks at higher
percentages is in fact correlated with other variables we would expect to generate such expectations, like
low income and a history of adverse shocks, so we believe the relative values of these expectations represent
useful information, if not the raw values.
6Interestingly, eventual degree earners assign just as high a probability to getting drunk in the next year,
the other adverse event the NLSY asks about, as those with less final educational attainment - that is, unless
race is controlled for. High-income and white students are both more likely to earn a bachelor’s degree and
more likely to expect drunkenness in the year after the survey, so there is some correlation between these
two measures. However, after dividing the sample by race or income group, we find that an expectation of
drunkenness displays the same pattern as the shocks reported here - increased adverse expectations among
those with lower eventual attainment.
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postsecondary program are the most optimistic about their ability to complete it — which
is unsurprising — but they often fail to do so. It may well be that the very adverse shocks
to which these students assign a high probability hinder their educational progress, and stu-
dents who instead revise their educational expectations downward are in fact “correct” in
this sense. Our primary aim in this paper is to assess this possibility much more rigorously.
Before moving on to more direct evidence concerning expectations and decision-making,
however, we briefly document the reality of the issue at hand: recent data show that the
crisis of enrollment, at which much previous research and policy has been aimed, has been
mitigated to a significant degree, but in its place has emerged a crisis of completion. Figures 7
and 8 show that for minority and low-income students in the ELS, attending a postsecondary
program of some kind but never earning any credential (denoted “Some PS”) is now the
modal outcome. This path is about 12 percentage points more common among minority
than white students, and 15 percentage points more common among low-income than high-
income students. Earning an occupational certificate rather than a degree is also more
prevalent in these disadvantaged groups. While there are also more high school dropouts,
this difference is relatively small, especially by race. In this paper, we provide one explanation
for why students might both drop out of postsecondary schools and, knowing this risk ahead
of time, choose to enroll in shorter-term certificate programs. The main concern, then, is
not enrollment after high school, but completion of a valuable credential.
Why does this issue matter — more specifically, what is the meaning and effect of a
“valuable credential”? The returns to a four-year degree over and above those to merely
attending college or earning a lesser credential are in fact quite large. In the NLSY, among
those employed as of the 2015 survey,7 the average annual income of college graduates was
nearly $60,000, while that of those who halted their education after graduating high school
was just under $36,000. Importantly, workers with some postsecondary education but no
7Respondents were thus between the ages of 30 and 36.
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bachelor’s degree - whether they earned an associate’s degree or not - had an average annual
income of just around $40,000 - that is, not much better than their peers who never attended
any postsecondary school. Certainly there are selection issues with this simple analysis, but
it is clear that the so-called “sheepskin effect” of a bachelor’s degree is likely quite strong, and
there is no evidence that the benefits of any other postsecondary outcome are comparable.
Students who attend briefer postsecondary programs are committing to often significant
expenditures with little return. Next, we show that there is reason to believe these students
chose such a path because they had doubts about their ability to complete a four-year
program due to expectations of volatility in their own lives.
2.4 Empirical Evidence
In this section we use our three nationally-representative data sets to provide evidence of
the following relationships: (1) educational attainment expectations are positively related to
actual attainment even after controlling for a host of covariates; (2) one important avenue
through which expectations can affect attainment is the decision of what type of postsec-
ondary institution (public vs. private vs. for-profit; four-year vs. short-term) to attend after
high school; (3) adverse shocks, in the forms of both past events and expectations for the
future, are negatively related to educational attainment expectations even after controlling
for a host of covariates; and (4) the strong predictive power of high-school performance for
final attainment may in part represent the impact of adverse shocks on attainment expecta-
tions, and in turn the impact of attainment expectations on the incentives to work hard in
high school.
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2.4.1 Expectations and Attainment
Jacob and Wilder (2010) show that ELS respondents who expect to complete college are
more likely to enroll in college. Yet our interest is in whether they are also more likely
to complete college, so we investigate that here. Jacob and Wilder (2010) also suggest
that the explanatory power of expectations for enrollment may have declined over time.
However, they note that this is at least in part due to the fact that the variance of attainment
expectations was lower in their most recent data, from the ELS2002. Because the NLSY
survey collects expectations as a percentage chance of graduation rather than a categorical
response, a decrease in variance may be less of a concern in the use of those data.
As we saw in Section 3.3, educational expectations are strongly correlated with attain-
ment across the data sets. In order to at least suggest causality - that is, to suggest that
students’ expectations with regard to graduation influence their enrollment and persistence
decisions - we control for growing sets of covariates, including demographics, socioeconomic
background, adverse shock history, and academic performance, in linear probability models
of college completion. The results can be found in Tables 15 and 16. In the NLSY (Table
15), the subjective percentages supplied by respondents are collapsed into quartiles. In both
cases, the introduction of control variables reduces the magnitude of the estimated effect of
expectations on graduation probabilities. However, that effect remains significant even after
the inclusion of all the above-noted covariates.8 The NLSY specification shows that believ-
ing one has at least a 50 percent chance of earning a bachelor’s degree may be something
of an inflection point, while estimates from the ELS suggests that an expectation of some
college predicts no greater a probability of graduation than an expectation of just a high
school diploma. This latter effect may in part be due to students who plan in 10th grade to
8The predictive power of expectations increases in the NLSY after academic performance is included,
but this is likely due to a severe (and presumably selective) reduction in the sample size owing to the many
missing test scores in this data set.
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earn a vocational certificate or associate’s degree and then carry out that plan. In any case,
these results lend credence to the idea that expectations have a causal effect on eventual
attainment.
2.4.2 Expectations and Postsecondary Institution Choice
It may come as no surprise that the type of educational institution at which a student
begins postsecondary education has a significant effect on that student’s final attainment
outcome. However, since this choice of postsecondary path is a key mechanism by which we
hypothesize that expectations impact attainment, it is important to establish as specifically
as possible what final attainment looks like at the many different available institution types
available to graduating high school students. Final attainment is summarized by the kind of
postsecondary school respondents first attend after high school in Tables 17 (NLSY) and 18
(ELS).9 A few patterns emerge across both data sets. First, not many students who start at
two-year programs go on to attain a bachelor’s degree. About a quarter of such students at
public and non-profit institutions do so, while very few at briefer for-profits do so (11 percent
in the NLSY and just 4 percent in the ELS). The failure of students who start at for-profit
institutions to earn bachelor’s degrees in fact carries over to their longer-term programs; less
than 30 percent of students in four-year programs at for-profits attain that degree. Around
half of for-profit students never earn any credential. Two-year programs at all kinds of
institutions display this pattern, however. To be sure, there is certainly selection in terms
of who applies to and attends such programs. But investment in two-year postsecondary
programs and for-profit schools appears to be fairly risky.
In Tables 19 and 20, postsecondary institution type is included in multinomial logits
9The institution types include public (Pub), private non-profit (NP), and private for-profit (FP). The
relevant program lengths are also included as separating group characteristics - programs are characterized
as either four years or no more than two years.
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for final attainment in each data set. Even in the presence of demographic, background, and
academic performance10 controls, the effects described above remain stark and significant.
In particular, note that in both data sets, and statistically significantly in the ELS, for-profit
two-year schools appear to increase the probability (relative to a public two-year school) of
a certificate or associate’s degree, but at the expense of the probability of going on to attain
a bachelor’s degree. Again, public and non-profit four-year schools have by a wide margin
the highest rates of eventual bachelor’s degree attainment. Keeping in mind that education
at for-profit schools tends to be more expensive and entail more debt than comparable
public programs, one might wonder if students in attendance were fully informed of their
likely outcomes when they enrolled. However, in the next subsection, we provide another
suggestion for why students might choose programs that lead to lesser returns by exploring
the relationships among expectations, institution type choice, and adverse shocks in more
depth.
If adverse shocks operate on institution type choice through expectations, though,
expectations themselves must clearly have some effect on this choice. The multinomial logit
estimates in Table 21 demonstrate the existence of this relationship in the NLSY. Those
with higher expectations regarding final attainment in the first interview are significantly
less likely to attend public two-year and for-profit four-year programs, and significantly
more likely to start their postsecondary education at a public four-year school, even after
demographics, socioeconomic status, and academic performance have been accounted for.
The HSLS contains a few specific variables of particular use in refining our answer
to the question of what influences postsecondary institution type choice. HSLS respondents
report their ninth-grade expectations with regard to the income they could earn with various
levels of educational attainment, how sure they are in ninth grade that they are “capable”
of completing a bachelor’s degree program given enrollment, and, once they are in eleventh
10Due to sample size concerns, academic performance controls are included in estimation in the ELS only.
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grade, how likely they think it is that they would qualify for financial aid in postsecondary
education if they applied. All these questions refer to factors students might incorporate
in their final attainment expectations, but which are not directly related to adverse shocks.
Thus, if we control for them in a model of institution type choice, we can be more confident
that any estimated effects of shocks or attainment expectations are related to uncertainty
about future adverse events. In addition, HSLS report in ninth grade whether they plan to
enroll in a bachelor’s degree program in the first year after high school. We can thus use
this variable to narrow the sample and assess what may cause such plans to be derailed.
Postsecondary attendance is also reported by the type of degree pursued as well as the type
of institution attended, permitting a more precise estimation of the actual decision being
made by each student, along with indicators for taking a break before enrolling and the
reasons for such a break. The relevant variables from the HSLS are summarized in Table 22.
Adverse shock indicators in the HSLS have been summed for the intra-wave periods 2009-
2011 and 2011-2016 for purposes of concision and clarity; the first sum includes indicators for
absence of a father figure, changing schools, the death, illness, divorce, or unemployment of a
parent, a respondent’s own serious illness, having a child,11 and having one’s home foreclosed
on, while the second period sum includes only indicators for the parent- and illness-related
variables since these are the only relevant questions asked in the most recent survey wave.12
Results from estimation of a multinomial logit model of postsecondary program type
choice in the HSLS are contained in Tables 23 and 24. In both cases the sample is narrowed
to those respondents who stated in ninth grade (survey year 2009) that they planned to
11As discussed in more detail in Section 2.5, childbearing is both a particularly significant predictor
of attainment and more than just an adverse shock - it has long-term effects and is potentially highly
endogenous. However, its inclusion in or exclusion from this sum has no impact on the final results of this
estimation.
12It might be noted that a smaller proportion of individuals say they are sure they could complete a
bachelor’s degree program than expect to complete one. The dummy variable indicating confidence in one’s
own ability is valued 1 only for those who report that they “strongly agree” with the statement that they
could earn a degree if enrolled. Nearly half say so; most of the rest merely “agree” with this statement, while
few students “disagree” with it, strongly or not.
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enroll in a bachelor’s degree program after high school. Table 23 demonstrates that despite
the inclusion of variables indicating whether and why students take a break before enrolling
postsecondary school, whether they are confident in their ability to complete a four-year
program academically, and their confidence about qualifying for financial aid in addition to
all the usual controls, attainment expectations have a statistically significant effect on the
choice of degree program after high school, increasing the probability of enrolling in public
or non-profit four-year programs at the expense of two-year programs.13 The incorporation
of shock variables in Table 24 reduces the sample to a great degree, but two results are
pertinent: the estimated effect of expectations is still large and in the expected direction,
and instability also has a significant effect on institution choice, increasing public two-year
enrollment. It seems clear that, to the degree that the HSLS can be said to measure them,
students’ predictions regarding their own academic ability and financial aid eligibility are
not driving the relationships among instability, attainment expectations, and outcomes.
Finally, we can examine the degree to which postsecondary institution choice accounts
for the relationship between expectations and final attainment. Tables 25 and 26 report
results from estimation in the NLSY of a multinomial logit model for attainment, given
enrollment in some kind of postsecondary program. In Table 25, expectations are included
as a predictor of attainment along with demographics, background, and high school GPA. A
higher subjective probability of college graduation clearly has a positive relationship with the
final true probability that an individual will earn a bachelor’s degree, with any expectation
over 50 percent increasing that probability in a statistically significant way, reducing the
probability of never attaining any credential. When we incorporate institution type14 in
Table 26, however, note that these relationships are halved in magnitude and insignificant.
13Earnings expectations also have no impact on the significance of this relationship and are themselves
typically insignificant predictors of program type choice (results available on request).
14The excluded category is public two-year school.
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Demographic effects are not altered nearly as much. Meanwhile, attending a public or non-
profit four-year school now significantly increases the probability of earning a degree. Results
from similar estimation in the ELS tell the same story, if not more starkly: the estimated
effect of expectations on attainment given enrollment is reduced by three quarters after the
introduction of postsecondary school type. A probit model for whether a student remains
enrolled in some program as of the last wave of the HSLS also shows that introducing program
type halves the positive and significant effect of attainment expectations.15
It appears that institution type selection accounts for most of the impact of expec-
tations, which precede that selection, on outcomes. A question of paramount importance,
then, is how are expectations generated? Do they owe at all to patterns of adverse shocks?
2.4.3 Adverse Shocks, Decision-Making, and Attainment
Table 27 summarizes the rates of a wide variety of adverse shocks among NLSY respondents
for the full sample and by final attainment.16 Outside of a few parental issues (hospitaliza-
tion, divorce, and unemployment), respondents with less final education are more likely to
have reported all these problems during their teen years. In particular, having an absent
father, changing schools, seeing someone shot, and parental incarceration seem to trend very
strongly with final attainment.
Do these childhood shocks predict educational attainment expectations? Results from
an ordered probit model of expectations in the ELS,17 reported in Table 28, suggest that they
do. Here, our adverse shock indicators are collected into sums within large categories: family
shocks (absent mother or father and changing schools) and victimization shocks (feeling
15ELS and HSLS results available on request.
16The set of adverse shock variables in the ELS, as well as the patterns by final attainment, are quite
similar and excluded here in the interest of space.
17Recall that ELS expectations are reported as an anticipated final attainment level, like a high school
diploma or a bachelor’s degree.
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unsafe, high neighborhood crime rates, and being the victim of various crimes) during high
school, and postsecondary shocks (divorce or death of parents, own or family illness, or
being the victim of violence) which occur after graduation. First, note that the last type of
shock do not have any relationship to attainment expectations. This makes some sense, as
these shocks occur after expectations are collected, and any power a student’s expectations
regarding these events are likely to have with respect to educational expectations ought
mostly to be captured by the student’s record of past shocks. Second, in the presence of
most of our control variables, both family and victimization shocks during high school have
a significant negative effect on attainment expectations. Third, this effect is insignificant if
high school performance is included in the model. What this may represent in terms of the
possible effects of shock events will be addressed in the next subsection.
Because attainment expectations are gathered at multiple ELS survey waves, it is
possible to estimate the effects shock events can have on changes in those expectations over
time. Table 29 contains results from a linear probability estimation of a reduction in a
student’s attainment expectations from at least a four-year degree to any level less than a
four-year degree. Victimization shocks have a persistent effect, increasing this probability
even when all our covariates are included. This suggests that students are altering their
educational expectations in response to negative events happening in their own lives.
Of course this may be because such shocks make it difficult to prepare for college or
keep one’s grades up in high school classes - in other words, students’ actual probability of
graduating college may drop because of negative impacts on high school performance, rather
than increased subjective probabilities of future shock events, and a downward revision of
expectations makes sense even without concern for future instability. However, the NLSY
provides us with a way to test this hypothesis. As we saw in Table 14, expectations regarding
future instability are higher among individuals who eventually attain less education, and
it appears that revising attainment expectations downward in response to concern about
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future adverse shocks makes sense since those who fail to do so may be less likely to earn
a degree even once they enroll. Table 30 gives some indication that the effect of instability
expectations on attainment may operate in part through attainment expectations, since
these are much lower for those with negative forecasts for their futures across all available
types of potential adverse shocks. In addition, Table 31 reports results from ordered probit
estimations of attainment expectation quartiles including expectations regarding other events
and increasing sets of controls. The negative impact of student expectations regarding
arrest, pregnancy, and death is persistent and significant, though reduced somewhat by the
introduction of controls. Note as well that the size and significance of some adverse shock
indicator coefficients is reduced from earlier results by the presence here of expectations
regarding future shocks, suggesting that past shocks operate on attainment expectations in
part through expectations regarding other types of adverse events.
Finally, we estimate a linear probability model of college completion including expecta-
tions concerning both adverse shocks and attainment, as well as demographics, shocks, and
high school performance, as covariates. Results are reported in Table 32, and several patterns
are of note. First, there is a negative effect of expectations regarding adverse shocks on the
probability of graduation, but this effect is mostly accounted for by attainment expectations
themselves, which thus appear to adjust, appropriately, for concerns about future instability.
Moreover, the significant effect of attainment expectations persists through the inclusion of
all our other covariates, including high school performance, though it is reduced somewhat.
Last, some adverse shocks have significant negative effects on attainment, though these are
somewhat muted in comparison to previous results once all covariates are included.
In this subsection, we have provided evidence that adverse shocks impact expectations
with regard to future instability as well as educational attainment, and that in turn these
expectations affect educational outcomes, in part mediating the relationship between shocks
and final attainment. In Section 2.5, we attempt to assess these relationships in greater
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depth, acknowledging the obvious data and identification concerns.
2.4.4 Expectations and High School Performance
In some of the results in the previous subsection, high school performance (grades and test
scores) appeared to account for the effects of shocks or expectations on final attainment.
However, there are multiple explanations for why these performance variables might be
related to attainment expectations in a negative way, and not all suggest that expectations
are merely a byproduct of a decision-making process impacted only by ability. For instance,
if reduced attainment expectations (possibly the product of past or expected future adverse
shocks) reduce the projected value of enrolling in college in the first place, a student will
have less incentive to perform well on those measures that most directly affect their ability
to enroll - that is, grades and test scores. That is to say, a student who believes college
is a risky proposition even with good grades and scores due to the likelihood of future
instability may disregard the value of earning those grades and scores. This is one reason
why we have referred to these metrics as “high school performance” rather than “academic
ability” - instability in one’s personal life can have an impact on educational investment, both
directly and through its effect on incentives. Thus, the strong predictive power of grades and
test scores for attainment may in part be one channel through which expectations become
accurate, through something of a self-fulfilling prophecy.
To assess the possibility that this mechanism is in operation, the relationship between
shocks and grades - particularly changes in grades over time, since these might be thought to
reflect changing circumstances rather than innate ability - must be estimated. Final GPA is
available in both the ELS18 and the NLSY, and we attempt to proxy for pre-shock “ability”
using 10th grade test scores in the ELS and 9th grade GPA in the NLSY. If adverse shocks
18The GPA variable used here is recorded categorically by half-points (e.g., 3.0-3.5) in the ELS.
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and the attendant changes in expectations (estimated in the previous subsection) have a
negative impact on grades, we would suspect that the mechanism described above is at
work. In fact, we estimate that adverse shocks during high school do have such an effect.
Tables 33 and 34 show that in both the ELS and the NLSY, respectively, adverse shocks
are estimated to reduce final grades in a statistically significant way relative to our proxies
for prior ability. In particular, an absent father, parental incarceration, feeling unsafe, and
being victimized stand out as impactful shocks across both data sets.
2.5 Modelling and Identifying Educational Decisions
All the results discussed in the previous section are obviously only suggestive. We have
said little about the actual educational decision-making process — whether past adverse
shocks in fact translate into greater expected future volatility, how both relate to educational
expectations, and how big a role these expectations play in educational choices. In addition,
there are clear concerns about endogeneity when it comes to subjective expectations and
actions taken based on them, which we describe in detail below. In this section, we push the
empirical analysis and modelling into this uncertain territory in part to demonstrate what
questions we can and cannot answer confidently as the data stand, and to suggest what
further information would be necessary.
2.5.1 Two-Stage Least Squares: Assumptions, Issues, and Esti-
mates
One of the most basic results discussed in Section 3.4 is that attainment expectations have
an independent effect on final actual attainment. But given concerns about unobserved
heterogeneity governing both beliefs and outcomes, as well as the possibility that some
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students have already made their decisions with respect to education at the time they are
asked to assess their probability of college graduation and answer based on this (reverse
causality), we need a more rigorous econometric approach. For instance, if a valid instrument
for attainment expectations in a model of actual attainment could be found, these concerns
would be alleviated. This is not a simple exercise, as Jacob and Wilder (2010) note. But while
there are some issues which we discuss below, the variables in the NLSY recording subjective
probabilities assigned to future adverse shocks have some promise as an instrument.
As shown in the previous section, much of the relationship between expectations re-
garding adverse shocks and attainment could be explained by (their impact on) expectations
regarding attainment itself, and these probabilities are otherwise strongly related to attain-
ment expectations. We might also think that subjective probabilities placed on things like
being arrested or experiencing a pregnancy are likely to be less correlated with unobserved
academic ability than subjective probabilities placed on college graduation (though admit-
tedly not entirely uncorrelated). In this case, we have something resembling an instrument
for a two-stage model regressing attainment on those expectations.
Before proceeding to the form of and results from such a model, however, we discuss
in more detail the assumptions necessarily being made and their validity. First, we must
assume that attainment expectations are sufficiently strongly predicted by the instability-
related expectations variables we use as exclusions in the final model. Given our prior results,
this is certainly true, particularly with respect to subjective probabilities regarding arrest
and pregnancy.
Second, in a two-equation model of attainment and attainment expectations, we must
assume that everything included in the second equation is exogenous with regard to the
error in that equation. In particular, this means that once we control for demographics,
background, and past instances of instability, expectations regarding future instability (ar-
rest and pregnancy) are not correlated with omitted variables that pertain to educational
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expectations. This is unlikely to be strictly true; respondents may be influenced by their
understanding of probabilities in their responses, there are likely personal characteristics
which govern general uncertainty or fear about the future for which we cannot control but
which impact all these subjective probabilities, and it is of course possible that a respon-
dent’s expectation regarding whether they will graduate (or attend) college causally impacts
expectations with regard to instability. This last possibility is of particular concern, as it is
easy to think of an individual who would not predict impending arrest or pregnancy if they
believed they were about to enroll in college, but since they do not anticipate this educa-
tional event, the subjective probability they assign to these other events increases. In fact,
such expectations and the decisions to which they are related could all be determined jointly.
Without more detailed information about the process by which each respondent formulates
their set of expectations, it will be difficult to alleviate this issue completely.
Third, we must assume that, controlling for demographics and past instability, expec-
tations regarding future instability — specifically the ones which will appear only in the
attainment expectations equation, those regarding pregnancy and arrest — do not have an
impact on final attainment except through their influence on attainment expectations. We
have some mixed evidence with regard to this assumption, which we cannot test perfectly.
In Table 32 we also showed that the coefficients on arrest and pregnancy expectations are
greatly reduced in size and significance by the inclusion of categorical attainment expecta-
tions in a model of college attainment. Table 35 attempts to express this finding in a slightly
different way: here we see that the addition of instability expectations (in column 3) to a
LPM of college attainment hardly changes the coefficients on attainment expectations at
all. In contrast, the presence of demographic or shock event variables in the model notice-
ably reduces these values. In addition, the last column shows us that coefficients on arrest
and pregnancy expectations are quite small and insignificant in such a model when all the
other controls are included. This may serve to lessen our concern with regard to this third
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assumption.
If we make these three assumptions, it allows us to estimate a two-equation model like
that contained in Table 36. Specifically, we estimate the two-equation system
Y = Xβ4X + Iβ4I + Eβ4E + ε4
E = Xβ5X + Iβ5I + Fβ5F + ε5,
where Y is the outcome (college graduation), X are demographic and background variables,
I are reported instances of past instability in the respondent’s life, F is our average subjec-
tive probability variable which represents expectations regarding future instability, and E
is the raw subjective probability assigned to college attainment. We apply the assumptions
discussed above and treat educational attainment expectations E as endogenous.19 Taking
a look at Table 36, we see that expectations regarding college attainment, estimated as the
result of (among other variables) expectations regarding pregnancy and arrest to which they
are negatively related, have a significant positive effect on graduation probabilities. In the
end, these results are in keeping with key relationships we are seeking to show exist. How-
ever, given the nature of the data, we may remain concerned about the soundness of the
assumptions needed to estimate this relationship, particularly with regard to the exogeneity
of instability expectations in a model of attainment expectations. The actual process of ex-
pectations formation, key to our understanding of the impact of the expectations themselves,
likely must be investigated in a more detailed way if the approach explored here is to be
applied formally. One way to perform this investigation would be via estimation of a model
of dynamic discrete choice like the one discussed in the next subsection. However, given the
nature of currently available data, there are identification concerns with this approach as
19The subjective probability assigned to death in the next year is included in the equation for college
graduation but not that for attainment expectations. Removing it or including it in both equations does not
have an appreciable effect on the results.
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well, concerns which we propose to remedy via the data collection described in Section 2.6.
2.5.2 A Simple Structural Model and Identification Concerns
Building on our preliminary and reduced-form analyses of the data, our structural analysis
begins with a formal decision-making model. The model provides an explicit conceptual
framework that relates beliefs about shocks, anticipated completion probability, and beliefs
about returns to educational investments and student decisions. The analysis in Section
3.4 proposes possible relationships among variables as well; however, these relationships
are somewhat ad hoc. The benefit of the structural model is that it allows us to use the
economic theory of dynamic decision-making to represent and estimate what are often highly
non-linear relationships between beliefs and optimal choices.
Suppose, for instance, that individuals have a choice set denoted ∆ = {N,C, T,E, I},
where N represents no action, C is attending college, T is attending a short-term institution
like a trade school, E is entering the labor market (“employment”), and I is engaging in
illegal activity that generates income. In any period t, any individual can choose any of the
above actions, though certain states of the world will mechanically eliminate specific choices
(e.g., once a college degree is earned, the individual will never choose C again because there
will be no benefit to doing so). The choice of an individual i at time t, dit, should be thought
of as representing an attempt to perform the given action; it is not a guarantee that the
action will be completed, as described below.
The set of state variables will be denoted Z, and the vector of their values for a given


















where Xit are demographic and background variables, Si is i’s childhood history of shock
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events which remains constant from t = 0 and thus is not indexed by time, the ydit are the
total years spent in each state corresponding to action d ∈ ∆, ri,t−1 is the true outcome
(“reality”) of the previous period’s choice di,t−1 (which again may not be identical to that
choice), Ddit are indicators for possession of a degree of type d ∈ {C, T}, and F dit are indicators
for having dropped out of a school of type d ∈ {C, T} (dropping out to be defined below). At
t = 0, all these values are equal to zero except Xi0 and Si, which represent the “endowment”
of i. All variables contained in Xit either are constants or evolve deterministically (e.g.,
ageit = agei,t−1 + 1).
Years in state d evolve according to the following simple formula for all d ∈ ∆:
ydit = y
d
i,t−1 + 1[ri,t−1 = d].
For d ∈ {C, T}, a failure indicator is generated by:






(1di,t−1 = d) (1ri,t−1 = N)
That is, if i had failed out of school type d as of the previous period, that status remains, but if
not, then the current failure indicator is equal to one if the previous period’s choice was d but
the true outcome was N (which as described below is the only possibility other than d), and
zero otherwise. Finally, cd represents the cost of choice d, and wr represents the wage earned
in true outcome r. It will be assumed that cN = 0 and wN = wC = wT = 0.20 The costs
of the other choices are functions of demographics, background, and whether the previous
state was equal to the current choice: cd = cd (Xit, ri,t−1); the last stipulation characterizes
switching or startup costs. Expected income in the working states (legitimate and illegal) is
a function of demographics, background, the previous state, years of experience in the chosen
20In principle it would be possible to include work-study states like “CE” and “TE” to represent students
who work while in school and thus do have positive income.
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We expect, for instance, that wE is enhanced significantly if DCit is equal to one.
The reality rit generated by choice dit is either equal to that choice or to N , the “no
action” state. This is determined by a draw against the probability αdit for each state. That
is, for action choice d, there is probability αd that the action will not be completed and the




that the action will succeed and
the final state will be rit = dit. Obviously, α
N is irrelevant. We can assume that αI = 0. For
choices C and T , a final outcome of N represents dropping out as defined above. For choice
E, final outcome N represents failed job search and unemployment. These α are functions
of all state variables: αd = αd (Zit). Thus, these probabilities of failure are the only values
in the model which depend on i’s history of shock events, which can serve as an identifying
exclusion (more on this later).
All the tools to formulate the individual’s value function are now in place. Letting ZS
represent the set of state variables not including the individual history of adverse shocks S,
the value function is:


















+ βE [V (Zi,t+1|Zit, dit, dit)]
]
.
Here u is the flow utility from the real outcome of the current action choice and the expec-
tation of future value is taken over the probability of next period’s outcome given the choice
that will be made based on the final state of the current period. β is of course the discount
rate.
This value function can also nest other explanations for the attainment gap — available
assets could be allowed to affect the cost function or an additional consumption choice, and
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information deficits could be captured by uncertainty or systematic errors in the expecta-
tion operator. As they concern adverse shocks and the probability of completing a degree,
though, the objects of greatest interest are the α. They govern the riskiness of the avail-
able educational investments. However, there are some serious questions related to these
parameters with which we must grapple before estimating the model in this fashion.
Issue 1: What are the α in theory? In the model above, the α are specified as known
functions of a student’s history of adverse shocks. But it could sensibly be argued that
the model ought to differentiate between the true probability of failure and the perceived
probability. The latter is obviously what enters decision-making processes. But the former
is what can be measured in the data, even accounting for issues of selection. It is possible
to write a model in which the true α are latent parameters about which students learn via
Si. But how much can be known about what this learning process looks like? Would it be
possible to ask students direct questions that lead to a characterization of their probabilistic
thinking and updating? We hope to address these questions as discussed below in Section
2.6.
Issue 2: What are the α in the data? Certainly, the quantities represented by the α
in the above model are related to the subjective probabilities supplied by NLSY respondents
with respect to their earning a bachelor’s degree. Of course, we do not have similar variables
representing expected success rates of other activities, educational or otherwise. But there
is a more important issue with the nature of these data, which can be exposed clearly by
adding detail to the example described in Section 2.1. In the NLSY, respondents are asked
the probability that they will have a college degree by the time they are age 30. Suppose the
respondent answers 40 percent. While this information is useful, it is difficult to understand
what exactly it reflects about decision-making and household instability. It could be the
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case that a respondent has little interest in going to college because he’d rather pursue a
career as an artist, and therefore places just a 40 percent probability on enrolling in college.
In this case, he must be placing a 100 percent probability on earning a degree provided that
he enrolls. Thus, household instability does not appear to play a role in this respondent’s
decision and it is not clear that an intervention is needed. Alternatively, a student may
want to go to college and obtain a four-year degree, placing a 100 percent probability on
enrollment. However, this student may face such a massive amount of household instability
that he believes the probability of finishing after enrolling is just 40 percent, since there is
a 60 percent of a degree-derailing shock. In this case, a policy intervention breaking the
link between degree interruption and degree derailment could be helpful in avoiding wasted
potential. Notice, however, the shortcomings of existing data: in both cases, the NLSY
respondent would answer 40 percent even though the mechanism underlying the probabilities
and the appropriate set of policy responses are vastly different. How do we tease out the
many different contributing probabilities, just one of which is most relevant to the question
at hand?
More generally, there are too many mostly unobserved uncertainties entering a subjective
probability of college graduation in the period before application and enrollment decisions
are made. In the model, we would like the α to represent a very specific uncertainty — that
over the possibility that an adverse shock event will occur while a student is enrolled in a
postsecondary program and force that student to drop out of their institution of choice. What
national survey respondents believe about this particular probability and how they arrive at
these beliefs remain unknown. In addition, there are of course concerns about numeracy and
errors in subjective probabilities beyond basic uncertainty — this issue is clearly visible in
the responses given with regard to the probability of one’s own death within one year in the
NLSY. In Section 2.6, we describe a survey instrument designed to alleviate these problems.
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In order to reap the benefits of estimating a model like the one described above, which
include assessing interventions that alter students’ beliefs, the accuracy of those beliefs, or
the probability that adverse shocks occur or lead to educational derailment, this survey and
interview approach is a necessary tool.
2.6 Survey Instrument and Model Development
In order to address the gaps in data collection exposed above, we have designed a survey in-
strument which collects the following specific information, in addition to basic demographic
and background information: (a) records of many types of adverse shocks similar to those in
nationally representative data sets, both before and after leaving high school; (b) the level
of information gathered by each individual in the postsecondary decision-making process;
(c) application, admittance, and attendance history, and the rationale behind the decisions
involved; (d) the nature of the individual’s postsecondary education program, if applicable,
and the rationale behind this choice; (e) any history of breaks, transfers, or dropping out,
and the reasons for these events; (f) expectations regarding events in the individual’s future,
including where applicable: application to and enrollment in postsecondary schools, likeli-
hood of completion given enrollment in different types of programs, eventual educational
attainment, adverse shock events, and educational disruption due to such events; and (g)
attitudes towards risk. As they pertain specifically to beliefs and adverse shocks, question
types include:
↪→ Probabilities of educational attainment outcomes;
↪→ Expected payoffs to different educational trajectories;
↪→ Probabilities of adverse shock events;
↪→ Range of anticipated adverse shock events (i.e., what events students worry about).
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A draft of the full survey instrument is contained in Part I of the Appendix document.
Given that concerns about uncertainties and gaps in the data are the main reasons
for administering this survey, gathering responses which very specifically address these gaps
is paramount. In the process of refining the survey instrument to this end, what is known
as a “cognitive interview” process will be used.21 This involves two separate but related
approaches to assessing the process by which respondents answered each question. First,
pilot interview subjects will be asked to communicate aloud, to an interviewer, what they
understand each question to mean as they read it, as well as the thought process which
leads them to the answer they eventually provide. Second, specific follow-up questions will
be administered after completion of the basic survey in an attempt to address potential or
apparent uncertainties. A draft of this follow-up cognitive interview is contained in Part II
of the Appendix document.
An open-ended interview, in which respondents are asked to speak at length about
their personal histories of shock events, their educational experiences, their decision-making
processes, and their expectations for the future will also be conducted with pilot subjects.
Part III of the Appendix document contains a draft of the protocol for these interviews.
We view the process of gathering individuals’ own stories and explanations regarding their
decision-making processes as interacting, potentially iteratively, with the process of the-
oretically modeling these processes, so open-ended interviews may reveal the necessity of
refinements to the model delineated in Section 2.5.2, which has been designed to remain
agnostic as to the specific cause or causes of gaps in educational outcomes and nest expres-
sions of the many phenomena that interviews can reveal. A crucial and novel feature of our
research design is thus that while our structural model is rooted in formal economic theory,
21Cognitive pre-testing is often used to assess how well questions work when they are fielded, and whether
they capture the scientific intent of the question. These interviews focus on whether respondents understand
the survey question as well as whether they feel they are able to provide answers. This allows us to identify
and improve any questions that are difficult to answer (see Desimone and Floch (2004)).
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it will also be tailored to align with students’ own descriptions of how they make or have
made decisions. We envision the procedure as outlined thusly:
1. An economist familiar with formal models of dynamic decision-making, but unfamiliar
with our specific research aims, is asked to explain in layman’s terms the intuition
behind the model we posit.
2. Students’ own descriptions of their decision-making processes are collected in surveys
and open-ended interviews.
3. An assessment is made of the similarity of the descriptions supplied by the economist
and the interviewees, and if this similarity is insufficient, the model is modified in
corresponding ways.
One difficulty is of course developing a method of accomplishing the comparison described in
the final part of this procedure. One possible answer is to employ text similarity metrics, of
which Gomaa and Fahmy (2013) provide an overview. Answers provided in the open-ended
interview sessions can inform the simpler survey questions in a similar fashion as well.
In this way, the benefits of employing a variety of methods in concert in investigat-
ing our research question become clear. At the crux of this methodology is the idea that
structural economic modelling represents an attempt to express the thought processes of
decision-makers in a useful — systematic — way. Looked at the right way, this is rather
similar to the attempt our interviewees make to express their own thought processes in open
discussion with interviewers. Following the economic theory that informs the structural
model to an estimable expression of the problem sheds light on what data are needed, via
identification issues. Any lack in these data suggests specific requirements with regard to
implementable survey questions. Moreover, the answers supplied by interviewees function
as descriptions of the very mechanisms we are attempting to model, in turn revealing what
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may be lacking in the theory. This interplay, enhanced by the cognitive interview approach
which digs deeply into the way respondents think about the subject matter, forms an it-
erative method of discovering potential mechanisms by which outcomes may be generated,
either through theory or respondents’ words, checking the one method against the other
until the theoretical and social models “converge.” Our belief is that, in this case, asking
questions suggested by theory and reformulating the theory based on the responses will bring
the economic structural model delineated above and the true process by which most individ-
uals make decisions about education into alignment, permitting accurate and useful policy
analysis on a large scale and an a priori basis.
2.7 Conclusions
As the decision-making process is not yet fully understood, it is not clear what specific
interventions might be recommended once our data collection and analyses are complete.
However, we speculate that interventions could include some combination of: information
and counseling; follow-up to re-engage students who interrupt degrees due to adverse shocks;
modification of full-time student requirements; modification of length of scholarships; and
informing students of these changes when they are at the point of decision making. One
important input in this process is the insight of community partners at institutions which
deal with the kinds of students experiencing concern about adverse shocks and degree non-
completion. In Baltimore, for instance, the Baltimore City Community College (BCCC) has
been integral to the process of initiating surveys as well as that of conceptualizing potentially
helpful interventions. This kind of institutional buy-in can be as important in the completion
of projects requiring an approach like that described in this paper as are the models and
estimation procedures.
This specific notion hints at the underlying purpose of this paper. Though the empirical
84
results and structural model we present require refinement, the process by which we propose
to pursue that refinement is, we believe, a novel and valuable contribution in itself. We
suggest that different research modalities — the theoretical, the empirical, the qualitative,
the personal — can not only supplement one another, stacking one kind of evidence on
another, but can in fact complement one another, increasing the reliability and impact of the
final product. Structural models of choice under constraints and qualitative interviews about
individuals’ experiences of such choice can symbiotically inform one another’s development.
In other words, the social sciences can be more than the sum of their siloed parts. It is our
sincere hope that this approach can be improved upon and replicated in other contexts in
which decision-making is a key subject of study.
85
Chapter 3
Involuntary Quits, Bargaining Power,
and the Wage Effects of Labor Market
Policy
3.1 Introduction
As research on the relationship between employment and housing (Desmond and Gershenson,
2016), transportation (Smart and Klein, 2015), and parenthood (Blau and Tekin, 2007;
Tekin, 2007) demonstrates, the size and variability of costs and necessities associated with
employment have significant ramifications for workers’ outcomes. Certain strains of public
policy, including public housing, transportation, and subsidization of child care, aim to
remedy these issues for some workers. Assessments of the employment status effects of
such policy abound, but analysis of effects on wage outcomes for the employed are more
I would like to acknowledge helpful comments from Nicholas W. Papageorge and Robert Moffitt.
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scarce. In addition, as I show in my first chapter, narrowly targeted policy has the potential
for economically relevant spillover effects on apparently ineligible groups in the context of
statistical discrimination.
In this paper I aim to more completely answer the question of how to capture the sum
total effect of labor market policies that reduce the costs of employment or their volatility. I
use a variation on a model of wage bargaining in the context of job search to make predictions
regarding the impact of these policies on wages for various groups of workers, and assess these
predictions empirically using data from the SIPP and the example of child care subsidization.
It may seem obvious that bargaining power affects the degree to which workers can capture
profits from productivity increases, but esults from both theoretical and empirical analysis
suggest that not only the size, but even the sign of the wage effects of employment-cost
policy is dependent on the bargaining position of the worker relative to the firm. This is
because, as is apparent from the model, a reduction of workers’ cost of employment can
generate additional surplus for both parties to a potential employment relationship. Strong
firms are able to eat workers’ additional surplus as well as their own, taking advantage of
reduced reservation wages (the minimum value workers will accept in exchange for work).
Workers with greater bargaining power, however, can leverage their increased value to firms
— and how this value is increased is key — to negotiate higher wages. If both exist in a
given economy, a mix of wage effects from a policy can be masked in the average and appear
insignificant, as is true here.
This result is significant because it implies a compounding of worker advantages each
of which can be affected by public policy. In particular, I show that union membership
and concentration bear the relationship with wage outcomes predicted by the model for
bargaining power, or a proxy therefor. Insofar as policy matters for union strength as well as
the costs of employment, the two can be expected to have compounding effects on workers’
wages. In fact, the bargaining model implies that policies affecting workers’ employment
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stability in particular will generate a stronger interaction effect, a relevant concern when
weighing the value of such interventions.
In treating unionization variables as reflecting bargaining power, I contribute to two
related strands of economic literature: that concerning labor’s share of income, and that
reflecting the labor market impact of unions and unionization. In his overview of the former,
Krueger (1999) notes that, among other purposes, factor shares of income are used to “infer
the division of rents between workers and firms,” as in Blanchard (1997). Of course, in
analyzing or estimating a model of wage bargaining, that is precisely the division we seek to
pin down. Flinn (2003) demonstrates that the demand-side data produced in the process of
measuring labor’s share can be used to identify the bargaining power parameter in a model
of job search and matching. The author estimates that this parameter is around .4 in the
U.S. economy, meaning that 40 percent of rents are captured by labor. However, Dey and
Flinn (2005) suggest that for workers earning not much more than the minimum wage, this
number is more like 25 percent.
The labor share literature has sought to identify the causes of a decline in the pro-
portion of profits turned into wage income that has generally taken place across advanced
economies since the 1980s. For instance, Autor et al. (2017) suggest that “superstar firms”
that start with a lower labor share have captured a larger market share. Guscina (2006)
finds that while the positive share effect of locational union density is marginally statisti-
cally insignificant, the effect of “employment protection” as reflected by an index, and thus
the bargaining power of labor more generally, is positive and significant. Leblebicioğlu and
Weinberger (2017) show that banking deregulation, and thus easy firm access to credit and
bank competition, is one cause of the decrease in labor’s share in the U.S., while Elsby,
Hobijn, and Şahin (2013) suggest that offshoring explains a significant proportion of the
change but substitution of capital for labor does not. The latter paper’s results with regard
to unionization are inconclusive, but the authors note that industry-specific fluctuations in
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labor’s share of income are in fact quite common, only masked prior to the 1980s, and that
the more recent decline has been led by the trade and manufacturing sectors in which unions
are much more common. Meanwhile, Kristal (2013) argues that the decline of unionization
in the U.S. has been a significant contributor to within-industry decreases in labor’s share
of income, concentrated in construction, transportation, and manufacturing,1 and finds that
union density is a significantly positive predictor of share outcomes in these industries. Re-
sults from Fichtenbaum (2011) corroborate this, suggesting that about 29 percent of the 17.9
percentage point decline in labor’s share of income in the period between 1997 and 2006 can
be explained by a decline in unionization.
How important are unions generally? Blanchflower and Bryson (2010) find that in
the U.K., significant wage premia exist for unionized workers, particularly in the public
sector, and Sojourner et al. (2015) show that in the U.S. service sector, unions have positive
productivity and wage effects, but negative effects on employment. Regarding right-to-work
laws,2 Farber (2005) finds that such legislation, by impinging on union formation, may even
reduce nonunion wages.
The results in this paper suggest that union membership and union concentration do
have a positive effect on the share of profits individual workers receive in the form of wages,
and that in fact these institutions can alter the impact of policy interventions that decrease
the cost of employment by allowing workers rather than firms to claim more of the resultant
common surplus. This conclusion has relevance for both policy that focuses on the relative
bargaining power of workers, such as that dealing with union rules, and firms and policy that
1The author advances the interesting argument that the force often cited as causing firms to substitute
into capital and fewer, more skilled workers — technological change — may also enhance the ability of firms
to counter, circumvent, or prevent workers from building union strength.
2“Right-to-work” laws bar unions from negotiating contracts which condition future employment on
union member status. This theoretically weakens unionization in a given state. Moore and Newman (1985)
summarize the early literature on such laws, suggesting that their effects are minimal; however, Ichniowski
and Zax (1991) and Ellwood and Fine (1987) suggest that unionization rates and organizing, respectively,
are reduced by right-to-work legislation.
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focuses on the costs of employment for workers, such as child care subsidization. A brief
review of the literature regarding the employment effects of child care policy is contained
in my first chapter, along with a summary of research involving job search models with
bargaining of the type employed in this paper.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section 3.2 I exposit a model of
wage bargaining adjusted to reflect the realities of separation costs for firms and instability
regarding the costs of employment for workers. Empirically testable predictions result. After
describing my data in Section 3.3, I examine these predictions’ correspondence with reality
in Section 3.4. I also assess the ability of simulations based on an estimated version of the
theoretical model to produce wage change results like those described in that section. I
provide concluding remarks in Section 3.5.
3.2 Model
In this section, I formulate a model of wage bargaining which accounts explicitly for the
impact of demographic group separation rates on wages. The theoretical model will abstract
from the contextual process of job search by workers or employee search by firms, except
insofar as workers enter the negotiation process with a reservation wage presumably based
in part on the value of the unemployed state, while firms know that each employee presents
a risk of needing to be replaced in the future, at a cost, when a separation occurs. The
bargained wage lies between the reservation wage and the firm’s revenues from the match,
less the wage and the expected cost of separation.
As in my first chapter, firms’ inability to tell the difference between worker subgroups
within gender categories will be relevant, but the emphasis will be different. Here, the key
issue is that this lack of information means the reservation wage firms assume, or allow for,
when deciding on a wage offer differs from the individual worker’s true reservation wage.
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Workers with an expected disutility of employment that is greater than the relevant gender
average, such as mothers who need to fund child care, will have a higher true reservation
wage than the reservation wage level against which firms will negotiate. Workers with a low
expected disutility, such as childless women, experience the opposite. The important point,
though, is that any policy which affects the quit probability or reservation wage (or both)
of some subgroup of one gender will alter the wage outcomes of all workers in that gender
group.
The model is based on a Nash bargaining system embedded in the classic search and
matching framework. Unemployed workers match with firms at a given rate, and upon any
match between a worker and a firm in this framework, a match-specific productivity level θ
is revealed. The bargaining power parameter α determines how much of the match surplus,
the difference between θ and the worker’s reservation wage, will be offered to the worker
in the form of the wage. The worker decides whether to accept such an offer and enter
the employed state or to remain in the nonemployed state and continue searching. In the
canonical model, there is usually a constant rate of exit from employment called the “job
destruction rate,” φ. It is at this rate that employees exogenously return to the nonemployed
state.
In order to explain the empirical patterns in Section 3.4, I make four important ad-
justments to the essential bargaining framework used in a basic search and matching model.
First, I associate a cost with separations which must be borne by firms. This cost reflects
any severance or other costs of actually separating from an employee, as well as the cost of
replacing the employee, including search.
Second, not all separations occur at a universal and exogenously determined rate, and
the method by which some separations are generated impacts the value of employment to
the worker. Specifically, workers incur a disutility cost from employment that varies over
the course of the employment relationship. All workers begin any employment relationship
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with a disutility level c. In each period, with probability λ, an employed worker draws a new
disutility level from a distribution with cumulative distribution function (CDF) F . The cost
of employment represents both the psychic costs of working and the pecuniary costs, such as
transportation, any materials or training not provided by the firm, and (importantly for this
paper) child care. The variability of these costs represents any variability in these values for
the worker — minor illnesses or injuries or a volatile workplace can cause the psychic costs of
work to vary, while a vehicle breakdown or a child care arrangement suddenly falling through
can bring about an increase in the pecuniary costs. When these costs increase significantly,
the wage at which the individual is working may no longer be adequate to cover them. As
I assume no renegotiation of wages is possible,3 this results in the worker quitting the job
and generating separation costs for the firm. The probability of a separation is therefore
the probability of a quit, specified further below, plus the exogenous rate of involuntary
separation φ.
Third, I allow the probability of a quit to vary across groups of workers by allowing
the distribution from which their periodic cost draws are made to vary with group charac-
teristics. Most significantly for this context, the probability of a costly separation ending an
employment relationship is allowed to vary by demographic characteristics including gender
and the presence of children. A worker from demographic group g thus enters any employ-
ment relationship with “base” disutility cost cg and draws new cost values from distribution
Fg.
Finally, I assume that firms can see workers’ gender, but not their family structure.
They therefore project quit probabilities based on this limited knowledge. This, plus the
fact that quits negatively impact firms’ bottom lines, leads to statistical discrimination in
the hiring process against those in the gender group that includes the most quit-prone
3This assumption particularly makes a good deal of sense at the low end of the wage distribution, in
occupations on the front lines in retail and other service industries. Ransom and Oaxaca (2010) find that
women in these occupations, in particular, have a low quit-rate elasticity with respect to wages.
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workers. The more quit-prone gender group in the data used in this paper as well as in
general is women, and the quit-prone subgroup largely driving this gender gap is mothers
of young children. This assumption also creates the potential for spillover effects from any
policy that impacts a specific gender subgroup based on family structure, such as child care
subsidization. It generates the gap discussed above between the reservation wage levels of
workers who appear identical to firms. For example, if mothers (women with kids, group
fk) frequently incur a greater (psychic and pecuniary) cost of employment than childless
women (group fn) due to child care costs, their initial cfk would be greater. And because
child care arrangements are potentially volatile, the distribution from which mothers draw
new cost values, Ffk, would have a greater variance in addition to a larger mean.
In combination, as I demonstrate in Section 3.2.1, these features mean that the model’s
prediction concerning the relationship between wage offers and a change in quit rates is
ambiguous. In particular, a change in quit rates resulting from a decrease in the cost or
cost variance of employment will have opposing effects on the wage negotiation, decreasing
the expected cost of the employment relationship for both the firm and the worker. The
sign of the resultant change in the wage will in large part be determined by bargaining
power: if workers’ bargaining power is great, they enjoy most of the surplus generated by
a longer employment relationship, but if that power is small, firms may be able to seize all
these profits and in fact lower wages because workers are happier with their more stable,
lower-cost labor market experience. Childless women’s reservation wages are not affected by
the policy directly. However, since their search prospects will change based on the wages
on offer, the value of the unemployed state will be altered for them, in turn generating a
change in their reservation wages. In fact, if women’s wages rise (resp. decline) overall, this
implies a larger (resp. smaller) reservation wage for childless women, reinforcing the effect
on the average outcome. However, this change will be secondary relative to the change in
mothers’ reservation wages. The most important thing to hold in mind is that, due to firms’
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inability to distinguish women at a high risk of quitting from those at a low risk, a policy
that alters the quit-proneness of only the high-risk group will affect wage offers to all female
job applicants identically.
3.2.1 Specification
In the employment state, individual i pays a flow utility cost cit, where t is the number
of periods since being hired; for workers in group g, ci0 = cg. New employment disutility
levels are randomly drawn at frequency λ from a group-specific distribution Fg (c) which
has support C = [cg,∞), and the cost remains at the drawn value until a new draw is
taken. Fluctuations in cit explain quit behavior because if a high employment cost value
is drawn, the present discounted value (PDV) of employment to the worker decreases, and
may decrease enough to alter the worker’s decision with regard to their current employment
arrangement. A critical cost value depending on the wage, c∗g (w), will therefore exist on
each job above which the worker will quit, and the probability of drawing a quit-inducing




. When a new draw of cit induces a quit by a worker or an
exogenous demand-side separation occurs, firms pay a cost cF .
Denote the value of the nonemployment state for a group-g worker by V Ng . After
rearranging terms in a Bellman equation expression, the value of the employment state at
wage w to the worker at the time of wage negotiation can be expressed as









w − cg + λ
[∫ c∗g(w)
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V Eg (w, c) dFg (c) +
∫ ∞
c∗g(w)
V Ng dFg (c)
])
, (3.1)
where individuals and firms discount the future at shared rate (1 + ρ)−1 and c∗g (w) is the
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critical disutility value generated by the prescribed wage. While employed, the worker earns
the wage w and pays the cost of employment cg, but also anticipates new draws from Fg
which will either alter the continuation value of the employed state if below c∗g or cause a
return to V Ng if above that critical value.
The value of a group g worker to a firm in a match with productivity value θ is
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Each period, then, the firm reaps θ in revenue but pays out wage w and is at risk of paying
the separation cost.
The Nash bargaining wage function is expressed
wg (θ) = arg max
w
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I assume that if there is no wage for which both
(
V Eg − V Ng
)
and V Fg are positive, no offer
occurs. If I additionally assume that the firm knows each worker’s group g and thus their
initial cost and cost distribution, it is possible to show that the wage resulting from a Nash


















































If quit rates were constant with respect to the wage, the derivatives of the value func-
tions for the employee and the firm would be equal to one and negative one respectively,
and the complex quit probability expression could be replaced by a constant. However, in
the present case, an increase in the wage does not only transfer instantaneous flow value
from the firm to the worker; a wage increase also reduces the probability that a future cost
draw will induce a quit, increasing the expected duration of the match and conferring some
additional value on both parties. Firms therefore have some incentive to offer a wage that
is higher than would otherwise be optimal in order to keep quit-prone workers on the job.
This significantly complicates analysis, and it seems reasonable to expect that the
effect (or firms’ reactivity to it) would be relatively small and in any case tend to inflate any
relationship between wages and quit rates otherwise implied by the model. So, I suppose
that c∗ depends not on the wage, but instead on θ — workers are still less likely to quit high-
productivity jobs, but firms cannot influence their propensity to quit by offering a higher
wage than is otherwise justified. In this case, c∗ is taken as a constant for any specific job
and the derivative terms simplify as noted above, resulting in the following wage expression:
w = α
[







g − λF (c∗) (ρ+ φ+ λ)
−1 (cg − E [c|c ≤ c∗])
]
. (3.5)
Note that if firms expect too high a cg or Fg, there may be no offer made where one could
in fact be mutually beneficial. If firms’ expectation of Fg is too low, they may make a
losing offer, since the worker is more likely to quit than expected; on the other hand, if their
expectation of cg is too low, they may make an offer that the worker will refuse, since their
belief about the negotiating floor is wrong. Incorrect expectations regarding these factors
are precisely the result of the limited information case described previously, in which women
96
with and without children look identical to firms.
Within gender groups, family structure subgroups with greater expected flow disutility
from employment will have a smaller V Eg and a larger quit rate at any wage level than
firms project, while subgroups with smaller expected disutility experience the opposite. The
direction of the net effect of these misalignments — the effect of statistical discrimination —
on wages is theoretically ambiguous. In most applications of statistical discrimination theory,
it is assumed that firms are discriminating on differing productivity, so that the direction
of the predicted wage effect is obvious. Here, however, the differentiating characteristic,
proneness to quits due to family instability, also impacts workers’ reservation wages — a
more likely quitter must also be paid more in order to agree to work in the first place,
since the higher potential disutility of employment is what generates more frequent quits.
Thus, firms may statistically discriminate without having a discernable effect on wages in
particular, as Section 3.4 suggests that, on average, they do.
In Section 3.2.2, I show that the sign of the relationship between quit probabilities and
wages depends on α. Intuitively, this result owes to the fact that, in this model, increased
quit rates harm both parties to an employment relationship in a unique way — quits are
not merely productivity concerns, but represent an imposed cost for firms as well as the
loss of an income stream to workers and a return to the unemployed state. While the
voluntary decision to quit might typically be thought of as necessarily utility-maximizing,
this picture is muddied when the workers under consideration are those on whom policies
like child care subsidies ought to have the greatest effect in terms of reducing quits. Such
workers would likely prefer to work but for a pressing family concern. Greater cg and Fg
do not only represent an increase in the quit rate, but also an increase in the expected
disutility of the employed state. After such an increase, then, the surplus available in the
employment relationship is squeezed out from both sides — firms are more likely to lose a
worker and pay a quit cost, so they see a reduced expected profit, and workers are more
97
likely to experience hardship, so they increase their reservation wages. If the bargaining
power of firms is extremely great, though, the wages they offer are already quite close to
the reservation wage, which is the negotiating floor. If this floor is raised by increased
employment disutility, firms may need to increase these offers simply to hire workers at all
(on what would still be, for the firms, relatively lucrative contracts).
3.2.2 Wage Determination and α
What determines whether an “increase” in Fg, and the attendant increase in quit probability,
drives group wages down? I will define such an increase as a shift to a new disutility
distribution which is first-order stochastically dominant (FOSD) to the original. In the




is reduced for all w — that is, quit probabilities
increase for all jobs, in addition to the increase in the expected cost draw. Assume that
any change in Fg shifts cg in the same direction — an increase in quit probabilities comes
with an attendant increase in the base cost of employment.4 If we (somewhat informally)
take the functional derivative of the wage in Equation 3.5 with respect to Fg, expressing the
operation as d
dFg
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. (3.6)
If and only if this expression is negative does a FOSD shift of Fg reduce wages. However,
its sign is ambiguous and depends in a significant way on the bargaining power parameter.
4This need not be true in theory, obviously, but it makes sense as applied to the scenarios concerning
child care or transportation costs.
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The relevant uncertainties become clearer upon examination of the individual terms in this
expression.





greater than zero, meaning that the sign is that of the derivative term. This derivative is
negative due to the FOSD shift assumption. Thus, in the extreme case in which α = 1
and workers own all the bargaining power, wages will fall when quit probabilities increase.
Workers receive all the profit from the employment contract, but increased quits eat into
that profit (in expectation) by generating greater turnover costs for the firm. This is the
expected result.
However, consider the second summand, the bracketed term multiplied by the firm’s
bargaining strength (1−α). The first term inside the large brackets is positive by assumption,
while it is clear that the second term, the derivative of the value of the nonemployment state
with respect to Fg, is negative because the value of that state is derived entirely from the
potential for employment draws, all of which decrease in value when employment costs
increase. Thus, ambiguity in the sign of the second summand is already present.
Focusing on the remaining values, the sign of the first term in the small brackets
depends on how the difference between the base cost cg and the expected contract-life cost
change with Fg. Intuitively, we expect that an increase in Fg ought to increase the expected
value of a new cost draw on the job, meaning that this term would be negative. It should
be noted, though, that this is ambiguous, and not just because cg increases by assumption.
Some portion of the distribution Fg is being pushed beyond c
∗, into the quit zone, where the
outcome is just the unemployed state. Only the potential for increased costs that do not
induce quits is of concern here. If previously the individual could expect frequent draws of
employment cost that would make continuing to work difficult, but not impossible — increase
costs near the critical point, but not past it — then the worker would have a relatively high
expected on-the-job cost value, and not anticipate taking home much profit. If a shift of Fg
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pushes these high probabilities to cost draws just beyond the critical value then, provided
the worker continues on the job, the expected cost value may decrease.5 Moreover, because
the sign of the second term in small brackets is necessarily negative, the difference of these
two terms amounts to subtracting a negative value from a value of ambiguous sign. It is
thus quite likely that this difference is positive.
Now, consider the extreme case in which α = 0 and firms own all the bargaining power.
As I have just described, there is a good deal of uncertainty about the sign of the effect of an
increase in quit rates on the wage. In particular, it is more likely to be positive if there is a
large change in the base cost of employment, cg, or if expected on-the-job costs of employment
are larger — in essence, if not only are quits more likely, but employment itself is in general
more burdensome. If firms are very strong in wage negotiations, an increase in the cost
of employment for workers translates into higher wage offers that offset this cost. This is
because firms are reaping all the available profit, and are willing to cover the necessary costs
for workers in order to hire them. Of course, any jobs on which the match productivity falls
between the initial cg and the new, larger value will now make no offer at all, so hiring rates
are lower. Average wages for the whole group of workers may thus go up or down, since they
will more often be making no wage at all. However, among the employed, wages rise.
This of course implies the opposite reaction as well: in the strong-firm scenario, a
decrease in Fg and cg could well lead to decreased wages. Workers may still be better
off, because some of the new surplus is generated in the form of lengthier employment
relationships, fewer spells of nonemployment, and lower disutility during employment. But
measured wages can fall, because firms see the decrease in their employees’ costs, and claw
most of this benefit back in the form of lower wages. The bargaining power parameter
5This may require a bimodal cost distribution. However, such a distribution is reasonable in the cases of
interest; sudden new vehicle repair expenses or child care issues represent potentially large discrete jumps
in employment costs, which suggests a distribution of potential cost draws in which some concentration are
quite low, essentially the same as the starting value, but another concentration are rather high.
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α thus plays a significant role in wage outcomes after changes in quit rates, particularly
after changes in policies that affect the variable cost of employment. If workers are strong,
decreases in costs and quits unambiguously increase wages. But if firms have the bargaining
power, this outcome is ambiguous and wage increases seem unlikely.
The foregoing analysis implicitly assumes that the changes in Fg being discussed are
fully visible to hiring firms — they represent shifts in, for instance, the gender-wide disutility
distribution the firm observes. Since all the value terms (V ·g ) in the wage expressions are
generated based on firm knowledge, the effect on individuals in group g of a shift in Fg will
be reduced to the effect achieved by the resultant shift in the overall gender distribution
known to firms. On the other hand, individuals outside group g in the same gender group
will experience exactly the same shift in wage offers, despite there being no change in their
distribution of disutility or true quit probability — for instance, single childless women in
this model would be forced to bargain based on much higher costs and quit probabilities as
a part of their entire gender group than they would if their full family structure could be
known and they were not forced to pool with the entire gender group. The effect on their
wage offers is of course ambiguous and dependent on α as well. We therefore cannot predict
the wage effects of a policy that alters a group’s (or subgroup’s) propensity to quit, such as
child care subsidization. I explore this implication empirically in Section 3.4, after discussing
the data I use to do so in Section 3.3.
Before proceeding, however, I note that similar types of predictions would look quite
different with the assumptions under which group differences and discrimination are typically
analyzed, that a difference in productivity (perceived or real) drives outcome gaps.6 In this
case, all the added complexity above falls away, and differences in θ drive wage gaps. Since
the derivative of the wage with respect to θ is simply α, a smaller productivity value of
6See Fang and Moro (2011) for a summary of research regarding statistical discrimination, and in partic-
ular the example of Sattinger (1998) which deals explicitly with quit probability but treats it abstractly as
a component of the present discounted value of workers to firms.
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course results in a lower wage regardless of bargaining power — only the magnitude of that
difference in fact depends on the power balance. If such a model were true, policy which
reduces “unproductive” quits ought never to decrease wages. However, as I show in Section
3.4, the data suggest that in some contexts one such policy does just that. The model in
this section provides an explanation for this outcome.
3.3 Data
I employ data from the 2001 and 2004 panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participa-
tion (SIPP). I restrict the working sample to individuals who at all points in the sample are
between the ages of 25 and 55. Individuals who report significant self-employment income
in any period are removed as well,7 along with individuals who ever fail to provide interview
responses in a particular wave.8 Finally, I include in the analytical sample only those indi-
viduals who have no bachelor’s degree, in order to focus on those workers for whom policy
regarding employment stability is most likely to be relevant. This leaves me with 48,216
individuals, each observed in about 29 months on average.
Importantly, the SIPP includes information on whether individuals received public
child care assistance, the specific cause of any job separation9, and the union status of any
employed individual. I thus define the most important analytic variables as follows.
Child Care Subsidies. The key policy variable in this paper is child care subsidy levels.
As in my first chapter, I use the maximum subsidy payout per week to reflect each state’s
7Employment statuses are inconsistently reported in the SIPP alongside self-generated income. This
creates an issue for recording and measuring employment spell durations. Removing such individuals results
in a reduction of the sample size of less than 5 percent.
8Non-interview waves in the SIPP are filled in with imputed data, which generates a relatively large
number potentially spurious employment status transitions. Eliminating these respondents reduces the
sample size by 13 percent.
9This is provided an answer to this question is recorded; around half of transitions from employment to
nonemployment have no cause specified.
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generosity with regard to subsidies.10 I extract child care assistance payment maxima for
state-year pairs from biannual reports produced by the National Child Care Information
Center of state plans for their use of Child Care and Development Fund dollars. Because these
plans were submitted biannually, states’ child care subsidy maxima are set at constant values
for two-year periods. Figure 9 shows the trajectories of child care subsidy policy by state
over the eight-year course of the two SIPP panels. It demonstrates that there is meaningful
variation in maximum subsidy levels both among states in each year and within many states
over time. For use in reduced-form estimation, I standardize the subsidy maximum variable
so that coefficients represent the effect of a one-standard-deviation increase in the maximum
subsidy value.
Occupational Groups. I control for occupation throughout this paper, primarily using
a simplified structure which includes four job categories constructed so that the educational
requirements and wage outcomes of their constituent occupations, as evidenced by the SIPP
data, are relatively similar: high-end, mid-tier, and low-end services, and manual work. High-
end services include management, STEM occupations, and sales of financial services and large
durables like homes and vehicles (i.e., non-retail items). Mid-tier services covers personal
and health services and clerical work. Low-end services include hospitality, food service, and
retail, while manual occupations include trades like construction and manufacturing as well
as mechanics and transportation. These parsimonious groupings suffice to control for any
relevant occupational effects and reverting to the larger set of controls does not alter my
results.
Group Quits. The group quit rate I assume firms use to negotiate is calculated for groups
of employed workers defined by their gender, age (younger than 40 or not), occupational
10See my first chapter for further discussion of child care subsidy policy.
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group, and region, within the year in which the observation takes place. The rate is simply
the number of quits that occur each year in each group thus defined divided by the number of
months spent employed by workers in the group, multiplied by 100. The events which count
toward the rate include quits due to working conditions, departures for new jobs, illnesses
and injuries, departures for familial obligations or school or retirement11, and voluntary quits
for “other” reasons.
Contextual Union Concentration. Even in the simple canonical model of job search,
worker bargaining power is notoriously difficult to identify with supply-side information
alone. Since in this context I am interested in bargaining power that differs by group,
the question is even thornier. Demand-side data can be used to identify the bargaining
parameter α in a broad sense, but the SIPP does not contain such data. One intuitive proxy
for worker bargaining power, however, is union membership — we expect that union jobs
come with more negotiating strength on the worker side. The issue is that union membership
is of course endogenous to wages. Thus I construct a variable reflecting the prevalence of
unions in the demographic groups relevant to each worker, which I will call “contextual union
concentration.” I define the groups as in the construction of group quit rates above, and
calculate a unionization rate for these groups in the same way as the quit rate: I divide the
number of months in which group workers report employed union membership by the total
number of months spent employed by group workers and multiply by 100. I exclude each
individual’s unionization status from the calculation of their contextual union concentration
in order to avoid endogeneity concerns, as I note in Section 3.4.1.
Summary statistics for key variables can be found in Table 37. Among the employed,
male wages are on average $3.34 higher than female wages, a 25 percent difference over the
female average. Meanwhile, quit rates are larger for women, occurring in 0.37 percent of
11Retirement and departures for school are quite rare due to age restrictions placed on the sample.
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their employed months as compared with 0.24 percent for men, a 35 percent difference. Men
are also much more likely to be unionized, at a 19 percent rate rather than the 10 percent
rate for women. This is of course likely related to the occupations in which these workers
are employed. This is why contextual union concentration is calculated within, rather than
across, broad job categories.
3.4 Union Concentration and Wage Outcomes
In this section I assess the relationship of wages to group quit rates, the impact of employment
stability policy on wages via this relationship, and the mediation of all of the above by
bargaining power. If quits are simply a productivity concern for firms, we may expect that
an increase in bargaining power would inflate the benefits of stability policy for workers, as in
the model above. However, we would also expect to find that reducing quits has a universally
positive relationship with wage outcomes. But if quits are generated by changes in the the
cost of employment, there is potentially a more complex relationship between quit rates and
wages. In particular, if results demonstrate that the effect of reducing quit probabilities can
have a negative effect on wages in certain contexts, it would rule out the productivity model,
but the evidence would be compatible with the model described in Section 3.2.
The operative example of employment stability policy is child care subsidization. As
noted, there are low income caps on eligibility for such subsidies in the United States. I thus
restrict my sample to those individuals with less than a bachelor’s degree in order to focus
on those workers more likely to potentially be impacted by subsidy policy.
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3.4.1 Empirical Approach
To examine the model predictions outlined above, I estimate a linear regression model of the
log wage:
ln (wiτ ) = β0 + βu (UCiτ ) + βcc (CCiτ ) + βint (UC × CC)iτ + βXXiτ + εiτ , (3.7)
where UCiτ is the union concentration in worker i’s group, CCiτ the standardized weekly
child care subsidy maximum in worker i’s state at time τ , and τ is used to denote the period
within the panel (since t represents time in the current spell in the theoretical model). As
covariates in the vector Xiτ , I include race and ethnicity (dummies for black, non-white
non-black Hispanic, and other non-white), marital and disability status, education (whether
the individual has a high school diploma or attended some college), age and its square,
other state-level policy variables (worker’s compensation generosity, unemployment insurance
benefit maximum, and minimum wage), and fixed effects for year, state of residence, and
occupation. I treat each person-month as an observation and thus cluster standard errors at
the individual level.
I first estimate Equation 3.7 without the interaction term in order to establish the
estimated effect of the quit-reduction policy on wage outcomes across contexts for the full
sample as well as male and female subsamples. I then introduce the interaction term. The
coefficient βint captures the way the wage effect of subsidy policy changes with the union-
ization context. If it is positive, then as union membership becomes more prevalent within
one’s gender, age, area, and occupation groups, the wage impact of child care subsidies be-
comes more positive. This would be a valuable result in itself, but would not distinguish the
model in Section 3.2 from a basic productivity model of the subsidy’s effects. However, if
in a low-union-concentration context the estimates suggest that the wage effect of child care
subsidies would be negative, the result would contradict the productivity model and support
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the inclusion of a nuanced structure for the value of the quit probability.
It is worth discussing the use of a “worker group union concentration” variable, rather
than an indicator of each worker’s own current or eventual union status. The latter is
of course endogenous with respect to the wage — union formation tends to occur in low-
wage occupations and amongst those who make lower wages within broad occupational
categories, and the concentration of union workers in specific worker groups may well be
linked to (lobbying for) policy efforts on that group’s behalf. All these connections muddle
any relationships to be estimated among wages, unions, and policy effects. In addition, it
is possible and maybe even likely that union presence in contextually relevant jobs — those
held by workers with the same characteristics in the same broad occupational category —
enhances the outside option for workers, increasing their reservation wages and thus their
negotiating position. For these reasons, group union concentration makes the most sense as
a proxy for worker bargaining power.
However, I also apply a 2SLS approach in which individual union status and its in-
teraction with child care subsidization are endogenous variables instrumented by the union
concentration variable and its interaction with child care subsidization. That is, I estimate
a model of the form:




u (Uiτ ) + β
IV
cc (CCiτ ) + β
IV
int (U × CC)iτ + β
IV
X Xiτ + ε
IV
iτ ; (3.8)
Uiτ = γ0 + γu (UCiτ ) + γcc (CCiτ ) + γint (UC × CC)iτ + γXXiτ + νiτ ; (3.9)
(U × CC)iτ = δ0 + δu (UCiτ ) + δcc (CCiτ ) + δint (UC × CC)iτ + δXXiτ + ηiτ , (3.10)
where Uiτ is a dummy indicating the worker’s own union status and the X vector contains
all the same covariates as in Equation 3.7.
In order for such a model to be viable, certain things must be true. It is reasonable to
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suppose that union concentration in one’s state, occupation, and gender group will signifi-
cantly influence one’s own union status, and results in Section 3.4.2 corroborate this. I must
also assume that all the variables in the second and third equations above are exogenous with
respect to the associated error terms. But of course, an individual’s own union status con-
tributes directly to the basic calculation of contextual union concentration described above.
Therefore, in this IV context, I use contextual union concentration as calculated from all
individuals in the group other than individual i. Finally, if I want the estimated coefficient
on Unioniτ to represent the true relationship between union status itself and the wage, I
must assume that union concentration influences individuals’ wage only through its effect on
the probability that each worker is a union member. My suggestion above that contextually
relevant union concentration might increase the wages of nonmembers appears to contradict
this, and imply that I will arrive at overestimates. However, remember that union status is
here not the true variable of interest, but a proxy for that variable, bargaining power; the
degree to which union concentration enhances bargaining power in other ways is in fact part
of what I hope to capture. However, I interpret the 2SLS results with caution, and merely
as a check on the basic estimates.
3.4.2 Results
The central estimation results are reported in Table 38. Gender and union status have a
statistically significant effect on wage outcomes, with men and union members receiving
higher wages by a margin of around 25 percent in each case. The effect of the worker’s own
union membership on the final wage is smaller for women than for men, but still signifi-
cant. However, the estimated coefficient on child care subsidization is not only statistically
insignificant, but negative.12 If we want to believe that child care subsidies positively affect
12In results not reported here, I estimate that this is true even for recipients of subsidies, whether by
restricting the sample to this group or by interacting the subsidy generosity effect with a dummy indicating
108
the productivity or labor market attachment (and thus the value to firms) of any workers,
these are worrisome results.
The introduction of contextual union concentration reveals a nuanced story within the
estimates. There are no effects for men of child care subsidies or their interaction with union
concentration, as expected. Yet estimates suggest that without any union power, increases
in child care subsidy maxima (and therefore reductions in female quit rates) would in fact
significantly reduce wages for women. In such a case a one-standard-deviation increase in
the subsidy maximum is estimated to reduce wages paid to all female workers by about
two percent, which translates to around a quarter per hour, or $500 per full-time year, for
the average worker in this group. In this case, firms are able to capture an outsized share
of the surplus generated by reduced quits, while workers may still be better off due to the
increase in the stability of their home and work lives. Another way to describe this would
be as a reduction in the costs of work to potential laborers, of which firms take advantage.13
However, with each percentage point increase in unionization, the wage-enhancing power of
child care subsidies rises in a statistically significant way. At under 18 percent unionization,
which is around the 80th percentile for state-year observations among women, subsidization
begins to raise wages.
Table 39 reports estimates from the instrumental variables model. In the first stage
for all workers, an increase of one percentage point in contextual union concentration is
estimated to increase the probability that an individual worker is in a union by nearly one
percentage point.14 F-test scores for this instrument suggest that, though it may be weaker
for female workers than for male, it is strong enough to provide good estimates in the second
receipt.
13It is thus possible that net wage offers rise, since child care costs are not being taken out of each paycheck
at the same rate. However, measured wages, and payroll costs to firms, decline.
14Recall that the individual is excluded from the calculation of contextual union concentration, so this
is result does not owe to a mechanical correlation. If the individual is left in the relevant concentration
calculation, the coefficient on this variable in the first stage increases by approximately one tenth of a
percentage point.
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stage in each group. The second-stage estimates corroborate the qualitative story told by
the OLS results: child care policy has no wage effects for men, but for women who are not
union members an expansion of child care subsidization reduces wages. Again, the estimate
suggests that a one-standard-deviation increase in subsidy maxima will drag women’s wages
down by 2 percent. However, for female union members, the effect is quite the opposite.
These workers can expect a wage increase of about 13 percent all told with a similar increase
in child care subsidy generosity. All these effects are statistically significant at no less than
the 10 percent level, and the difference in wage adjustment by union status is significant at
the 1 percent level.
Thus, the empirical evidence corroborates the model described in Section 3.2. More-
over, it suggests that the final effects of many labor market policies, but certainly and in
particular those designed to increase labor market attachment by reducing the costs of work,
depend quite strongly on the bargaining atmosphere in which individuals search for work
and firms hire. Worker bargaining power in the form of union membership and union con-
centration can translate the impact of policies having little to do with unions themselves
into more beneficial outcomes for workers.
3.4.3 Search Model Re-estimation and Simulation
In this section I use the estimates generated by the search model in my first chapter to
simulate wage outcomes for workers in different child care subsidy environments under the
assumption of various values of the bargaining parameter α. In order to perform these
simulations I must first re-estimate the parameters of the productivity distribution G (θ) for
each group given the new assumed value of α.15 For example, under the assumption that
α = 1, the productivity distribution that explains the wage outcomes in the data will be
15In the original estimation, α is fixed at 0.3.
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essentially the same as the distribution of wages itself, because workers are capturing all
surplus in the form of their wages. But under the assumption that α = .2, the productivity
distribution that explains the true wage outcomes will be concentrated at much higher values,
since firms retain a large proportion of total productivity and a small fraction is translated
into wages. By re-estimating the distributions, I prevent changes in α from generating
absurdly low or high wages in simulation. I fix all parameters of the model other than the
parameters characterizing the lognormal productivity distributions at the values estimated in
my first chapter, and re-estimate the model using a maximum likelihood procedure otherwise
identical to the one in that paper to determine the productivity distribution parameters.
Once this re-estimation has been performed, I use the new distributions and the other
retained parameters to simulate 25,000 individuals just as in my first chapter, under new
assumptions about the wage generating process. In particular, I add to firms’ calculation of
workers’ reservation wage a cost of child care that can be reduced by subsidies. Child care
subsidies still reduce quit rates as in the original simulations, but now also reduce reservation
wages by reducing the cost of employment. Firms add to women’s reservation wages a child
care cost equal to the average subsidy available in the data at a per hour rate, about $3,
multiplied by the fraction of female workers who actually use some form of child care, about
0.21. They subtract from this the child care subsidy value applicable in their state multiplied
by the fraction of eligible female workers who access those subsidies, about 0.12, up to the
average available subsidy (so that even where subsidies are more generous than average, this
difference is never less than zero — firms don’t expect subsidies to provide more than the full
cost of child care to recipients). Child care costs thus add to firms’ estimation of women’s
reservation wages in two ways: some proportion of women have children but do not access
subsidies, so firms assume they pay for care, but there is also an often significant difference
between the supposed cost of child care and the available subsidy, leaving a gap that must be
covered by the worker. In this way, large child care subsidies both reduce quits for recipients,
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making female workers appear more valuable to firms, and reduce employees’ costs, making
work more valuable on net to workers.
I assume for simplicity that there is only one exogenous layoff rate φ on the job market.
In order to demonstrate the effect — specifically the wage gain that results from the imple-
mentation of more generous subsidies — at a reasonable magnitude, I must also assume for
simulation that the cost of a separation to the firm is on the order of $80k. This is around
one order of magnitude larger than the typical separation cost described in the management
literature, though there are some types of recruiting that according to that literature do
cost tens of thousands of dollars. I hypothesize that the main reason for this is that the
model does not account for the demand-side possibility of retaining a vacancy and waiting
for another applicant. In the model, firms choose between making a productive match or
getting zero return, but on the true job market, firms have the option to pay a possibly quite
low vacancy cost and continue searching — many vacancies are not even filled until multiple
candidates have been interviewed. Thus, in order to justify a wage offer in reality, firms
must view the applicant as more desirable than the likely outcome of continued recruiting
efforts (less any vacancy costs), not merely more desirable than no production at all as in the
model. One key extension to the model, then, is a general equilibrium framework in which
firms can weigh these options and make wage offers accordingly. In such a context, a much
smaller cost of separation may justify a larger decrease in the wage offer, since a similarly
productive and less quit-prone worker may be right around the corner.
Given these assumptions, I plot in Figure 10 the difference between average wage offers
received by simulated white women under 40 with a high school education in two scenarios:
all available child care subsidies are set to the maximum level available in any state in
the data ($275 per week), and all subsidies are set to $0. The x-axis reflects (ten times)
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the parameter α, or workers’ bargaining power.16 That is, at each value of α at one-tenth
intervals, I subtract the simulated average wage for women in the no-subsidy scenario from
the simulated average wage for women in the maximum-subsidy scenario, then divide this
difference by the no-subsidy average wage to arrive at a percent change. According to Figure
10, for low levels of bargaining power workers’ wages do not merely remain stagnant, but
in fact fall, in the face of generous child care subsidies. With α = 0.1, this decrease is just
over 2 percent — about the level of wage decrease found in the data for nonunion women
with a one-standard-deviation increase in child care subsidy generosity. However, when
workers have more bargaining power, they are benefitted by the reduction in female quit
rates generated by the introduction of subsidies. At a very high level of worker bargaining
power, α = .9, the increase in subsidy generosity boosts wages for workers by over 5 percent.
Thus, a model of job search and bargaining with the right specification can produce results
on the order of those suggested by the data.
3.5 Conclusions
In this paper, I have demonstrated using a model of wage bargaining that policies which
reduce the cost of employment as well as the volatility of that cost for workers can have
widely varying effects on those workers’ wage outcomes depending on their power in the
bargaining process. Of particular importance is the prediction that wages could fall if workers
have particularly little power — that the cost savings that allow burdened workers to afford
employment could be in part captured by firms who can negotiate those workers down to their
16I plot the difference between the two scenarios because, due to the re-estimation process, average simu-
lated wages decrease as α increases. This does not imply that more worker bargaining power drives wages
down; rather it simply indicates that a search model estimated on the assumption that α is larger will reflect
a productivity distribution with a much smaller right tail in the simulation process, leading to slightly lower
average simulated wage outcomes. A graph of the raw predicted averages, though, may give the false im-
pression that increased bargaining power would be detrimental for a given productivity distribution, which
is not what is depicted in Figure 10.
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reservation wages. I have also provided empirical evidence that this theoretical prediction
is borne out in the wage response to child care subsidies. Female workers, treated as a
homogenous group by firms, see lower wages where subsidies are more generous unless they
have the bargaining power enhancement of union membership, which in fact generates wage
increases for women in otherwise identical contexts.
If the goal of policies like child care subsidization is to “make work pay” for workers
with costs that attend employment, it would seem that a resultant wage offer reduction
for those same workers in response to the policy counteracts that goal. In essence, some
proportion of an in-kind benefit for employees is being transferred to employers, who are
aware that this benefit reduces the basic wage a worker in a certain group requires —
despite the fact that in general such a benefit also increases workers’ value to firms in terms
of expected profits, whether by reducing quits or enhancing productivity. In fact, in a
context of statistical discrimination, many workers who were previously unaffected by the
relevant cost of employment may see their wages decline because their employers are no
longer concerned that any employee will ever need to cover such a cost.
However, this is only a relevant concern in employment relationships in which firms
have the power to pay their employees something close to the bare minimum wage that they
require in order to make working worthwhile. Policy that enhances workers’ ability to bargain
can shift the incidence of the benefit of all complementary labor market policies. In the end,
this may seem an obvious point. However, it is important to hold it in mind when assessing
the effects of other labor market policies; any results with regard to the worker-income effects
of a certain labor market policy may hide divergent outcomes for workers having bargaining
power and workers lacking it. Disregarding union concentration or membership, I estimate
that child care subsidies have no effect on wages. But this conclusion disguises that such
subsidies may well impact wages in counterbalancing ways for workers in contexts that vary
across location and time. This is an important caveat in assessing the effects of specific labor
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market policies, but also in designing a full suite of such policies.
Additional research could assess the applicability of the model and empirical approach
in this paper to other policies addressing the costs of employment, including housing and
transportation. Refining the use of the search-and-bargaining model in similar contexts to
assess the impact of unionization and other bargaining-power shifters on the impact of labor
market policy is an important avenue for future research. It may be possible to use demand-
side data to identify the bargaining power of workers in industry- and union-status-specific
contexts. On the other hand, it appears it may also be possible to calibrate such a model
to predict the wage outcome changes revealed in the data, providing a different estimate
of the parameter α. This would of course impose the assumption that bargaining power
operates in the way I have described here, but could provide a way of estimating, rather
than fixing, α using only supply-side data concerning the impact of variations in bargaining
power alongside that assumption. As noted, the demand side of the labor market is also a
key contributor to these interrelationships, and should be analyzed more directly. All this
remains for future research.
115
Appendix for Chapter 1
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Year
Each line represents the child care subsidy trajectory of a specific state or state group. Lines on
this graph represent the eleven states in the top quartile of the standard deviation of their subsidy
maximum over time.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics by Selected Groups
All Female White Black HS or Less Assoc or Voc Bachelor’s or More
Churn Rate 0.94 1.01 0.85 1.21 1.06 0.96 0.74
–Firing Churn 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.02
–Layoff Churn 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.25 0.22 0.19 0.14
–Match Quit Churn 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.09
–Life Quit Churn 0.20 0.26 0.19 0.23 0.21 0.21 0.15
–Unknown Churn 0.44 0.46 0.39 0.59 0.50 0.43 0.36
Hispanic 0.13 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.09 0.05
Black 0.12 0.13 0.00 1.00 0.13 0.12 0.07
Other NWNH 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.09
Limiting disability 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.17 0.15 0.10 0.04
Married 0.63 0.64 0.67 0.41 0.59 0.65 0.70
Less than HS 0.09 0.08 0.05 0.09 0.24 0.00 0.00
HS Grad 0.29 0.27 0.28 0.34 0.76 0.01 0.00
Some college 0.33 0.35 0.34 0.39 0.00 0.97 0.00
College Grad 0.19 0.20 0.22 0.13 0.00 0.02 0.67
Grad School 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.33
Age 41.38 41.45 41.97 41.00 41.31 42.17 41.32
Num. children 1.00 1.08 0.92 1.01 1.04 0.99 0.98
High Serv 0.41 0.44 0.46 0.31 0.16 0.38 0.76
Mid Serv 0.19 0.31 0.18 0.25 0.19 0.23 0.11
Low Serv 0.14 0.16 0.12 0.16 0.21 0.12 0.06
Manual 0.26 0.09 0.24 0.27 0.43 0.27 0.06
Observations 81477 42346 56740 9935 31025 11315 23005
Observations are individual respondents. Age, children, and churn rates are measured at the end
of the panel. Occupational category is recorded as the modal in-panel value for each individual.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics by Total Number of Separations In-Panel
All 0 1 2 3 4 or More
Churn Rate 0.94 0.00 3.68 6.04 8.54 11.52
Firing Churn 0.04 0.00 0.15 0.29 0.44 0.76
Layoff Churn 0.19 0.00 0.65 1.38 2.35 3.14
Match Quit Churn 0.09 0.00 0.31 0.71 1.24 1.84
Life Quit Churn 0.20 0.00 0.77 1.29 1.56 2.37
Unknown Churn 0.44 0.00 1.79 2.72 3.65 4.85
Hispanic 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.19
Black 0.12 0.11 0.14 0.16 0.15 0.11
Other NWNH 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.08
Limiting disability 0.10 0.10 0.13 0.14 0.16 0.16
Married 0.63 0.65 0.60 0.56 0.51 0.42
Less than HS 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.11
HS Grad 0.29 0.28 0.30 0.32 0.34 0.29
Some college 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.37 0.42
College Grad 0.19 0.20 0.18 0.15 0.10 0.15
Grad School 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.03
Age 41.38 41.61 40.72 39.81 39.78 39.68
No. children in family 1.00 0.99 1.04 1.11 1.14 0.95
High Serv 0.41 0.43 0.35 0.28 0.20 0.20
Mid Serv 0.19 0.18 0.20 0.21 0.23 0.19
Low Serv 0.14 0.13 0.17 0.18 0.20 0.23
Manual 0.26 0.26 0.28 0.33 0.37 0.38
Observations 81477 64146 13177 3090 823 241
Observations are individual respondents. Columns 2-6 divide the sample by the number of job
separation events the individual experiences during the panel. Age, children, and churn rates are
measured at the end of the panel. Occupational category is recorded as the modal in-panel value
for each individual.
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Table 3: Impact of Job Churn on Outcomes
Log Wage Lack HI Poor Hlth Food Inad Own Home Prop Val Welfare
OLS: Supply-Side Churn
Churn Rate -.017∗∗∗ .009∗∗∗ .009 .012∗∗∗ -.012∗∗∗ -.141∗∗∗ .009∗∗∗
Female -.210∗∗∗ -.077∗∗∗ .021 -.019 .081∗∗∗ 1.133∗∗∗ .095∗∗∗
Black -.084∗∗∗ .041∗∗∗ .193∗∗∗ .097∗∗∗ -.216∗∗∗ -2.881∗∗∗ .143∗∗∗
Hispanic -.223∗∗∗ .150∗∗∗ .140∗∗∗ .066∗∗∗ -.109∗∗∗ -1.325∗∗∗ .090∗∗∗
Other NWNH -.038∗ .022∗∗∗ .120∗∗∗ -.009 -.078∗∗∗ -.882∗∗∗ .026∗∗∗
Limiting disability -.136∗∗∗ .006 1.067∗∗∗ .222∗∗∗ -.091∗∗∗ -1.238∗∗∗ .086∗∗∗
HS Grad -.155∗∗∗ .022∗∗∗ .079∗∗∗ .021∗ -.040∗∗∗ -.563∗∗∗ .020∗∗∗
Age .034∗∗∗ -.013∗∗∗ -.014 -.002 .040∗∗∗ .520∗∗∗ -.024∗∗∗
Age squared -.0003∗∗∗ .0001∗∗∗ .0003 -4.19e-06 -.0004∗∗∗ -.005∗∗∗ .0003∗∗∗
Mid Serv -.323∗∗∗ .040∗∗∗ .113∗∗∗ .065∗∗∗ -.093∗∗∗ -1.285∗∗∗ .030∗∗∗
Low Serv -.588∗∗∗ .164∗∗∗ .200∗∗∗ .135∗∗∗ -.180∗∗∗ -2.418∗∗∗ .094∗∗∗
Manual -.391∗∗∗ .103∗∗∗ .197∗∗∗ .096∗∗∗ -.128∗∗∗ -1.737∗∗∗ .064∗∗∗
Const. 2.452∗∗∗ .368∗∗∗ 2.462∗∗∗ 1.431∗∗∗ -.411∗∗∗ -6.271∗∗∗ .497∗∗∗
Obs. 449189 464849 12938 12978 29279 29183 464849
OLS: Demand-Side Churn
Churn Rate -.019∗∗∗ .017∗∗∗ .033∗∗∗ .043∗∗∗ -.018∗∗∗ -.211∗∗∗ .013∗∗∗
Obs. 449189 464849 12938 12978 29279 29183 464849
2SLS: All Churn, Policy IV
Churn Rate -1.022∗∗∗ .094∗∗∗ . . . . .
Obs. 448057 463699 . . . . .
First Stg. F-test 21.00 20.66 . . . . .
OLS and policy IV results for the effects of individual quit history on the following outcomes:
wages, lack of health insurance, poor health, food inadequacy, home ownership, property value
given ownership, and welfare recipiency. Outcomes in columns 3-6 are taken from topical mod-
ules in specific panel waves. State and year dummies included as regressors in OLS models; all
controls present in the top panel are also used in estimation in the middle and bottom panels.
Policy instruments: child care subsidy maxima, worker’s compensation generosity, unemployment
insurance maxima, minimum wage levels. *p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 4: Layoff Rate
All HS or Less Some College Bach or More HiServ MidServ LoServ Manual
Female .030∗∗∗ .080∗∗∗ .016 .003 .008 .052∗ .048∗ .115∗∗∗
Black .036∗∗ .057∗∗ .054∗∗ -.013 .019 .031 .074∗ .156∗∗∗
Hispanic .036∗ .024 .080∗ -.030 .001 .059 .031 .142∗∗∗
Other NWNH .044∗∗ .023 .086∗∗ .018 .034 .061 .055 .124∗
Limiting disability .092∗∗∗ .054∗ .135∗∗∗ .089∗∗ .140∗∗∗ .140∗∗∗ .143∗∗∗ .097∗∗
Married -.063∗∗∗ -.061∗∗∗ -.062∗∗∗ -.069∗∗∗ -.059∗∗∗ -.072∗∗∗ -.026 -.111∗∗∗
HS Grad -.045∗ -.040 . . .018 -.122∗ .060 -.086∗
Some college -.070∗∗ . . . -.042 -.137∗ -.007 -.090∗
College Grad -.065∗∗ . . . -.014 -.179∗∗ -.001 -.176∗∗∗
Grad School -.085∗∗∗ . . -.026∗ -.064 -.178∗∗ .031 -.121
Age -.016∗ -.010 -.029 -.008 -.010 -.040 -.034∗ -.007
Age squared .0002 .00009 .0003 .00007 .00009 .0004 .0004 .0001
CC Rate -.008 -.028 .015 -.010 -.012 .049 -.078∗∗ -.023
Workers’ Comp -.013 -.025 .023 -.036 -.016 .047 .045 -.079
UI Max -.0002 -.00009 -.00008 -.0005∗ -.0006∗∗ .0003 -.001∗ .0003
State minimum wage -.001 -.004 -.0004 .003 .003 -.019 -.004 .004
Const. .848∗∗∗ .817∗ 1.175∗∗ .209 .292 1.492∗∗ 1.463∗∗ 1.249∗
Obs. 1534381 513613 540014 480754 713343 329429 237908 418754
OLS coefficients in regressions for individual layoff frequencies. Column 1 are estimates from the
full working sample, subsequent columns from noted subsamples. *p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01.
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Table 5: Churn Rate
Churn Firing Layoff Match Quit Life Quit
CC Rate -.068∗∗∗ -.001 -.009 -.018∗∗ -.028∗∗
Female .097∗∗∗ -.005 -.007 .004 .115∗∗∗
Age -.087∗∗∗ -.004 -.012 -.014∗∗∗ -.037∗∗∗
Age squared .0008∗∗∗ .00003 .0001 .0001∗∗ .0004∗∗∗
Const. 3.983∗∗∗ .211∗∗ .898∗∗∗ .608∗∗∗ 1.437∗∗∗
Obs. 1925249 1925249 1925249 1925249 1925249
Children in Household
All -.069∗ .0001 -.015 -.028∗∗ -.022
Women -.085 .005 -.021 -.039∗∗ -.035
Men -.048 -.006 -.008 -.012 -.004
Low Serv -.323∗∗ -.023 -.093 -.122∗∗ -.051
No Children, HS or Less
Women -.249∗∗∗ -.00007 -.176∗∗∗ -.005 -.019
High Serv -.031 -.028 -.156∗ .038 .061∗
Low Serv -.302∗∗ .035 -.105∗ -.051 -.132∗∗
No Kids, HS, Labor Force
Women -.323∗∗∗ -.009 -.213∗∗∗ -.009 -.057
Controls Y Y Y Y Y
OLS coefficients in regressions for overall churn and different types of churn rates. Coefficients
in panels 2-4 represent the effect of the child care subsidy maximum on churn in the subsample
described at the top of the panel. *p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 6: Layoff Hazard Rates, Low-Education Women
Young NK Young K Old NK Old K
CC Rate -.320∗ .030 -.167 -.0005
Workers’ Comp -.378 .144 -.160 .335∗∗
UI Max .004 -.0002 .003∗∗ .001
State minimum wage .309 -.008 -.203 .223
Black .560 -.141 .159 .602∗∗
Hispanic .661 .176 .064 .139
Other NWNH . -.003 .702∗ .115
Limiting disability .296 .219 -.079 .775∗∗
Married .469 -.260 -.033 .278
HS Grad -.434 -.306∗ -.467∗∗ -.537∗∗
Age -.418 -.034 .058 -.172
Age squared .006 -.0001 -.0006 .002
Const. -1.937 -3.603 -6.419 -3.730
Obs. 16976 69926 73168 62140
Hazard rate coefficients on child care subsidy maxima from complementary log-log estimation of
event risk. *p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 7: Churn Rate — CC Receipt Interaction, ≤HS Only
Churn Firing Layoff Match Quit Life Quit Unknown
CC Rate -.084∗ .022∗ -.030 -.019 -.002 -.054∗∗
Ever rec CC subsidy .744∗∗∗ .144∗∗ -.016 .282∗∗ .290∗∗∗ .151
Rec CC*CC Rate -.042 -.007 .103 -.044 -.156∗∗ -.012
Female .316∗∗∗ -.002 .080∗∗∗ .016 .145∗∗∗ .077∗∗∗
Black .156∗∗∗ -.003 .057∗∗ -.020 -.015 .114∗∗∗
Hispanic .058 -.035∗∗ .023 -.056∗∗ .029 .073∗∗
Other NWNH .170∗ -.007 .023 -.033 .035 .123∗∗
Limiting disability .799∗∗∗ .087∗∗∗ .054∗ .034 .344∗∗∗ .271∗∗∗
Married -.210∗∗∗ -.051∗∗∗ -.061∗∗∗ -.038∗∗∗ -.004 -.067∗∗∗
HS Grad -.258∗∗∗ -.028∗∗ -.040 -.031 -.047∗∗ -.126∗∗∗
Age -.065∗∗ -.007 -.010 -.010 -.030∗∗∗ -.006
Age squared .0005∗ .00006 .00009 .00005 .0003∗∗ -.00003
Workers’ Comp .111 .005 -.026 -.038 .098∗∗∗ .078
UI Max -.0004 .00003 -.00009 .00002 -.00003 -.0004
Const. 2.383∗∗∗ .260∗ .802∗ .273 .677∗∗ .377
Obs. 513704 513704 513704 513704 513704 513704
Women
CC Rate -.181∗∗ .009 -.068∗∗ -.038∗ -.029 -.068∗
Ever rec CC subsidy .675∗∗∗ .162∗∗ -.023 .217∗ .278∗∗ .136
Rec CC*CC Rate -.028 -.007 .107 -.056 -.155∗∗ .003
Obs. 246620 246620 246620 246620 246620 246620
Women with Children
CC Rate -.115 .017 .011 -.062∗ -.027 -.066
Ever rec CC subsidy .579∗∗∗ .165∗∗ -.015 .204∗ .212∗ .114
Rec CC*CC Rate -.008 -.011 .104 -.072 -.123∗ .006
Obs. 147710 147710 147710 147710 147710 147710
OLS coefficients in regressions for overall churn and different types of churn rates. Coefficients
in panels 2-3 represent the effect of the child care subsidy maximum on churn in the subsample
described at the top of the panel. *p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 8: Fixed Model Parameters
φ1 0.0019 φ2 0.0083
p1 0.768 p2 0.696
α 0.3 p3 0.585
ρ 0.008 p4 0.400
w∗ 2.25
Parameter values fixed prior to structural estimation. The right-hand panel parameters — the high
layoff rate φ2 and the draw probabilities p1, p2, and p3 — are estimated in a first-step maximum
likelihood procedure based on the selected values of φ1 and p4 and initial guesses of all other
parameters as described in the text.
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Table 9: Model Parameters






















µmin -0.176 β5 -0.257
(.006) (.013)
µsc 0.144 β6 0.017
(.005) (.027)
µhi -0.065 β7 0.040
(.015) (.008)
σ1 0.587 β8 0.149
(.007) (.109)
σ2 0.575 β9 -0.002
(.008) (.0008)
σ3 0.625 β10,2 0.055
(.008) (.018)
σ4 0.656 β10,3 0.242
(.008) (.018)










Parameter estimates from maximum likelihood estimation of search model; standard errors in
parentheses beneath each estimate. The β in the right-hand panel are estimated in a separate
probit as described in the text.
125
Figure 2: Outcome Paths by Group in Base Simulation



















































Mean values of wages, employment, and φ values as well as quit frequencies by subgroup in simula-
tion with statistical discrimination and variable child care subsidy maxima based on true distribu-
tion. All simulants begin at time 0 without a job and with permanent characteristics with regard
to parent status, child care and subsidy user status, race, and education (high school or less).
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Age
Male Fem, No Kid
Mother
Layoff Rate
Mean values of wages and employment as well as quit and layoff frequencies by subgroup in SIPP
data at ages corresponding to simulation ranges in Figure 2.
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Figure 4: Outcome Paths by Group in Simulation with Full Information



















































Mean values of wages, employment, and φ values as well as quit frequencies by subgroup in sim-
ulation with firm access to full applicant information (and thus no statistical discrimination) and
variable child care subsidy maxima based on true distribution. All simulants begin at time 0 with-
out a job and with permanent characteristics with regard to parent status, child care and subsidy
user status, race, and education (high school or less).
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Table 10: Simulated Mean Outcomes By Scenario
Base Sim Full Info Max CC Sub No CC Sub
Wages ($)
Men 25.77
Childless Women 21.08 21.58 21.02 21.13
Mothers 20.92 20.95 20.91 20.81
Quit Rates (%)
Men 0.270
Childless Women 0.475 0.474 0.476 0.474
Mothers 0.604 0.603 0.562 0.678
Employment Rates (%)
Men 93.7
Childless Women 91.0 91.4 91.5 90.8
Mothers 89.8 89.6 90.7 88.8
Layoff Rates (%)
Men 0.233
Childless Women 0.266 0.259 0.257 0.271
Mothers 0.278 0.287 0.266 0.290
Mean outcome values for middle 20 years (out of 40) in simulation by subgroup and counterfactual
scenario.
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Figure 5: Outcome Paths by Group in Simulation with Zero Subsidy Al-
lowances



















































Mean values of wages, employment, and φ values as well as quit frequencies by subgroup in simu-
lation with statistical discrimination and child care subsidy maxima set to zero for all individuals.
All simulants begin at time 0 without a job and with permanent characteristics with regard to
parent status, child care and subsidy user status, race, and education (high school or less).
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Figure 6: Outcome Paths by Group in Simulation with Maximal Subsidy Al-
lowances



















































Mean values of wages, employment, and φ values as well as quit frequencies by subgroup in sim-
ulation with statistical discrimination and child care subsidy maxima set to $275 per month, the
largest value for any state in the 2001-2007 period, for all individuals. All simulants begin at time
0 without a job and with permanent characteristics with regard to parent status, child care and
subsidy user status, race, and education (high school or less).
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Appendix for Chapter 2
















No HS HS Diploma Some PS Certificate Associate's Bachelor's Grad school
Black or African American, non-Hispanic







Graphs by Student's race/ethnicity-composite
Final attainment of ELS respondents, sorted by race and ethnicity. “Some PS” indicates that the
respondent attended some postsecondary educational institution, but received no credential of any
kind.
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Graphs by HH Income Grp
Final attainment of ELS respondents, sorted by household income during youth. “Some PS”
indicates that the respondent attended some postsecondary educational institution, but received
no credential of any kind. “Low income” includes households earning less than $35k per year,
“high income” those earning more than $100k per year, and “middle income” those between the
two thresholds.
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Table 11: Data Features
NLSY97 ELS2002 HSLS2009
Timeframe 1997-2013 2002-2012 2009-2016
Start Ages 12-18 10th Grade 9th Grade
Test scores Standardized Survey-admin. Survey-admin. math
HS GPA Yearly Total Yearly
Certificate? No Yes Yes
Educ. expectation Pct. chance bach. Final attainment Final attainment
Shock expectation Pct. chance None None
Exp. elicitation 1997 All four waves All three waves
Reason incomplete No Yes Yes
Final attainment? Yes Yes No
Observations 8,984 16,197 23,503
Essential features of the three data sets used. “Certificate?” denotes whether the data include an
indicator for earning a postsecondary certificate, short of an associate’s degree. “Shock expecta-
tion” describes how (in the NLSY) expectations for future adverse shocks, such as victimization
and pregnancy, are recorded. “Reason incomplete” indicates whether the data include responses
regarding the reason(s) the individual dropped out of any educational institution.
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Table 12: NLSY Summary Stats By Attainment
All No Deg HS Some Coll College
Black 0.26 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.17
Hispanic 0.21 0.31 0.23 0.22 0.14
Low income 0.40 0.61 0.50 0.39 0.20
Mid income 0.39 0.21 0.34 0.40 0.50
Mother: no degree 0.23 0.46 0.31 0.19 0.08
Mother: HS diploma 0.36 0.34 0.42 0.39 0.25
Mother: some coll 0.24 0.15 0.20 0.26 0.29
Mother: Bachelor’s 0.18 0.05 0.07 0.16 0.38
GPA 1-2 0.08 0.22 0.14 0.07 0.01
GPA 2-3 0.50 0.60 0.64 0.56 0.27
GPA 3 and up 0.41 0.12 0.20 0.36 0.72
Math score -0.12 -0.81 -0.54 -0.25 0.26
Verbal score -0.09 -0.44 -0.60 -0.31 0.19
Observations 8984 969 2897 2731 2355
NLSY means for group indicator variables and standardized test scores. Test scores have themselves
been statistically standardized. The “Some Coll” column includes all individuals who attended
some kind of postsecondary institution but never earned a bachelor’s degree (but may have a lesser
credential like an associate’s degree).
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Table 13: ELS Summary Stats By Attainment
All No Deg HS Some Coll College
Black 0.12 0.19 0.12 0.15 0.07
Hispanic 0.14 0.28 0.17 0.16 0.08
Low income 0.28 0.49 0.42 0.31 0.15
Mid income 0.53 0.38 0.46 0.54 0.56
Mother: no degree 0.13 0.38 0.23 0.13 0.05
Mother: HS diploma 0.27 0.33 0.40 0.29 0.18
Mother: some coll 0.33 0.20 0.28 0.37 0.31
Mother: Bachelor’s 0.27 0.09 0.09 0.21 0.45
GPA 1-2 0.17 0.59 0.36 0.20 0.02
GPA 2-3 0.41 0.22 0.47 0.51 0.25
GPA 3-4 0.40 0.02 0.13 0.28 0.73
Math score 50.71 40.73 44.36 49.04 56.87
Reading score 50.53 40.85 44.66 49.17 56.39
Observations 16197 356 1388 6406 5100
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Table 14: Expectations By Attainment
All No Deg HS Some Coll College
ELS
No Diploma 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.00
HS Only 0.07 0.32 0.24 0.06 0.01
Some College 0.10 0.22 0.22 0.13 0.03
Bachelor’s 0.39 0.25 0.35 0.42 0.36
Graduate Deg 0.42 0.15 0.15 0.38 0.60
Observations 16019 352 1368 6346 5067
NLSY
Coll exp 0-25 0.13 0.31 0.23 0.08 0.01
Coll exp 25-50 0.18 0.30 0.25 0.17 0.05
Coll exp 50-75 0.13 0.09 0.13 0.15 0.11
Coll exp 75-100 0.56 0.30 0.39 0.60 0.83
Observations 3546 370 1164 1069 930
Exp: crime victim 14.70 16.64 15.91 15.53 11.43
Exp: arrest 10.22 15.08 11.80 10.51 6.06
Exp: death 18.64 21.06 20.20 19.04 15.30
Exp: pregnancy 7.90 15.24 9.50 6.96 3.97
Observations 3531 367 1156 1068 926
Average expectations responses from the ELS and NLSY. ELS educational attainment expectations
are by final attainment expected; NLSY expectations are stated as a percent chance of completing
a bachelor’s degree, and are sorted into quartiles. NLSY expectations over other adverse events
are stated as a percent chance for the event to occur in the next year. The “Some Coll” column
includes all individuals who attended some kind of postsecondary institution but never earned a
bachelor’s degree (but may have a lesser credential like an associate’s degree).
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Table 15: LPM for College Attainment with Demographics, Shocks, and
Expectations: NLSY
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
College grad College grad College grad College grad College grad
Coll exp 25-50 0.05∗∗ 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.10
Coll exp 50-75 0.24∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗
Coll exp 75-100 0.42∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗
Black -0.06∗∗ -0.02 -0.02 0.14∗∗∗
Hispanic -0.11∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗
Asian or PI 0.15∗∗ 0.15∗∗ 0.14∗ 0.05
Native American -0.04 0.06 0.05 0.13
Multiple races -0.12 -0.11 -0.11 -0.13
Male -0.06∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗
Low income -0.16∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -0.02
Mid income -0.06∗ -0.04 -0.04 0.02
Mother has no degree -0.31∗∗∗ -0.30∗∗∗ -0.30∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗
Mother has HS diploma -0.28∗∗∗ -0.28∗∗∗ -0.28∗∗∗ -0.19∗∗∗
Mother has some college -0.18∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗
Break-in by 18 -0.06∗∗ -0.06∗∗ -0.06
Bullied by 18 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02
Seen shooting by 18 -0.07∗∗ -0.06∗∗ -0.06
Feels unsafe -0.08∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗
Victim of crime -0.01 -0.01 -0.04
Ever homeless, 1997-2002 -0.14∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗ -0.42∗∗
No mother or female guardian in HH 0.00 0.00 0.00
No father or male guardian in HH -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
Changed schools -0.09∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ -0.05
Parent died -0.07 -0.07 -0.14
Other family died -0.03 -0.02 -0.04
Parent hospitalized -0.03 -0.03 -0.06
Parent jailed -0.09 -0.08 -0.08
Parents divorced -0.04 -0.04 -0.09
Parent unemp -0.00 -0.00 0.05
Sibling count -0.01 -0.01 -0.02
Expect: victim of crime 0.00 -0.00
Expect: arrest -0.00 -0.00
Expect: death -0.00∗ -0.00
Expect: pregnancy 0.00 0.00
Expect: get drunk -0.00∗ 0.00





Constant 0.04∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗ 0.03
Adjusted R2 0.12 0.23 0.26 0.26 0.26
Observations 1954 1954 1954 1954 1028
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 16: LPM for College Attainment with Demographics, Shocks, and Expectations:
ELS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Expects > 4 year degree (student) (Omitted)
Expects no degree (student) -0.38∗∗∗ -0.24∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗
Expect HS diploma (student) -0.29∗∗∗ -0.22∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗
Expects some college (student) -0.29∗∗∗ -0.22∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗
Expects 4 year degree (student) -0.11∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗
Expects > 4 year degree (parent) (Omitted)
Expects no degree (parent) -0.50∗∗∗ -0.39∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗
Expects HS diploma (parent) -0.41∗∗∗ -0.33∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗
Expects some college (parent) -0.38∗∗∗ -0.34∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗
Expects 4 year degree (parent) -0.11∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗
White (Omitted)
Black -0.14∗∗∗ 0.01 0.01
Latino/a -0.17∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗
Asian 0.05∗∗ 0.04∗ 0.04∗
Native -0.21∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗ -0.09∗
Multiple races -0.14∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗
High income (Omitted)
Low income -0.14∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗
Middle income -0.07∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗
Controls for mother’s education No Yes Yes Yes
Controls for academic ability No No Yes Yes
Controls for all shocks No No No Yes
Adj. R2 0.17 0.23 0.33 0.33
N 6,553 6,553 6,553 6,553
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 17: Attainment by Type of First PS School: NLSY
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pub2 NP2 FP2 Pub4 NP4 FP4
mean/sd mean/sd mean/sd mean/sd mean/sd mean/sd
No postsec 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Some college 0.74 0.74 0.89 0.33 0.26 0.71
(0.44) (0.44) (0.32) (0.47) (0.44) (0.45)
No credential 0.53 0.46 0.50 0.27 0.21 0.56
(0.50) (0.51) (0.50) (0.45) (0.41) (0.50)
Associates 0.22 0.28 0.38 0.06 0.05 0.15
(0.41) (0.46) (0.49) (0.23) (0.22) (0.36)
College grad 0.26 0.26 0.11 0.67 0.74 0.29
(0.44) (0.44) (0.32) (0.47) (0.44) (0.45)
Observations 1992 39 244 1813 713 91
NP = Nonprofit; FP = For-profit; Pub = Public; 2 = two yr. or less; 4 = four yr.
Table 18: Attainment by Type of First PS School: ELS
Public 2 NP 2 FP 2 Public 4 NP 4 FP 4
Some college 0.78 0.71 0.96 0.35 0.27 0.73
No PS credential 0.47 0.42 0.38 0.24 0.20 0.47
PS certificate 0.15 0.19 0.41 0.05 0.04 0.12
PS associates 0.16 0.10 0.18 0.05 0.04 0.14
College or more 0.22 0.29 0.04 0.65 0.73 0.27
White 0.52 0.54 0.43 0.59 0.65 0.41
Black 0.13 0.15 0.19 0.11 0.10 0.19
Hispanic 0.16 0.13 0.20 0.09 0.07 0.20
Low income 0.32 0.23 0.37 0.19 0.15 0.34
Middle income 0.54 0.60 0.50 0.56 0.53 0.50
High income 0.09 0.14 0.05 0.21 0.29 0.09
Observations 3,426 59 357 3,927 2,013 182
NP = Nonprofit; FP = For-profit; 2 = two yr. or less; 4 = four yr.
140
Table 19: MNL for Attainment with First PS School Type: NLSY
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Att Coll Associates Bachelors Adv Deg
Black 0.12∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -0.01
Hispanic 0.07∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗ -0.01 -0.02
Asian or PI -0.03 -0.05 0.02 0.06∗∗
Native American 0.01 -0.02 0.10 -0.09
Multiple races -0.00 -0.02 0.03 -0.00
Male 0.09∗∗∗ -0.01 -0.03∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗
Low income 0.04∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗ -0.03∗
Mid income -0.01 0.03∗∗ -0.02 0.00
Mother has no degree 0.14∗∗∗ 0.03∗ -0.07∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗
Mother has HS diploma 0.12∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗
Mother has some college 0.05∗∗∗ 0.01 -0.01 -0.05∗∗∗
PrivNP2 school -0.07 0.04 0.09 -0.06
PrivFP2 school 0.03 0.10∗∗∗ -0.06 -0.07
Pub4 school -0.16∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗
PrivNP4 school -0.23∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗
PrivFP4 school 0.02 -0.04 0.11∗ -0.09
Adjusted R2
Observations 4478 4478 4478 4478
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 20: MNL for Attainment with First PS School Type: ELS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No credential Certificate Associates College+
White (Omitted)
Black 0.03∗∗ -0.00 -0.03∗∗∗ -0.00
Latino/a 0.03∗∗ -0.01 -0.00 -0.01
Asian -0.00 -0.02∗ -0.04∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗
Native 0.07 0.01 -0.01 -0.07
Multiple races 0.04∗ -0.00 -0.00 -0.04∗
Male 0.06∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ -0.01 -0.02∗∗
High income (Omitted)
Low income 0.05∗∗∗ 0.02 0.02∗ -0.08∗∗∗
Middle income 0.01 0.00 0.03∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗
Public, 2 year or less (Omitted)
Nonprofit, 2 year or less -0.05 0.02 -0.03 0.06
For-profit, 2 year or less 0.04 0.12∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ -0.21∗∗∗
Public, 4 year -0.08∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗
Nonprofit, 4 year -0.10∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗
For-profit, 4 year -0.06∗ -0.03 0.01 0.08∗∗∗
Controls for mother’s education Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls for academic ability Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 10,078 10,078 10,078 10,078
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 21: MNL for First PS School Type: NLSY
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pub2 FP2 Pub4 NP4 FP4
Coll exp 25-50 -0.01 0.03 0.10 -0.08 -0.03∗∗
Coll exp 50-75 -0.21∗∗∗ 0.02 0.21∗∗ 0.01 -0.03∗∗
Coll exp 75-100 -0.28∗∗∗ 0.00 0.26∗∗∗ 0.04 -0.03∗∗∗
Black -0.05 0.01 0.05∗ -0.01 -0.00
Hispanic 0.07∗∗ 0.02 -0.03 -0.06∗ 0.00
Asian or PI -0.11 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.02
Native American 1.50 0.22 1.70 -3.50 0.09
Multiple races 0.69 -0.63 0.12 0.01 -0.19
Male -0.01 -0.02 0.03 0.00 -0.00
Low income 0.07∗ 0.03 -0.05 -0.07∗∗∗ 0.03
Mid income 0.03 0.02 -0.02 -0.06∗∗∗ 0.03
Mother no degree 0.14∗∗∗ 0.05∗ -0.10∗∗ -0.08∗∗ 0.00
Mother has HS diploma 0.09∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗ -0.08∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗ 0.01
Mother has some college 0.07∗∗ 0.02 -0.05 -0.04∗ -0.00
GPA 3 and up -0.34 -0.09 0.26 -0.03 0.20
GPA 2-3 -0.16 -0.04 0.08 -0.10 0.21
GPA 1-2 0.09 -0.02 -0.23 -0.04 0.20
Adjusted R2
Observations 1645 1645 1645 1645 1645
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Exp bach plus, 2011 0.62
(0.49)
Exp. earnings, no diploma 15.39
(8.14)
Exp. earnings, HS diploma 20.16
(13.60)
Exp. earnings, certificate 27.12
(18.37)
Exp. earnings, Associate’s 33.23
(22.08)
Exp. earnings, Bachelor’s 49.93
(32.82)
Thinks def capable of BA 0.49
Fin aid: will qual 0.43
Fin aid: won’t qual 0.26
Fin aid: unsure 0.31
Plans bach enroll, 2009 0.53
Observations 23495
HSLS means for postsecondary school type indicator variables, adverse shocks, and expectations.
NP = Nonprofit; FP = For-profit; Pub = Public; Priv = Private; 2 = two yr. or less; 4 = four
yr. “Shocks” variables are sums of various types of adverse shocks over the relevant time period as
described in the text. Expected earnings are in thousands of dollars per year. Standard deviations
included below means in parentheses where relevant.
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Table 23: MNL for First PS Program Type Given Plan to Enroll in Four-
Year: HSLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pub2 FP2 Pub4 NP4 FP4
Exp bach plus, 2011 -0.09∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗ 0.06∗ 0.05∗ 0.01
Break: Academic 0.68 -0.19 2.07 -1.86 0.04
Break: Family 0.08∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.12 -0.00
Break: Financial 0.10∗∗ 0.01 -0.13 -0.03 0.02∗∗∗
Break: Work 0.03 0.01 0.04 -0.13 0.01
Break: Unknown 0.07 0.00 -0.12 0.07 -0.10
Thinks def capable of BA -0.02 -0.00 0.02 0.01 -0.00
Fin aid: will qual 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Fin aid: won’t qual -0.01 -0.00 0.05∗∗ -0.04∗∗ 0.00
Fin aid: unsure -0.02 -0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.00
Black -0.09∗∗∗ -0.00 0.04 0.07∗∗∗ 0.01∗
Hispanic 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.02 0.00
Asian, HI, PI -0.10∗∗∗ 0.01 0.11∗∗∗ -0.03 0.00
Native American -0.00 -0.14 0.15 0.07 -0.09
Multiple races 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.01∗∗
Male 0.01 -0.02∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ -0.02∗ -0.00
Low income 0.09∗∗∗ 0.01 -0.05∗ -0.05∗∗ 0.00
Mid income 0.07∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ -0.03∗ 0.00
Mother no degree 0.12∗∗∗ 0.01 -0.00 -0.11∗∗ -0.00
Mother has HS diploma 0.05∗∗∗ 0.01∗ -0.03 -0.03∗∗ -0.00
Mother has Associate’s 0.07∗∗∗ -0.00 -0.04∗ -0.03∗ -0.01
GPA: Academic -0.09∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ -0.01∗
GPA: CTE -0.02∗ -0.00 0.04∗∗ -0.01 -0.00
Math score -0.05∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.00
Adjusted R2
Observations 3768 3768 3768 3768 3768
“Break” variables indicate that the respondent took a break from school for the stated reason. “Fin
aid” variables regard respondents’ expectations for educational financial aid qualification. “CTE”
indicates Career and Technical Education.
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Table 24: MNL for First PS Program Type Given Plan to Enroll in Four-
Year: HSLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pub2 FP2 Pub4 NP4 FP4
Exp bach plus, 2011 -0.17 -0.01 0.02 0.05 0.14
Feels unsafe 0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.02 0.00
Shocks, 09-11 0.02∗∗ 0.00 -0.03∗∗ 0.02 -0.00
Thinks def capable of BA -0.00 -0.00 0.01 -0.00 -0.01
Black -0.09∗∗∗ -0.00 0.04 0.09∗∗∗ 0.01
Hispanic -0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.03 -0.00
Asian, HI, PI -0.09∗∗ 0.02 0.08∗ 0.02 -0.00
Native American 0.04 -0.20 -0.01 0.23 -0.13
Multiple races -0.00 0.02∗ -0.06 0.03 0.02∗∗
Male 0.01 -0.02∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ -0.04∗ -0.00
Low income -0.01 0.21 -0.09 -0.10 0.00
Mid income -0.02 0.22 -0.14 -0.05 0.00
Mother no degree 0.16∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.09 -0.07 0.00
Mother has HS diploma 0.08∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.06∗∗ -0.02 -0.00
Mother has Associate’s 0.10∗∗∗ -0.01 -0.06∗ -0.03 -0.01
GPA: Academic -0.08∗∗∗ -0.00 0.06∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ -0.01
GPA: CTE -0.03∗ -0.01∗∗ 0.07∗∗ -0.01 -0.00
Math score -0.05∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.00
Adjusted R2
Observations 1564 1564 1564 1564 1564
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 25: MNL for Attainment: NLSY
(1) (2) (3)
Att Coll Associates Bach or More
Coll exp 25-50 -0.05 0.02 0.04
Coll exp 50-75 -0.09 -0.03 0.12∗
Coll exp 75-100 -0.16∗∗∗ -0.04 0.20∗∗∗
Black 0.05∗ -0.06∗∗ 0.01
Hispanic 0.10∗∗∗ -0.01 -0.08∗∗
Asian or PI -0.05 -0.07 0.12
Native American 0.02 0.00 -0.02
Multiple races 0.09 -0.01 -0.08
Male 0.06∗∗ -0.03 -0.03
Low income 0.04 0.07∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗
Mid income -0.02 0.06∗∗ -0.04
Mother no degree 0.15∗∗∗ 0.07∗ -0.21∗∗∗
Mother has HS diploma 0.14∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗ -0.20∗∗∗
Mother has some college 0.07∗ 0.05∗ -0.12∗∗∗
GPA 3 and up -2.24 -0.90 3.14
GPA 2-3 -2.10 -0.84 2.94
GPA 1-2 -1.81 -0.81 2.61
Adjusted R2
Observations 1467 1467 1467
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 26: MNL for Attainment with First PS School Type: NLSY
(1) (2) (3)
Att Coll Associates Bach or More
Coll exp 25-50 -0.04 0.02 0.02
Coll exp 50-75 -0.04 -0.02 0.05
Coll exp 75-100 -0.09 -0.01 0.10
Black 0.06∗∗ -0.06∗∗ -0.00
Hispanic 0.09∗∗ -0.03 -0.06
Asian or PI -0.04 -0.06 0.10
Native American -0.07 0.00 0.07
Multiple races 0.07 -0.02 -0.05
Male 0.06∗∗∗ -0.03 -0.04
Low income 0.01 0.06∗ -0.06∗
Mid income -0.04 0.05∗ -0.01
Mother no degree 0.10∗∗ 0.03 -0.13∗∗∗
Mother has HS diploma 0.10∗∗∗ 0.03 -0.13∗∗∗
Mother has some college 0.05 0.03 -0.08∗∗
GPA 3 and up -2.09 -0.71 2.80
GPA 2-3 -1.99 -0.70 2.69
GPA 1-2 -1.76 -0.70 2.45
PrivNP2 school -0.06 0.07 -0.00
PrivFP2 school 0.03 0.04 -0.07
Pub4 school -0.10∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗
PrivNP4 school -0.18∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗
PrivFP4 school 0.95 -1.59 0.65
Adjusted R2
Observations 1431 1431 1431
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
148
Table 27: NLSY Adverse Shock Summary Stats By Attainment
All No Deg HS Some Coll College
Absent mother 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02
Absent father 0.28 0.37 0.33 0.28 0.19
Changed schools 0.11 0.17 0.14 0.11 0.05
Break-in by 18 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.07
Bullied by 18 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.09
Seen shooting by 18 0.12 0.21 0.16 0.13 0.05
Parent died 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.02
Other family died 0.51 0.52 0.54 0.50 0.48
Parent hospitalized 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.09
Parent jailed 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01
Parents divorced 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07
Parent unemp 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08
Victim of crime 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.04
Ever homeless, 97-02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.00
Sibling count 1.45 1.71 1.56 1.43 1.24
Observations 8984 969 2897 2731 2355
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Table 28: Ordered Probit for Expectations: ELS
Black -0.15 0.10 0.17 0.32∗∗∗
Hispanic -0.25∗∗ -0.08 -0.01 0.05
Asian or PI 0.13 0.15 0.04 -0.11
Native American -0.20 0.15 0.27 0.53
Multiple races -0.13 0.12 0.17 0.34
Male -0.20∗∗ -0.21∗∗∗ -0.24∗∗∗ -0.25∗∗∗
No mother or female guardian in HH 0.00 0.00 0.00
No father or male guardian in HH -0.04 0.06 0.12
Changed schools -0.52∗∗∗ -0.50∗∗∗ -0.47∗∗
Parent died -0.18 -0.07 -0.05
Other family died -0.03 -0.02 -0.05
Parent hospitalized 0.23 0.24 0.22
Parent incarcerated 0.08 0.09 0.17
Parents divorced -0.33∗∗ -0.30∗ -0.31∗∗
Parent unemp -0.09 -0.05 -0.06
stuhhsibcnt -0.09∗∗ -0.07∗∗ -0.07∗
Break-in by 18 0.56∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗
Bullied by 18 0.00 0.01 -0.00
Seen shooting by 18 -0.26∗∗ -0.24∗ -0.17
Feels unsafe -0.43∗∗∗ -0.42∗∗∗ -0.39∗∗∗
Victim of crime -0.12 -0.09 -0.12
Low income -0.43∗∗∗ -0.34∗∗
Mid income -0.21∗ -0.15
Mother has no degree -0.10 -0.05
Mother has HS diploma -0.35∗∗∗ -0.31∗∗∗
Mother has some college 0.00 0.00






HS -1.93∗∗∗ -2.87∗∗∗ -3.18∗∗∗ -8.10
Some College -1.38∗∗∗ -2.26∗∗∗ -2.56∗∗∗ -7.46
Bachelor’s -0.90∗∗∗ -1.75∗∗∗ -2.04∗∗∗ -6.91
Adjusted R2
Observations 1159 1159 1159 1159
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 29: LPM for Expectation Change from College to Less Than College:
ELS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Black 0.03∗∗ 0.01 -0.01 -0.10∗∗∗
Hispanic 0.10∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ -0.02∗
Asian or PI -0.05∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗
Native American 0.05 0.02 -0.00 -0.06
Multiple races 0.05∗∗ 0.03∗ 0.02 -0.01
Male 0.03∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
Family shocks 0.01 -0.00 -0.02∗
Victimization shocks 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗
Low income 0.08∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗
Mid income 0.03∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗
Mother has no degree 0.19∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗
Mother has HS diploma 0.14∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗






Constant 0.12∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ -0.01 0.80∗∗∗
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.15
Observations 7747 7747 7747 7747
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 30: Attainment Expectations by Expectations for Other Future
Events, 75th Percentile: NLSY
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Victim Arrest Death Pregnancy Drunk
mean/sd mean/sd mean/sd mean/sd mean/sd mean/sd
Coll exp 0-25 0.13 0.16 0.18 0.14 0.19 0.18
(0.34) (0.36) (0.39) (0.35) (0.39) (0.39)
Coll exp 25-50 0.18 0.22 0.26 0.22 0.26 0.19
(0.38) (0.42) (0.44) (0.41) (0.44) (0.39)
Coll exp 50-75 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.14
(0.33) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.37) (0.35)
Coll exp 75-100 0.56 0.48 0.41 0.49 0.39 0.49
(0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50)
Par exp 0-25 0.14 0.18 0.20 0.17 0.21 0.19
(0.35) (0.38) (0.40) (0.37) (0.41) (0.39)
Par exp 25-50 0.25 0.31 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.27
(0.43) (0.46) (0.46) (0.46) (0.46) (0.44)
Par exp 50-75 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.11
(0.31) (0.30) (0.30) (0.29) (0.31) (0.32)
Par exp 75-100 0.50 0.42 0.39 0.44 0.37 0.43
(0.50) (0.49) (0.49) (0.50) (0.48) (0.50)
Observations 3546 673 797 825 823 854
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Table 31: Ordered Probit for Student Expectations: NLSY
Exp: crime victim 0.10 0.22 0.19 0.17
Exp: arrest -0.82∗∗∗ -0.59∗∗∗ -0.69∗∗∗ -0.62∗∗∗
Exp: death -0.19 -0.32∗∗ -0.29∗∗ -0.26∗
Exp: pregnancy -0.78∗∗∗ -0.64∗∗∗ -0.56∗∗∗ -0.51∗∗∗
Exp: get drunk 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.11
Absent mother 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Absent father -0.22∗∗∗ -0.21∗∗∗ -0.08 -0.05
Changed schools -0.19∗∗ -0.15 -0.13 -0.09
Parent died -0.27∗ -0.23 -0.14 -0.15
Parent hospitalized 0.41∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗
Parent jailed -0.34∗ -0.21 -0.18 -0.12
Parents divorced -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12
Sibling count -0.08∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗
Feels unsafe -0.29∗∗∗ -0.28∗∗∗ -0.26∗∗∗ -0.24∗∗∗
Victim of crime -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.07
Demographics No Yes Yes Yes Yes
SES controls No No No Yes Yes
Mom’s ed. controls No No No Yes Yes
GPA controls No No No No Yes
Observations 1958 1958 1958 1958 1958
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Table 32: College Attainment on Expectations for Other Events: NLSY
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
College grad College grad College grad College grad College grad
Expect: victim of crime -0.04 -0.06 -0.05 0.01 0.01
Expect: arrest -0.22∗∗∗ -0.09 -0.06 -0.04 0.01
Expect: death -0.10∗ -0.07 -0.07 -0.08∗ -0.06
Expect: pregnancy -0.23∗∗∗ -0.11∗ -0.00 0.02 0.04
Expect: get drunk 0.00 -0.01 -0.06∗ -0.06∗ -0.03
Coll exp 25-50 0.06∗∗ 0.04 0.04 0.04
Coll exp 50-75 0.23∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗
Coll exp 75-100 0.40∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗
Black -0.06∗∗ -0.02 0.02
Hispanic -0.11∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗
Asian or PI 0.14∗ 0.14∗ 0.10
Native American -0.05 0.05 0.02
Multiple races -0.12 -0.11 -0.08
Male -0.06∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗ -0.03
Low income -0.16∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗
Mid income -0.06∗ -0.04 -0.04
Mother has no degree -0.31∗∗∗ -0.30∗∗∗ -0.25∗∗∗
Mother has HS diploma -0.28∗∗∗ -0.28∗∗∗ -0.24∗∗∗
Mother has some college -0.19∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗
Break-in by 18 -0.06∗∗ -0.03
Bullied by 18 -0.04 -0.04
Seen shooting by 18 -0.06∗∗ -0.05∗
Feels unsafe -0.08∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗
Victim of crime -0.01 -0.00
Ever homeless, 1997-2002 -0.15∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗
No mother or female guardian in HH 0.00 0.00
No father or male guardian in HH -0.03 -0.01
Changed schools -0.08∗∗∗ -0.06∗
Parent died -0.07 -0.08∗
Other family died -0.02 -0.03
Parent hospitalized -0.03 -0.03
Parent jailed -0.08 -0.04
Parents divorced -0.04 -0.04
Parent unemp -0.00 0.02
Sibling count -0.01 -0.01
GPA 3 and up 0.38∗∗∗
GPA 2-3 0.14∗∗∗
GPA 1-2 0.04
Constant 0.40∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗
Adjusted R2 0.02 0.13 0.23 0.26 0.32
Observations 1954 1954 1954 1954 1954
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 33: Ordered Probit for Categorical GPA: ELS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Final GPA Final GPA Final GPA Final GPA
Final GPA
Black -0.69∗∗∗ -0.55∗∗∗ -0.20∗∗∗ -0.20∗∗∗
Hispanic -0.51∗∗∗ -0.43∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗
Asian or PI 0.12∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗
Native American -0.55∗∗∗ -0.41∗∗∗ -0.13 -0.13
Multiple races -0.29∗∗∗ -0.24∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗
Male -0.33∗∗∗ -0.33∗∗∗ -0.39∗∗∗ -0.40∗∗∗
No mother in HH -0.16∗∗∗ -0.06 -0.06
No father in HH -0.24∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗
Changed schools -0.36∗∗∗ -0.30∗∗∗ -0.30∗∗∗
Unsafe neighborhood -0.16∗∗∗ -0.08 -0.07
Feels unsafe -0.33∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗
Moderate crime -0.11∗∗∗ -0.05∗ -0.04
High crime -0.23∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗ -0.12∗∗
Reading test score 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
Math test score 0.04∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗
Low income 0.01
Mid income -0.01
Mother has no degree -0.23∗∗∗
Mother has HS diploma -0.18∗∗∗
Mother has some college -0.15∗∗∗
Adjusted R2
Observations 12606 12606 12606 12606
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 34: OLS for Senior GPA on Freshman GPA: NLSY
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GPA Yr 4, Std GPA Yr 4, Std GPA Yr 4, Std GPA Yr 4, Std
Black -0.46∗∗∗ -0.33∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗
Hispanic -0.29∗∗∗ -0.24∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -0.07∗
Asian or PI 0.12 0.11 -0.08 -0.10
Native American -0.42∗ -0.34 -0.13 -0.11
Multiple races -0.24 -0.24 -0.17 -0.17
Male -0.35∗∗∗ -0.36∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗ -0.19∗∗∗
No mother or female guardian in HH 0.00 0.00 0.00
No father or male guardian in HH -0.19∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗
Changed schools -0.06 0.01 0.01
Parent died 0.01 0.06 0.07
Other family died 0.00 0.03 0.03
Parent hospitalized 0.08 0.03 0.02
Parent jailed -0.43∗∗∗ -0.38∗∗∗ -0.37∗∗∗
Parents divorced 0.01 0.00 0.01
Parent unemp -0.07 -0.05 -0.04
Sibling count -0.03∗∗ -0.01 -0.00
Break-in by 18 -0.07 -0.06 -0.06
Bullied by 18 -0.03 0.04 0.04
Seen shooting by 18 -0.11∗∗ -0.02 -0.01
Feels unsafe -0.11∗∗∗ -0.04∗ -0.04∗
Victim of crime -0.20∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗ -0.14∗∗
Ever homeless, 1997-2002 -0.34∗ -0.15 -0.16
GPA Yr 1, Std 0.58∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗
Low income 0.01
Mid income 0.05
Mother has no degree -0.19∗∗∗
Mother has HS diploma -0.15∗∗∗
Mother has some college -0.16∗∗∗
Constant 0.35∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗
Adjusted R2 0.06 0.09 0.34 0.34
Observations 4076 4076 4076 4076
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 35: College Attainment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
College College College College College College College
Coll exp 25-50 0.05∗∗ 0.04 0.06∗∗ 0.04 0.06∗∗ 0.06∗∗ 0.04
Coll exp 50-75 0.24∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗
Coll exp 75-100 0.42∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗
Black -0.06∗∗ -0.06∗∗ -0.02
Hispanic -0.11∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗
Asian or PI 0.15∗∗ 0.14∗ 0.14∗
Native American -0.04 -0.05 0.05
Multiple races -0.12 -0.12 -0.11
Male -0.06∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗
Low income -0.16∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗
Mid income -0.06∗ -0.06∗ -0.04
Mother no degree -0.31∗∗∗ -0.31∗∗∗ -0.30∗∗∗
Mother HS diploma -0.28∗∗∗ -0.28∗∗∗ -0.28∗∗∗
Mother some college -0.18∗∗∗ -0.19∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗
Expect: victim of crime -0.06 -0.05 0.02 0.01
Expect: arrest -0.09 -0.06 -0.04 -0.04
Expect: death -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.08∗
Expect: pregnancy -0.11∗ -0.00 -0.05 0.02
Expect: get drunk -0.01 -0.06∗ -0.03 -0.06∗
Break-in by 18 -0.05∗ -0.05∗ -0.06∗∗
Bullied by 18 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04
Seen shooting by 18 -0.11∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗
Feels unsafe -0.09∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗
Victim of crime -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
Ever homeless, 1997-2002 -0.17∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗
No mother in HH 0.00 0.00 0.00
No father in HH -0.08∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ -0.03
Changed schools -0.09∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗
Parent died -0.10∗ -0.09∗ -0.07
Other family died -0.03∗ -0.03∗ -0.02
Parent hospitalized -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
Parent jailed -0.08 -0.07 -0.08
Parents divorced -0.03 -0.03 -0.04
Parent unemp -0.02 -0.01 -0.00
Sibling count -0.03∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ -0.01
Constant 0.04∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗
Adjusted R2 0.12 0.23 0.13 0.23 0.18 0.18 0.26
Observations 1954 1954 1954 1954 1954 1954 1954
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 36: 2SLS for College Attainment and Categorical Attainment Ex-
pectations
(1)
College grad Expect: college (cat.)
Expect: college (cat.) 0.14∗∗
Black -0.04 0.30∗∗∗
Hispanic -0.08∗∗∗ 0.07
Asian or PI 0.05 0.35∗∗
Native American -0.03 0.05
Multiple races -0.06 0.04
Male -0.06∗∗∗ -0.21∗∗∗
Low income -0.10∗∗∗ -0.35∗∗∗
Mid income -0.03 -0.15∗∗
Mother no degree -0.26∗∗∗ -0.72∗∗∗
Mother HS diploma -0.25∗∗∗ -0.54∗∗∗
Mother some college -0.17∗∗∗ -0.34∗∗∗
No mother in HH 0.00 0.00
No father in HH -0.02 -0.08∗
Changed schools -0.07∗∗ -0.10
Parent died -0.06 -0.13
Other family died -0.03∗ 0.01
Parent hospitalized -0.06∗ 0.19∗∗∗
Parent jailed -0.05 -0.17
Parents divorced -0.04 -0.03
Parent unemp 0.01 0.05
Sibling count -0.01 -0.04∗∗
Break-in by 18 -0.05∗∗ 0.10
Bullied by 18 -0.02 0.00
Seen shooting by 18 -0.07∗∗∗ -0.02
Feels unsafe -0.06∗∗∗ -0.19∗∗∗
Victim of crime -0.01 -0.07







∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Appendix for Chapter 3



















2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Year
Each line represents the child care subsidy trajectory of a specific state or state group. Lines on
this graph represent the eleven states in the top quartile of the standard deviation of their subsidy
maximum over time.
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Table 37: Summary Statistics
All Male Female
Wage 15.27 16.90 13.56
Log wage 2.60 2.72 2.48
CC maximum 125.63 125.28 125.93
Union 0.15 0.19 0.10
Quit rate (pct) 0.31 0.24 0.37
Hispanic 0.16 0.16 0.15
Black 0.13 0.12 0.14
Other NWNH 0.04 0.04 0.05
Disability 0.13 0.13 0.14
Married 0.62 0.61 0.62
HS Grad 0.40 0.41 0.39
Some college 0.48 0.46 0.50
Age 41.43 41.01 41.83
Observations 48216 22051 26165
Table 38: Wages, Child Care Subsidies, and Union Concentration
All Male Female All Male Female
Female -.232∗∗∗ . . -.230∗∗∗ . .
Union member .259∗∗∗ .290∗∗∗ .202∗∗∗ .254∗∗∗ .288∗∗∗ .194∗∗∗
CC rate -.006 -.008 -.002 -.011 -.005 -.021∗
Union concentration . . . .0009∗∗∗ .0005 .002∗∗∗
CCxUC . . . .0002 -.0002 .001∗∗∗
Const. 2.149∗∗∗ 2.011∗∗∗ 2.099∗∗∗ 2.148∗∗∗ 2.013∗∗∗ 2.082∗∗∗
Obs. 1020923 501045 519878 1020864 501033 519831
OLS estimates of Equation 3.7. Observations include all working sample members without a college
degree. Covariates include race, marital status, education, age and age squared, occupational
category, state-year policy variables for workers’ compensation, unemployment insurance, and
minimum wage, and fixed effects for year, state of residence, and occupation. *p < 0.10, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 39: OLS with Right-to-Work and 2SLS
First All Male Female
Female -.031∗∗∗ -.244∗∗∗ . .
CC rate -.003 -.009 -.003 -.020∗
Union concentration .008∗∗∗ . . .
CCxUC .00004 . . .
Union member . .323∗∗∗ .314∗∗∗ .411∗∗∗
CCxUM . .018 -.021 .151∗∗∗
Const. -.092 1.883∗∗∗ 1.752∗∗∗ 1.825∗∗∗
FS F-test . 57.31 36.69 22.92
Obs. 996785 996785 490815 505970
2SLS estimates of Equation 3.8 (right panel). Observations include all working sample members
without a college degree. Covariates include race, marital status, education, age and age squared,
occupational category, state-year policy variables for workers’ compensation, unemployment insur-
ance, and minimum wage, and fixed effects for year, state of residence, and occupation. *p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Figure 10:
Percent change in wage offers to female applicants between no-subsidy and maximum-subsidy
scenarios, at different levels of α.
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Rendon, Śılvio. 2006. “Job Search and Asset Accumulation under Borrowing Constraints.”
International Economic Review 47 (1):233–263.
Rosenbaum, James. 2015. “The New Forgotten Half and Research Directions to Support
Them.” .
Sattinger, Michael. 1998. “Statistical Discrimination with Employment Criteria.” Interna-
tional Economic Review 39 (1):205–237.
Smart, Michael and Nicholas Klein. 2015. “A Longitudinal Analysis of Cars, Transit, and
Employment Outcomes.” Mineta Transportation Institute Publications .
Snyder, Thomas D. and Sally A. Dillow. 2011. “Digest of Education Statistics.”
Sojourner, Aaron J., Brigham R. Frandsen, Robert J. Town, David C. Grabowski, and
Min M. Chen. 2015. “Impacts of Unionization on Quality and Productivity: Regression
Discontinuity Evidence from Nursing Homes.” Industrial and Labor Relations Review
68 (4):771–806.
Stewart, Mark. 2007. “The Interrelated Dynamics of Unemployment and Low—Wage Em-
ployment.” Journal of Applied Econometrics 22:511–531.
Stinebrickner, Ralph and Todd Stinebrickner. 2008. “The Effect of Credit Constraints on the
College Drop-Out Decision: A Direct Approach Using a New Panel Study.” The American
Economic Review 98 (5):2163–2184.
Tekin, Erdal. 2007. “Childcare Subsidies, Wages, and Employment of Single Mothers.”
Journal of Human Resources 42 (2):453–487.
United States Congress. 1990. “Child Care and Development Block Grant Act of 1990.”
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/occ/ccdbgact.pdf.
171
van den Berg, Gerard J. 2001. “Duration Models: Specification, Identification, and Multiple
Durations.” In Handbook of Econometrics, vol. 5, edited by James Heckman and Edward
Leamer. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1 ed.
Waldman, J. Deane, Frank Kelly, Sanjeev Arora, and Howard L. Smith. 2004. “The Shocking
Cost of Turnover in Health Care.” Health Care Management Review 29 (1):2–7.
Wiswall, Matthew and Basit Zafar. 2015. “Determinants of College Major Choice: Identifica-
tion Using an Information Experiment.” The Review of Economic Studies 82 (2):791–824.
172
Curriculum Vitae
Andrew Gray graduated with bachelor’s degrees in Economics and Anthropology via the
Glynn Family Honors Program at the University of Notre Dame in 2010. He joined the
Johns Hopkins University doctoral program in Economics in 2013, and earned awards for
undergraduate teaching and research seminar contributions in 2018 and 2019. His research
interests lie in labor economics, the economics of education, structural microeconomics,
and individual economic precarity in general. He is joining the Olin Business School at
Washington University in St. Louis as a postdoctoral research scholar in July 2019.
173
